民主 — 从古代到现代的一般发展途径

民主 — 从古代到现代的一般发展途径
民主 — 从古代到现代的一般发展途径
(本文的中文译文将在不久后发表.)
Democracy: From Ancient to Modern Times
Lin, Ershen
June 13, 2007
Democracy in the Modern Time
After the breakup of the USSR, democracy is typically considered to represent the future of the world; every country will sooner or later become part of a global democratic system, which, together with a global free-trade capitalism, will realize the Utopia on the earth that the communist theory had promised but failed to deliver. Unfortunately, failure of the democratic experiments in Iraq and Afghanistan has created a strong doubt about the promise of a worldwide paradise of democracy in the near future.
Even during the Cold War, many already credit democracy for every success of the west, or the lack of it in totalitarian countries for every failure. Comparisons have been made between East Germany and West Germany, North Korea and South Korea, China and Taiwan to prove the superiority of the capitalism as well as democracy.
But this logic is a double-edge sword. Rapid growth and development in Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore actually took place before democracy was established, which is consistent with the more recent experience in China and Vietnam. This phenomenon becomes all the more striking considering some countries in this region that has already nominally established a capitalist economy and a democracy but cannot yet rid themselves of hunger, illiteracy, corruption, and mass unemployment; it has prompt some (including certain Asians leaders) to credit the totalitarian system with the virtue of facilitating growth and development in the early stage, possibly as a result of a higher efficiency afforded by such a system. This theory seems to be backed up by the economic mess in Russia and eastern Europe after introduction of capitalism and democracy. Attempts were made to explain away these observations, but the damage is already done.
Obviously, the contradictory conclusions are the results of the simplistic method adopted by both sides: a simple cause-and-effect relation was assumed to exist between the political system and the socio-economic development. This approach is loved by the political propagandists of all persuasions, but has little use for a serious academic investigation.
In reality, more useful understanding could be obtained by comparing the countries in which democracy work well in both political and economic arena with those where democracy fails to live up to its expectation. The first group naturally includes the OECD countries. The second group includes most of the countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa where a democratic system has been formally adopted.
There is a correlation between a high level of socio-economic development and the realization of political liberty: by both the economic and the political standard, the first group is more successful than the second. A Marxist will probably use this correlation to support their doctrine of economic determinism, although such a correlation by itself proves nothing.
An interesting fact is that all of the countries in the first group are primarily western countries, meaning they share a common cultural heritage rooted in the Greek tradition whereas those countries in the second group do not share this cultural heritage. Russia and eastern Europe, which just started to adopt the democratic system in 1990';s, are "western" in terms of their ethnic, linguistic and religious affiliations, but their lack of a democratic tradition suggest they actually do not belong to the first group.
Perhaps the indigenous culture is an important factor in determining the success of the democratic system: some are compatible with democracy, some do not, and some are in between. The indigenous culture apparently possesses a self-defense system that can reject incompatible cultural elements, very much like an immune system can reject transplanted organs, a kind of cultural immunity. This is the first hypothesis regarding a political system; the conclusion is obviously applicable to all kinds of political systems.
What about the East Asian culture? Should we consider it compatible to the western democracy? I suspect the answer is negative; otherwise democracy should not have encountered so many obstacles in China. As matter of fact, the democratic institutions were introduced in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan after industrialization.
These observations lead to the second hypothesis: industrialization can overcome the rejection by the indigenous culture. It seems that industrialization creates a condition not un-similar to immune suppression. Whether this hypothesis could be applied to other countries without a democratic tradition requires further proof.
The first test ground for this hypothesis will be Russia and eastern Europe, where the industrialization has essentially completed, and their cultural heritage is not so dramatically different from western Europe. Perhaps China and Vietnam will follow their footsteps in not so distant a future based on the experience in Taiwan. As for Iraq and Afghanistan, the prognoses may not be so optimistic. There is much Americans can do to change the dramatically different cultural heritage which determines their respective social morphology, and this will remain so even if the US army manages to destroy all the armed resistance there. For these societies, even industrialization might not be sufficient to overcome their cultural immunity.
In summary, modern democracy could be successfully adopted if at least one of the two preconditions is met: (1) an indigenous culture of the western origin, or (2) industrialization prior to adoption of the democratic system. The fundamental issue here is the self-defense mechanism of the indigenous culture if it is incompatible with democracy.
Since the cultural factor is important for the success of democracy, it would be highly instructive to inquire about the cultural environment in which the very idea of democracy sprang up in the first place. This will be the subject matter in our next step of investigation.
Democracy in Its Ancient Origin
As a form of government, democracy means self-governing of the people at the state level. The statement above implies two exclusions: (1) local or professional organizations of autonomous nature (e.g., university faculties) do not qualify as democratic governments even though these organizations may be considered as democratic institutions; (2) assemblies or councils of elders for the purpose of political consultations, which apparently existed in many different part of the ancient world (e.g., Mesopotamia, China, India, American Indian tribes) before the formation of nation-state, do not qualify as democratic governments. Unfortunately, institutions of this kind have often been misinterpreted and misrepresented by adventurous modern historians as evidence of ancient democracy. In reality, these assemblies or councils were power structures of oligarchy in proper sense. In addition, careful studies always reveal that these structures widely existed before the formation of the state; there was no government at the state level to be considered. Disappearance of these institutions and the rise of nation-state were parallel developments in history. However, remnants of such institutions could be found in recent ethnographic studies.
Obviously, democracy is a unique creation in the ancient world of Aegean, which never arose independently in any other ancient civilizations. The uniqueness of this development rests not only on the absence of such a form of government in other parts of the world but also on the fact that it moved against the general trend of increasing power concentration during the rise of the nation-state and the empire. Therefore, it is of great interest to follow the historical progress leading up to the creation of democracy, albeit nothing more than tracing of the outline will be attempted here. We hope that certain important factors in the process could be identified.
After the Dark Age, the Aegean world was occupied by three ethnic groups: the Dorian, the Ionian and the Aeolian. The Dorian possessed the Crete, Rhodes, the Peloponnese, and the southern part of the west coast of Asia Minor. The Ionian occupied the middle part of the west coast of Asia Minor, the Aeolian, the northern part. They were all under the system of monarchy in the form of early city-states, mostly along the coastline of Mediterranean.
The Dorians apparently were of the latecomers among the three groups, probably descended from the invaders at the end of the Bronze Age. As the conqueror, they considered themselves superior to the other groups. But it is Ionian who was the best achiever in navigation, trade, and, in the later days, in philosophy and science.
Unlike the ancient Egyptian or the Chinese, the different ethnic groups of the ancient Aegean were never unified and lacked a common national identity. The rivalries and conflicts between the different ethnic groups are of great importance to its later history of development and the rise of democracy.
The Aegean was the center of commerce and marine trade back at the time of Minoa, but experienced a precipitous decline after the Dorian invasion. The seventh century BC, however, started the revival of the marine trading activity conducted by the Greek, as evidenced by the introduction of coins in the Ionian area (ca. 675 BC) a quarter of a century before it arrived at the Greece proper. Even the colonization and the political alliance of the time were greatly influenced by the business activities; many of the colonies were originally trading posts. However, the colonialists never penetrated deep into the mainland and the colonies were not merged with each other. The later colonies retained its relation with a specific mother city from which the immigrants came. All these features further strengthened the political fragmentation of the Greek world.
Rise of business activities coincided more or less with the decline of monarchy and the rise of oligarchy, although this process occurred in the late eighth century BC in Athens, where the king was replaced by three elected magistrates. The rise of oligarchy means a transfer of the power from a hereditary king to a class of nobles as landowners, who formed the council. It is the beginning of the political pluralism, which, in its ultimate form, led to direct democracy.
Apparently, oligarchy was not a highly stable form of government, although it could last for a few centuries in some cases. The conflict of the rich and the poor seemed to intensify under the oligarchy with concentration of wealth and land while the poor farmers became tenant farmers or slaves. In the 7th century BC, tyranny started to take over the power, which was related to the conflict between the ruling Dorian class as the landowner and the poor farmer. The tyrants were the illegitimate rulers who tended to champion the cause of the lower class. As popular leader, tyrants were usually unable to convert tyranny to monarchy by passing their position to their heirs. Probably the greatest contribution of the tyrants was the destruction of the old nobility, a precondition for setting up a government of the populace.
In Athens, Solon reform of the early sixth century reduced economic inequality by abolishing debts, tax reform, and introduced important democratic elements such as election of archons by the assembly and trial by a jury. The power of the Council of the Areopagus consisting of the former archons and representing the aristocrats was greatly reduced. Nonetheless, Pisistratus was able to seized power in 546 BC and the tyranny lasted until his son Hippias was driven out by the Spartans in 510 BC. Whether the tyranny of Pisistratus is related to class struggle is still disputed.
In 508 BC, the Athenians drove out the Spartan army from the city, and Cleisthenes established a new political system - direct democracy, characterized by the universal right to vote for all male citizens without a property qualification and the council elected by lot. Interestingly, the reform of Cleisthenes was not achieved by democratic means. The reforms process continued into the fifth century, the most significant ones being election of archons by lot in the 487 BC and complete abolition of property qualification for higher office in 479 BC.
The general sequence of the events was from the monarchies of the city-states through oligarchy and tyranny to democracy.
The first critical element is the fact that the ethnic conflicts and the subsequent political fragmentation precluded the establishment of a unified nation and a powerful monarchy with heavenly mandates. The comparatively weak monarchies of the city-states were more dependent on the wealth created by marine trades and concentrated in the hands of the local nobles, and was eventually forced to make concessions to the ancient bourgeoisies. This process soon produced oligarchies. This was the beginning of the European mercantile tradition.
As the rulers of the oligarchies were only allowed to rule for limited terms, they were more interested in enriching themselves than ensuring a long-term political stability of the state. When the society polarized, tyranny was the reaction to the social inequality. Democracy was one of the outcomes of the tyrannical rule, albeit not the exclusive outcome – it was followed by an oligarchy in Corinth.
The sequence of events discussed above suggests that the weak political structure of the city-states combined with a mercantile tradition associated with marine trade was a necessary condition in the democratic creation in ancient Greece.
This unique combination is lacking in other ancient civilizations: most of them lacked a mercantile tradition, and some of them (e.g., Egypt and China) were unified in their pre-historical times. In Mesopotamia, Egypt, India and China, oligarchy in the true sense never existed. The cause for the dynastic changes in Mesopotamia and Egypt of the third and the second millennia BC were not sufficiently clear for a precise analysis, but resistance to the ruler seemed to play but a minor role. In China, any resistance to the rulers necessarily took the form of simultaneous peasant uprisings, which would overthrow the existing monarchy and replace it with another one if they were not brutally crashed. The merchant class in the cities was too weak to play any significant roles in the political process, which would explain why democracy never had a chance in China. Even in the Greek world, monarchy managed to survive in land-based power such as Sparta and Macedonia where marine trade and mercantilism were nonexistent. This further proves the precondition proposed above.
Democracy in the Industrial Age
After analysis on the ancient democracy, we shall attempt to analyze the development of more recent democracies to gain further insight.
(A) The Development of the British Democracy
The economic and political changes in the Great Britain after the Middle Age were very similar to the process that led to the Greek democracy. The transition actually started with the Magna Charta (1215). The monarchical power was weaken by the rise of urban centers based on commerce and the influx of precious metals from America, which reduced the royal income by inflation. The bourgeoisies gained limited autonomy for the city, followed by shifting the financial power from the king to the parliament in the seventeenth century. The Petition of Rights (1628) and the laws passed by the Long Parliament gave the Parliament the exclusive right of taxation and abolished special courts and commissions controlled by the monarch effectively established an oligarchy, which was confirmed by the victory of the Parliamentary force in the English Civil War (1642-1646). The tyranny set up by Cromwell in 1649 and lasted till 1660 further weakened the power of the king but failed to settle the issue. The restoration of 1660 took place when Richard, the son of Cromwell, failed to hold on to the power, very much like the son of the ancient tyrants. The restoration did not return the Britain to the old monarchy; what it actually established was a constitutional monarchy, a fact fully confirmed by the Glorious Revolution (1688) and the Bill of Rights (1689). This political system was an oligarchy in essence but would evolve in time into a democracy. The second stage of political liberalization took place in the nineteenth century. The Reform Bills of 1832, 1867 and 1884 gradually extended the voting right to all the male citizens, together with the introduction of the secret ballot (1872) and the right to strike (1875), finally established democracy. It is clear that the British democracy was only realized after the Industrial Revolution. Apparently, industrialization also facilitated the democratic progress in the Great Britain.
The sequence of event was from monarchy through oligarchy, tyranny, oligarchy, to democracy. Compared to the development of the Athenian democracy, the overall pathway is similar but the transition was more gradual and each stage less distinct. The existence of the second stage of oligarchy was related to the fact that the period of tyranny was rather brief and insufficient to break the hold of the old nobility. In the long term, the British system is more stable than the ancient Athenian democracy.
(B) The Development of the French Democracy
The development of democracy took a different path in France. Before the revolution of 1789, the class structure of the French society stopped the upward mobility of the bourgeoisies, who were classified as the Third Estate, together with the poor farmers and workers. An absolute monarchy ruled the country. The bourgeoisies wanted to end the privilege of the Church and the nobles, to limit the power of the monarch, and to set up a National Assembly to replace the Estates-General dominated by the clergies and the nobles. These were the original cause of the revolution whereas the financial crisis of the kingdom was merely a trigger.
In England, the period before the tyranny could be viewed as an oligarchy, but its counterpart cannot be identified in the pre-revolutionary France. Apparently, the lack of the oligarchical stage was related to the unmatched intensity of the French Revolution: a stronger feudal tradition means a stronger resistance to the revolution and a harsher repression. The tyranny ruled the revolutionary France for a sustained period; from the Jacobins'; Reign of Terror (1793) till Napoleon';s defeat at Waterloo (1815) it lasted more than twenty years and caused a war that eventually spread to the entire continent. The period that followed was essentially an oligarchy, which preserved some results of the revolution (e.g., freedom of speech, press, religion, equality among the citizens, and a parliamentary system, albeit under the king). The Second Republic was short-lived (1848-1852), the Third Republic (1870-1940) was set up during a crisis, marked by an external defeat and an internal revolt from the beginning, but managed to survived for seven decades.
While the British democracy followed an evolutionary path, the French democracy followed a revolutionary path. The general sequence was from monarchy through tyranny, oligarchy to democracy. The period of tyranny could be subdivided into two sub-periods: the first one was a revolutionary tyranny under Robespierre while the second one was a popular tyranny of more classical type under Napoleon. In this pathway, tyranny became a precondition for oligarchy, associated with a prolonged blood bath and wars. The unique features of the French Revolution were predetermined by the harsh class repression before the revolution.
(C) The Early Twentieth Century Experience – the Fascist Path
We should not forget the recent experience in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Japan.
By the early twentieth century, the political systems in these countries already shifted from monarchy to oligarchy in the form of constitutional monarchy except Germany, which was formally a republic after World War I.
The Weimar Republic born during the chaos and class conflicts after World War I should be considered an oligarchy. As the first attempt at democracy, it was a complete failure, an outcome that is hardly surprising in view of the long totalitarian tradition of the German states. The Council of People';s Commissioners (1918-1919) was an oligarchy proper, while the subsequent political development under President Ebert was heavily influenced by his alliance with the military leaders (the so-called "Ebert-Groener pact"), which could be considered a de-facto oligarchy. The political intrigues leading up to the takeover by Hitler further proved the oligarchical nature of the regime. Facilitated by the economic crisis in the early 1930';s, the oligarchy quickly degenerated into the tyranny of Hitler.
Italy unified under King Victor Emmanuel II (1861) was also an oligarchy in the sense that the power was shared between the king and the parliament, a system inherited from Sardinia. The monarchy stage has to be found in the pre-unification period.
The Fascist force taking over Italy (1922-1943) and the Nazi force taking over Germany (1933-1945) between the wars resembled the tyranny of the ancient world and those during the British and the French revolutions, although they were much more extreme forms of tyranny. By the end of the war, Germany and Italy had already experienced monarchy, oligarchy, and tyranny, the first three stages of the Athenian pathway, which made the introduction of democracy feasible.
In general, the durations of the tyranny in the Fascist countries were obviously shortened by the war, which was predetermined by the extreme form of the tyranny. However, there is no reason to believe that the final outcome would have been fundamentally different without the war. This point could be proved by the modern history of Spain.
The Spanish monarchy lasted until the First Republic (1873), followed the restoration (1874), which produced a de-facto oligarchy in the form of turnos. The system malfunctioned in 1920';s, and finally collapsed with the rise of the Second Republic (1931). The Fascist tyranny under the dictator Franco (1936-1975) was in a less extreme form, and lasted a longer time, but eventually led to democracy.
Generally speaking, the sequence of events in Germany, Italy and Spain resembled the democratic development in Athens despite the fact that the external factors were involved in the final stage in Germany and Italy.
In contrast, the development in Japan is another matter and requires a separate analysis. In Japan, the military dictatorship of shogun ruled the country whereas a monarchy in the proper sense did not existed. An oligarchy under a few noble families was established during the Meiji Restoration (1868), when the power was transferred from the military dictator to the imperial court under the control of a few powerful families. In the early twentieth century, the power was shifted to big business, and eventually to the military immediately before World War II. There is no question that Fascism in term of political and economic totalitarianism did take over the government of Japan, resembling the development in Germany. Nonetheless, a true tyranny never existed; it was a military oligarchy that was in control. In Japan, a charismatic tyrant was precluded because the emperor was still considered a demigod. The post-war constitution intended to establish a democracy, but the system quickly degenerated into a de-facto oligarchy again. Not only the big business asserted undue influences, but also the political process was under the control of one party (LDP) throughout the post-war time except the brief period of 1993-1996. Apparently, the return to oligarchy in Japan is related to the lack of a tyranny that would break the stranglehold of the old tradition.
In the future, the Japanese political system might become more democratic, but it will never be a democracy by the western definition. This outcome is most certainly related to certain unique characters of the traditional culture. When Japan copied the imperial system from China, it ended up with the shogun rule; it is thus hardily surprising that the western system of democracy will also experience some unexpected permutations there. This demonstrates both the incompatibility of the indigenous traditional culture with the imported system (either Chinese or western) and the adaptability of it under new environments, as compared to the futile reactionary response in China. In any event, the Japanese political development defies a standard analysis.
(D) The General Pathway
The analyses carried out so far reveal a general pathway of democratic development. The starting point is a monarchy or other types of autocracy, including a totalitarian government in certain form of republic, or a colonial government. The process goes through two stages: (1) oligarchy (as in the cases of ancient Greece) or de-facto oligarchy, (2) a brief period of tyranny. These two stages could occur in any order: oligarchy first, tyranny first, or tyranny sandwiched between two stages of oligarchy. The final stage is democracy. The duration of the oligarchy stage(s) is highly flexible. On the other hand, the stage of tyranny was never bypassed, and should be considered the critical stage of the development. This argument is further strengthened by the Japanese experience. From this perspective, the pathway to democracy has not changed much since the time of the ancient world.
This theory is consistent with the hypothesis proposed in the beginning. In the country with a western culture, the culture had already passed the various stage of democratic development in their homeland, and thus was ready to adopt a democratic government from the beginning. The country with a non-western culture, once it completed the stage of industrialization, has also passed the stages of oligarchy and tyranny (Japan was the sole exception), and the culture allowed further progress to democracy. In contrast, the early republican leaders in China and other Asian countries were trying to establish democracies on the ruin of autocracies, which was doomed to fail. What the US administration is trying to do in Iraq and Afghanistan today is simply to repeat the same mistake of those revolutionary leaders of the early twentieth century; the result can hardly be any better.
Instability of Democracy
Much ink has been spilled about how the Athenian democracy failed to live up to the expectation, often focused on the economic and the military affairs in relation to the Peloponnesian Wars. Actually, the first sign of trouble was none other than the reform of Pericles itself. The general was repeatedly elected to his office and gained a great influence. He used the influence to promote his political agenda, which has nothing to do with his official duty as a general. Apparently, he did so legally, but this did not change the fact that he established a de-facto autocracy, which severely undermined the democratic institution. Furthermore, the reform of Cleisthenes was not realized by democratic means, either. Clearly, the Athenian democracy was born with a congenital defect. The importance of the means used for establishing democracy can never be over-emphasized because democracy is a mean, not an end by itself. An attempt to establish a democracy by a non-democratic mean is a contradiction.
At the practical level, the autocratic rule of Pericles demonstrates how easily the people could be manipulated, which created a condition for the comeback of the oligarchy. From this perspective, it is not difficult to understand how a democracy voted itself out of existence in 411 BC. Democracy was restored after the war, but Athens never recovered its former glory.
There is certainly another contradiction in the Athenian democracy; i.e., the equality of its male citizens was rested on the inequality among the general population within Athens and the inequality of Athens with its allies. The expenses required for maintenance of the Athenian state was fed from both the surplus of the slave labour and by the contribution of the subject states within the Athenian Empire. Slavery and imperialism were among the basic features of the Athenian democracy. The revolt of the subject states determined the outcome of the wars, which reduced Athens to a second-class power.
The Athenian democracy lasted less than two centuries, counting from the reform of Cleisthenes until the invasion of Alexander. The relative short duration is related to an inherent instability of the system rather than any incidental factors.
In comparison, the evolution of the British democratic institution was a more coherent process. Starting with the Magna Charta, a trend set in to limit the power of the monarch. The process was essentially democratic and worked within the system, while the tyranny from 1649 until 1660 could be considered a brief aberration. Similar to the Athenians, the British also pursued an imperialist policy and benefited from it besides exploitation of domestic labour class especially in the early period. Unlike the situation in Athens, the class conflict and the colonialist policy did not compromise the long-term stability of the system. The gradual and democratic feature of the progress of the British democracy apparently had ensured a long-term stability of the system by giving it a greater flexibility and adaptability.
Besides the external threat, a democracy also faces internal threat. A democracy could degenerate by itself without any outside interference. In a representative democracy, the source of power could be shifted from the voters to large organizations such as big business, political parties, military, and religions. With the American democracy, this process already started in the nineteenth century, symbolized by the rise of two interdependent elements: large incorporations and party politics. Abraham Lincoln once said: "I see in the near future a crisis approaching that unnerves me and causes me to tremble for the safety of my country ... corporations have been enthroned and an era of corruption in high places will follow, and the money of the country will endeavor to prolong its reign by working upon the prejudices of the people until all wealth is aggregated in a few hands and the Republic is destroyed." Currently, the democracy in the US and some other industrialized countries is in a slow process of degeneration to oligarchies. Most of the voters are aware of this change; certain independent survey has shown that most American voters believe the US government is "THE government" instead of "our government". The process of degeneration could be facilitated by various kinds of crisis (e.g., WTC bombing) or perceived threats.
In the description above, the assumption is made that this reverse process is devolution or degeneration. Theoretically, it cannot be completely ruled out that the process might represent an evolution to a higher form of civilization under the corporate control. But in the absence of concrete evidence, invoking such a scenario is not unlike invoking the communist utopia.
Democracy in Historical Cycles
In the analyses carried out so far, development of democracies was considered as individual cases. It is also important that it is placed in a greater historical framework and investigated.
From the beginning of the recorded history, democracy has appeared two times in the stage: the first time it appeared during the peak of the Greek civilization; the second time it arrived with the modern industry and capitalism. The period between the Greek and the modern civilizations is commonly known as the Middle Age, when monarchy reigned unchallenged.
The Greek civilization represented the peak of the ancient world in terms of philosophy, science, art, literature, and political liberty. Although surpassed in economic prosperity by the Roman and in military conquest by the Macedonian and the Roman, the Greek civilization attained the highest overall achievement and historical significance. The Middle Age was the exact opposite of the Greek civilization. The cities declined, together with the culture and commerce. In politics, liberty was replaced by totalitarianism, democracy by monarchy. Since the Renaissance, the downward spiral has reversed itself. Rise of commerce and cultural activities was followed by scientific and industrial revolutions coupled with the rising tide of democracy. Overall speaking, there is a correlation in three elements: economic development, cultural development, and democracy. As all the elements rise and fall together, they form a historical cycle of the western world.
Hence, in the recorded history of the western world, there have been two peaks (the Greek civilization and the modern industrial civilization) and one bottom (the Middle Age). Democracy has always been related to the historical peak and never to the bottom. From this perspective, democracy is also a cyclical phenomenon. This implies that democracy will not dominate the world forever. Instead, it will enter a retreat again once the current phase of the historical development reverses itself. There are many factors that could cause such a reversal, including major economic/financial crises, depletion of nonrenewable resources, and destabilization of the ecological system. In fact, anything that will end the economic prosperity will also end political pluralism and liberty. The assumption that the political development is in an irreversible course from totalitarianism to democracy is unwarranted since this is a result of extrapolating limited experience to infinity, a mistake that must be avoided by scientific thinkers.
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点链有些不方便,复过来吧
俺复过来了,
民主从古代到现代的发展
Lin, Ershen
2007年6月13日 英文原文
2007年6月25日 中文译文
对于现代民主的初步考察
自从苏联解体以来，民主似乎被认定为世界的未来，并最终导致一个全球性的民主体制。这样一个政治体制，再加上一个全球化的经贸体制，将实现一个乌托邦式的理想世界。这种理想世界大概与苏联阵营所倡导的共产主义理想相去无几，因为两者都代表了一种全球性体制的确立 (解放全人类) 和一个线性历史进程的终点 (历史的终结)。然而，伊拉克和阿富汗的民主实验的失败在这个虚幻的民主乐园里投下了长长的阴影。
早在冷战时代，民主制度就已经被一些人说成是一切成功之母，而缺乏民主制度是一切失败之源，而东西德、南北韩以及大陆和港台之间的差距都被用来作为这一论点的证据。但这个论证充满了陷阱。事实上，东亚地区的经济成长往往领先于民主制度的建立，从韩、台到中国大陆和越南无不如此。同样引人嘱目的是这一地区某些引进西方民主制度已经若干年的国家仍然无法摆脱饥饿、文盲、腐败和失业，以至于某些亚洲国家的领导人 (如李光耀) 认为集权制度对于经济发展更有利，因为它比民主制度更有效率。俄国和东欧实行民主和私有化后产生的负面效应似乎进一步印证了这一论断。近年来，不少人试图解释这些逻辑矛盾，但也未必能够奏效。显然，结论的矛盾源于方法的简单化：政治制度和经济社会发展之间被套上一个简单的因果关系。这种方法除了宣传之外别无价值。
假如把在政治、经济诸方面都比较成功的民主国家与不那么成功的名义上的民主国家作个比较，我们可以获得更多的有用的信息：前者主要包括OECD成员国，而后者则是亚非拉地区的国家。一般来说，经济发展与政治民主化有很高的关连度。这种现象可以被解释为经济基础决定一切，但如果考虑到很多西方国家在开始实行民主制度时经济发展程度并不很高，这种一元论的解释是站不住脚的。从另一个角度来看，可以发现实行民主制度较为成功的国家都是西方国家；这些国家代表了一种以古希腊文明为基础的西方文明，而其它国家则不然。东欧国家在人种、语言、宗教方面与西方关系密切，但在价值观方面与西方有相当的差距，缺乏民主传统，很难说是属于正统的西方文化，也许属于西方文明的一个亚形。也许本土文化对于民主制度成功与否起着决定性的作用。有些本土文化与民主相容，有一些不相容，还有一些中间状态。本土文化看来拥有一种自身保护功能，以便识别和排斥不相容的文化因子，如同人体免疫系统能够识别和排斥来自异体的移植器官一样。这是本文的第一个假设，不妨称之为文化的免疫假说。
那么东亚传统文化是否与西方文化相容呢？我个人的看法是否定的，这可以解释民主在中国的曲折历程。另一方面，日本、韩国等地的民主化则是在工业化实现之后成功引进的。在这里，我们要引进第二个假设，即工业化能够克服本土文化对于西方民主制度的排斥，如同免疫抑制疗法一样，也可以称为免疫抑制假说。当然，这一假说能否运用于世界其它地区尚有待观察。
俄国和东欧将成为这个假设的试金石，因为这些国家已经完成了工业化进程，而且他们的文化与西方文化的距离毕竟比较小。他们的民主进程已经进入较为高级的阶段，问题只是能否最终成功。在他们之后就轮到中国和越南了。阿拉伯世界是个潘朵拉式的未知数，其中较为发达的国家也没有成功实行民主制度的先例，更遑论伊拉克和阿富汗。美国军队不可能改造那里的社会形态和意识形态，即使消灭了所有的抵抗力量也无济于事。对于某些文化而言，光是工业化可能还不足以克服其排外机制。
到此，对以上的讨论作一个小结。现代民主的成功实行要求下列两个条件中的至少一个得到满足：(1) 本土文化属于西方来源；(2) 民主制度引进之前实现工业化。
既然文化因子对于民主制度的成功有重要的作用，我们在下一步将考查民主发源地的文化环境。
民主的古代起源
作为政体的民主制度不仅仅意味着人民的自我管理，还必须作出两种排除：(1) 区域性和行业性的组织 (如西方大学的faculties) 不属于民主政府，尽管它们属于民主机构；(2) 在民族国家形成之前的远古时代，许多地方 (包括两河流域、中国、印度) 曾经存在过的部落长老会之类的咨询机构，也不属于民主制度。在民族国家形成之前，并无国家的政治制度可言。另外，这一类的咨询机构曾经广泛存在，作为部落利益的代表，随着成熟的国家形态的出现而消亡。近代在国家尚未形成的地方的民族学研究 (如北美印第安部落的研究) 也或多或少地支持这一结论。
从这一角度来看，民主制度是古代爱琴海地区的独特创造，而从未出现于其它的古文明。这种制度不但在世界其它地区的古文明中不曾见过，而且也与国家和帝国形成过程的权力不断集中的总趋向背道而驰。民主决不是一个不可避免的结果，也不属于决定论的分析范畴。因而，对民主制度的兴起过程作一个哪怕是初步的考查也是有益和有趣的。我们希望从中找到某些关键的因素。
我们从爱琴海的黑暗年代的结束谈起。当时这个区域有三个民族：Dorian (多里安人)，Ionian (爱奥尼亚人)，Aeolian (伊奥利亚人)。其中Dorian集中在Crete岛，Rhodes岛和Peloponnese (伯罗奔尼撒) 半岛，以及小亚细亚西海岸的南段。Ionian集中在小亚细亚西海岸的中段，而Aeolian集中在小亚细亚西海岸的北段。这些岛国或者海岸国家如同其它地中海沿岸的国家一样处于城邦的早期阶段，实行君主世袭制。Dorian是这三个族群的后来居上者。有迹象表明是铜器时代结束时南下的入侵者的后裔。作为征服者，他们自认为是最优越的族群。然而，Ionian却是航海和贸易以及后来发展出来的哲学和科学的姣姣者。与古埃及和中国不同的是这些民族当时没有被整合成一个统一的民族大家庭。对抗和冲突对于后来的历史发展包括民主的产生具有重要的作用。
早在Minoa时代，爱琴海就已经是商业和海上贸易的中心，Dorian的入侵导致了衰退。到了公元前第七世纪，海上贸易又开始趋于活跃。在675 BC，Ionian在他们的区域率先使用钱币，比希腊本土早。当时的一些殖民地就是贸易基地。这些殖民者既没有兴趣深入内地去攻城掠地建立王朝，也没有彼此结盟，而是与殖民者的母城保持密切关系。这种情况使得该地区的政治统一变得困难。希腊的历史进程也是在各个城邦独立进行的，很少相互影响，也没有同步化。
商业的复兴与世袭君主制的衰落和寡头政治 (oligarchy) 的兴起几乎是同时的，尽管雅典早在前八世纪就已经以三位执政官取代国王。寡头政治的实施意味着权力从世袭君主向以土地拥有者为代表的贵族转移。这是政治多元化的开始，并最终导致直接民主制。
虽然在个别地方寡头政治可以维持两三个世纪之久，其稳定性总的来说不及君主制。执政官们往往从事掠夺式的剥削，使得乡村地区出现严重的贫富分化，贫困农民沦为佃农甚至奴隶。在一部分地区，第七世纪就开始出现专治者 (tyrant) (1) 的夺权现象。这与Dorian所代表的地主阶级与农民阶级的冲突有关，专治者在这一冲突中往往代表农民和其它下层大众的利益。他们的地位依赖于下层民众的支持，所以也极少能够将其演变成世袭君主制度。专治者的历史贡献在于粉碎旧贵族的压迫性统治，为民主的建立铺平道路。
在雅典，前六世纪早期的Solon经济改革减少了贫富差距，并引进了一些民主程序，如执政官直选和陪审团制度。由前执政官组成的最高法庭的权限受到削减。这一系列的改革并未根本解决问题，专治者Pisistratus在546 BC夺权，他的儿子Hippias在510 BC被斯巴达人赶走，专治体系 (tyranny) 维持了36年。至于Pisistratus的专治与阶级冲突有多少关连在西方学界尚无共识。到了508 BC，雅典人将斯巴达军队赶走，Cleisthenes建立了新的政治体制，即著名的直接民主制度，包括男性公民的普选权 (取消财产限制) 和参议会主席的抽签选举。这里的问题是Cleisthenes的改革并非以民主方式实现。进一步的改革持续到479 BC取消被选举人的财产限制，民主制度才完全建立。雅典民主的运作细节过于繁琐，有些问题仍有争议，故不属于本文的讨论范围。
总的来说，雅典民主的建立经历了从君主制、寡头政体、专治政体到民主政体四个阶段。在这个过程中起关键作用的是族群冲突和政治分裂，这两个因素阻止了大一统王朝的建立。城邦的君主势力较弱，受到以商贸活动聚财敛富的贵族们的制约，并最后不得不向他们交出权力。其结果是寡头体制的建立，也是欧洲重商主义传统的开始。在寡头体制下，执政官们的任期不是永久的，往往在其任期内以中饱私囊为最高优先，而置国家的长治久安于不顾，结果造成了社会分化和专治者的篡位。民主是专治政体的后继发展之一，但不是唯一的可能性。在Corinth，继专治政体之后是新的寡头体制。
从直接的层面来看，古代城邦薄弱的政治权力结构加上海上贸易所带来的重商主义传统是古希腊民主产生的必要条件。上述独特的历史条件的组合是其它古文明所不具备的：它们无一具有重商主义的传统，而且许多在史前时期就实现了统一 (如埃及和中国，虽然两者的疆域都比今天的国界小得多)，并形成了强有力的王朝。所有四大文明古国里从来就没有过，也不可能有寡头政体的出现。在公元前第三和第二个千年里，美索不达米亚的早期王朝 (ED时期) 和古埃及的朝代更迭原因不是十分清楚，但对于统治者的反抗似乎不是主要的因素。在中国，农民起义有可能改朝换代，但不会改变政体，而城市的商人阶层的力量过于薄弱，只能作壁上观。所以民主与古代中国无缘是毫不足奇的。即使在古希腊大陆型的强权国家 (如斯巴达和马其顿) 里，海洋贸易与重商主义传统的缺乏和世袭君主制在雅典的民主时代里安然无恙地存活下来是并行不悖和密不可分的两个现象。这一历史事实进一步证明了上述历史条件组合对于古代民主产生的必要性。如果我们说雅典为代表的古代民主是海洋和重商文化的产物是毫不夸张的。
工业时代民主的产生
在分析完古代民主后，我们可以把目光投向近代和现代的民主进程。
(A) 英国民主的产生
大不列颠中世纪以后的经济和政治进程与古代希腊的民主进程具有相似性。整个过程始于1215年的大宪章 (Magna Charta)。这个文件是政治多元化的开始。接下来的几个世纪里，商业的发达、都市的兴起、美洲的黄金造成的通货膨胀减少了王室的收入，限制了王权的行使。资产阶级 (bourgeoisies) 为自己争得了城市的有限自治权 (2)，然后在十七世纪促成了权力从王室向议会的转移。1628年的权力情愿书 (the Petition of Rights) 和相关法律将收税的权力给予议会，并取消王室掌控的特别法庭和委员会，建立了事实上的寡头政治。议会武装在1642-1646年间的内战中取胜证实了这一点。克伦威尔 (Cromwell) 建立的专治政体从1649年有效地维持到了1660年。王室在此过程中被进一步削弱，但矛盾并未解决。克伦威尔之子理查德 (Richard) 失去控制，导致复辟，好像是Pisistratus和Hippias的故事重演。这次复辟绝不是王权的重建，而是君主立宪制的建立。1688年的光荣革命 (Glorious Revolution) 和1689年的权力法案 (the Bill of Rights) 向人们充分显示了新政体的实质。当时的体制属于寡头政治，但最终将演变成民主体制。十九世纪的一系列改革完成了这个历史的进程。1832年、1867年和1884年的法案给予全体男性公民以投票权，1872年实行秘密投票制度，1875年确立罢工权力，是英国民主的主要里程碑。看来，英国民主的最后实现也与工业化有关。
整个事件的进程大致上可以划分为君主制、寡头政体、专治政体、寡头政体、民主政体五个阶段。第二个寡头政体的出现可能是专治政体的短暂而不足以粉碎旧贵族的控制力有关。英国的民主制度的一个特点是从一开始就是从合法途径中孕育演化而来，长期而言也比雅典文明更稳定。
( 法国民主的产生
民主在法国走出了一条非常不同的路子。1789年的革命之前，法国社会的阶级结构将资本家和工人、农民、小商人一起归于第三等级 (the Third Estate)，无法进入社会中上阶层。整个法国被置于绝对王权的统治之下。资产阶级对此极为不满，要求取消教会和贵族的特权，限制王室的权力，并以新的Assemblée Nationale (议会) 来取代由僧侣和贵族占优势的Estates-General。当国内充满不满和阶级冲突的背景下，国家财政危机就成了革命爆发的导火线。
在英国的克伦威尔专治之前有一个相当长的寡头时期，而法国在大革命前却完全找不著与之所当的时期。没有了寡头体制的缓冲期，法国直接从绝对王权进入民主革命，结果是前所未有的大爆炸，并波及整个欧洲大陆。从1793年的雅可宾统治到1815年拿破仑兵败滑铁炉，专治持续了二十余年。此后一段实际上可以认为是寡头政体。某些革命成果被保留下来，例如言论、出版、宗教的自由，等级制度的取消，议会与国王并存。第二共和国 (1848-1852) 过于短暂，可以忽略不计。在战乱中出现的第三共和国 (1870-1940) 可以算作民主时期的开始。
如果说英国民主采取的是循序渐进的进化模式，那么法国民主则是采取急风暴雨的革命模式。法国革命的专治时期不但较长，而且可以分为两个亚期：第一个亚期是罗伯斯庇尔 (Robespierre) 时期，而第二个亚期则是拿破仑时期。其中拿破仑更像经典的、得到大众拥戴的专治统治者。法国的历史显示在当时法国的压迫性的环境里，专治统治成了寡头政体的前提条件，伴随着更为惨烈的战争和流血。
© 二十世纪上半叶的民主经验 — 法西斯之路
谈到民主，我们不得不考虑德国、意大利、西班牙和日本的相关发展。
在二十世纪初，上述国家 (除了德国之外) 的政体已经由君主制演变成君主立宪式的寡头制。德国在第一次世界大战之后建立的政体在名义上是一个共和政体。作为德国民主的第一个尝试，魏玛共和国则是个不成功的例子。1918-1919年间执政的人民委员会符合经典的寡头定义。到了Ebert总统执政的1920年代，他与军事将领结成的政治同盟 (所谓“Ebert-Groener pact”) 决定了后续的政治发展，是个事实上的寡头体制。希特勒上台之前德国政坛的一系列暗箱操作现在都已经公诸于世，有案可查，无法用现代民主程序加以解释，只能说是寡头制的表现方式 (3)。在1930年代的经济危机催化之下，寡头制很快就被希特勒转化为专治体制。意大利在1861年统一之后，政治权力由国王Victor Emmanuel二世和议会分享，因而也是一个寡头体制。这个体制是从统一之前的撒丁尼亚 (Sardinia) 继承下来的，而君主制也在撒丁尼亚存在过。
1922-1943年间在意大利掌权的墨索里尼和1933-1945年间在德国掌权的希特勒相当于专治统治者，所不同的是这两个法西斯主义者比起古代或近代的专治统治者更加独裁，也更加铤而走险。到了战争结束的时候，德国和意大利都已经经历了君主制、寡头政体、专治政体三个时期，而这也正是雅典民主进程中的头三个阶段。在此之后，德、意两国也都像雅典一样进入了民主时期。两国的专治统治期显然由于战争的缘故而被大大缩短了，这是纳粹法西斯的极端专制所造成的。假如德、意两国没有发动战争的话，专治统治期固然会延长，但最后结果将毫无二致。这一点我们可以从西班牙的经验得到证实。
在西班牙，君主制一直延续到1873年的第一共和国。1874年复辟之后产生了轮流执政的寡头政体。这个体制到了1920年代再也无法维持下去了。1931年成立的第二共和国在1936年被独裁者佛朗哥 (Franco) 的法西斯政权所取代。西班牙法西斯不象德、意法西斯那么极端，其政权也延续得比较久，直到1975年才寿寝正终，西班牙从此进入民主时期。
总而言之，德国、意大利、西班牙三国的民主进程与雅典民主的进程非常类似，只是前两者的专治时期由于外力的干预而缩短了。
与欧洲的情况相比，日本的历史发展完全不同，需要另加分析。日本在近代处于军事独裁之下，君主制早已名存实亡。1868年的明治维新将权力转移到了王室，但后者却处于少数望族的控制下。在二十世纪初，权力重心又从贵族转移到了大财团手里，并在大战前夕为军人所掌握。当时的日本处于法西斯意识形态的统治之下，但始终没有出现德、意式的独裁者，控制政权的是军事寡头集团。专治者无法出现的原因之一是天皇当时仍然被神化，另一个原因是日本文化推崇集体主义而非个人英雄主义。从这个意义上来讲，日本自从明治维新到二战始终在寡头体制内运作。战后宪法以建立民主制度为目标，但很快又蜕变成为寡头体制，这表现在财团的影响和自民党对国会的绝对控制。看来，寡头体制的复活与专治时期的缺失有关 (4)；没有后者就很难消灭旧的权力结构，也无法建立新的体系，正所谓不破不立。将来的日本或许会变得更加民主化，但不大可能成为名符其实的西方民主。联系历史上日本向中国学习的帝国体制在本土化之后的迅速蜕变，我们不必对此感到惊讶。日本的本土文化与任何外来文化，无论是中国的或是西方的，都是不相容的，同时又具有一种可适应性，能够与之结合而产生新的东西。
(D) 一般发展进程的概述
对于古代、近代和现代民主产生进程的分析向我们揭示了一个一般的发展模式。这个过程的起点是世袭君主制或者其等价物 (包括殖民地政府)。这个过程包括两个程序：(1) 寡头政体或者其等价物；(2) 相对较短的专治时期。这两个过程可以以多种方式排列：从寡头到专治，从专治到寡头，或者从寡头到专治再到寡头。整个发展的终点是民主体制。寡头时期的长短不一，是有弹性的。专治时期是必不可少的。可以认为是整个发展的关键阶段。日本的经验证实了这一点。总的来说，民主产生的进程的一般特征并没有随着时间的推移而发生根本的改变。
这一理论与本文开头部分提出的假设并不矛盾。对于以西方文化为主导的国家 (这里指的主要是英语移民国家如美国、加拿大、澳大利亚、新西兰) 而言，其文化在其发源地就已经经历了上述发展进程的全部或大部，一旦移植到了新的土壤，就不必再去重复已经完成的历程，民主的建立就变得相对简单和容易了。对于一个非西方文化主导的国家而言，工业化往往意味着专制体制和寡头体制阶段的完成，从而为民主的引进准备好了条件。与此相反，中国、印度等亚洲国家早期的民主实验都是直接建立在君主制或其它专制制度的废墟上的，因而也是注定要失败的。今天美国在伊拉克和阿富汗的尝试也不过是在重复那些早期民主实验而已，其结果也可想而知。
民主制度的不稳定性
有很多人已经探讨过雅典民主的不足之处，特别是在经济和军事的角度 (如伯罗奔尼撒战争)，毋需加以重复。但问题的最初征兆就在Pericles (伯里克利) 的民主改革，他多次当选连任，具有巨大的政治影响力，而这种影响力又被用来为实现其政治纲领服务。也许他的活动都是合法的，但毕竟超出了他作为将军的公职的职权范围。在他任内所实行的实际上是个人的独裁。比他更早的Cleisthenes改革也同样不是按照民主程序来实现的。雅典民主因而具有一种先天性的缺陷，即这个体系是政治强人恩赐的结果。用于实现民主的手段的重要性不应该被低估，因为民主本来就是手段，而不是目的。用非民主的手段来建立民主制度是自相矛盾的。
从实际的角度来看，Pericles的独裁证明选民是很容易被操纵，这就为寡头体制的复活创造了条件。到了411 BC，民主制度通过投票宣布自身的终结同样是不足为奇的。虽然民主在战后得到恢复，雅典往日的荣光却一去不返。
雅典民主的另一个难以克服的矛盾是下述事实：雅典男子公民的平等权力是建立在其内部总人口的不平等权力以及雅典与其盟国的不平等关系之上的。维持雅典帝国所需费用是由奴隶劳动的剩余价值以及附庸国的进贡提供的。对于雅典民主而言，奴隶制和帝国主义政策为其基本特征。附庸国的反叛决定了战争的结局，并使雅典沦为二流强国。
从Cleisthenes改革到Alexander (亚历山大) 的入侵，雅典民主的寿命不足两百年。这是系统本身的不稳定性造成的，不必借用偶然因子来解释。
相比之下，英国民主的发展显得更具有连贯性和一致性。自大宪章以始，对于王权的限制形成了一种历史发展的趋向。整个过程，除了1649-1660年间的专治时期之外，都属于一个持续的体制内的民主化进程。与雅典类似的是英国曾经大力推行的帝国主义政策和对于国内劳工的剥削 (这一点在早期尤其严重)，但却没有对长期稳定性造成影响。这是英国体制的弹性和可塑性的反映，使其能够及时调整政策。这种弹性和可塑性显然与整个体制产生过程采取的途径有关。
除了外部威胁，民主制度更必须面对内在危险。即使没有任何外力干扰，一个民主制度仍然可以发生蜕变。作为代议制民主的权力来源的选民可能被大财团、党派、军队、宗教取代。这种转变早在十九世纪的美国就已经开始，特别引人注目的是大公司和党派政治的兴起。林肯总统曾经说过：“我预见在不久的将来一个危机的来临，我为我的国家的安全而颤抖...大公司已经加冕登基，政治腐败的年代即将降临，金钱将利用人们的偏见来延续其统治，直至财富全部集中到少数人手里，共和政体被毁灭为止。”目前，美国和若干西方工业国正处于一个缓慢而持续地滑向寡头政治的道路上。大部分美国选民对此有所了解。独立结构的民意测验表明多数美国人认为美国政府是一个为自身谋利益的政府 ("THE government") 而不是一个民众的政府 ("our government")。这个蜕变过程会被各种危机 (如“911”事件) 或者主观认定的威胁而加速。
我们假设民主体制向寡头体制的演变属于蜕变，但理论上存在另一种可能性，即可能演变成为某种由工商界控制的更高级的文明形式。就目前的情况而言，这还只是幻想。
民主与历史周期性的关系
到此为止，对于民主的分析是将民主发展进程孤立地加以考虑。如果将民主进程放在更为广阔的历史大背景中考查也是非常有用的。
自从历史记录诞生以来，民主曾两度登上历史舞台：第一次发生在古希腊文明的高峰时期；第二次在现代工业革命和资本主义时代。在古希腊文明和现代工业文明之间的中世纪，世袭君主制的权威始终没有受到任何挑战。
古希腊文明无论是在哲学、科学、艺术、文学和自由方面都代表了整个古代世界的顶峰。尽管在经济繁荣方面不及古罗马，在军事征服方面不及马其顿和古罗马，古希腊文明总的成就和对于历史的贡献是无可比拟的。中世纪则是古希腊文明的反主题，都市凋敝，商业和文化萎缩，政治自由被专制统治取代，民主被君主取代。文艺复兴之后，历史又一次进入了上升期，商业和文化的繁荣之后是科学革命、工业革命和民主潮流。总的来说，经济、文化和民主三者在大历史框架内显现出紧密的相关性。上述三个方面在历史时间尺度内共同的上升和下降的运动形成了西方主流文明的历史周期性。
由此可见，西方历史上有过两个高峰 (古希腊文明和现代工业文明) 和一个低谷 (中世纪)。民主总是与历史周期的高峰相联系，而不与低谷有任何关连。由此可知，民主本身也是一种周期性现象。换句话说，民主不可能永远统治这个世界；一旦现代文明进入下降时相，民主也将再一次退却。很多因素都可以使现代文明进入下降时期，诸如世界性的财政金融危机、可再生资源的枯竭、生态环境的破坏。事实上，任何能够终止经济繁荣的力量都可以终止政治多元化和自由的环境。那种把政治史描写成从专制向民主前进的不可逆进程的说法是毫无根据的臆想，其来源不外于将有限的历史经验加以无限外推，而这种做法是任何科学的思想者所不取的。
注释:
(1) 传统上，tyrant这个词常被翻译成暴君；实际上，这个词的本原含义是非法篡位者。古希腊的tyrant既非君主，也没有残暴的恶名。暴君是该词的衍生含义。古罗马的tyrant才是残暴的君主。本文的tyrant是采用该词的本原含义，无残暴之义。
(2) 英国历史上的市政府 (municipal government) 是一个自治性的权力结构，有自己的宪章 (charter)，不应被认为是金字塔式的权力结构的一部分。
(3) 1932年4月，希特勒在总统选举中失败，纳粹冲锋队被禁。5月8日，希特勒与野心勃勃的军官Schleicher达成秘密协定，希特勒支持后者，换取纳粹冲锋队的合法化和新的国会选举。在右翼的压力下，总理Bruening在5月29日被迫辞职。 Schleicher选择Papen作为新任总理，并得到总统的同意。在纳粹冲锋队的谋杀和恐吓中举行的7月选举给予纳粹第一大党 (37%的席位) 的地位属于意料中事。希特勒向Schleicher提出当总理的要求，被总统拒绝。9月份，Papen与纳粹的冲突导致新一轮选举。纳粹在11月选举中失败，但总理Papen也因为无法组成联合政府而辞职。希特勒再次要求成为总理，再次被拒绝。这时，德国工商界领袖联合致信总统，要求让希特勒当总理。总统召见Schleicher和Papen问计，两个人都想自己上台，吵得不可开交。最后Schleicher胜出，在12月2日上台。在1933年1月份的一次秘密会议中，希特勒说服总统的儿子Oskar和前总理Papen相信纳粹上台已经成为定局，再让他们向总统施加压力。1月28日，Schleicher向总统要求再次选举被拒，提出辞职。这时，有人放出谣言说Schleicher要搞政变并逮捕总统，于是Hindenburg 终于同意将政府总理给了希特勒。
(4) 如果要说日本现代史上有过什么专治统治者的话，那就要数美国占领那一段时间，麦克阿瑟将军也许可以权充这个角色，但时间毕竟太短，不起作用。任何历史时期都必须具备一定的时间延续性方能有意义。