神马文学网郭岱君：台湾的转折点
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郭岱君：台湾的转折点时间:2010-08-19 15:44 作者:郭岱君 译者：孤城落日点击:399次
长久以来学者们都在关心着一个问题，蒋介石的国民政府在台湾摆脱计划经济建立市场经济制度，相应的生产力达到了中国历史上的最高水平，这一转变是如何产生的？1947年是转变发生的一个重要年份，这一年恰好是日本帝国被盟军击败和蒋自己被中共击败的中间时点。引起变化的是一场暴力运动：根据胡佛研究所最近开放的蒋公日记，一场发生在台湾的起义被国民党镇压，蒋介石思索是什么引发了这场暴动，他决定改变一些东西。
日本统治结束后的国有经济
1945年秋天，日本投降后不久，蒋介石任命陈仪为首任台湾省行政长官公署行政长官，他的任务就是让台湾从日本殖民统治下恢复过来。此时，蒋介石的南京国民政府仍然在与毛泽东领导的共产党进行殊死对抗。上任后两年，陈仪将台湾一切工商业、贸易和交通设施国有化。
日军占领台湾的半个世纪时间里，殖民统治和兵灾使得海岛万象凋敝。台湾面临着工业物资匮乏、农业衰败、与外国贸易不足、严重通胀以及迅速增长的人口等种种问题。陈仪作为孙中山思想的忠实追随者，秉承了其“节制私人资本，发达国家资本”的教诲，这意味着所有商业贸易都要在国家的批准支持下进行。
陈仪常挂在嘴边的话是“如果我们没有发展好国有企业，中国就没有未来。”他认为所有资本家都自私自利，妄图制造垄断。
蒋介石接受了陈仪笃信的东西——国有企业要优于私有企业，计划经济会增强国家安全、增进人民福祉。事实上在20世纪三四十年代，大多数国民党领导人都相信计划经济的力量。蒋介石在1943年出版的《中国之命运》中强调说“只有国家控制的计划经济能够使经济发展与国防安全有机结合。”
因此，在蒋介石的支持下，陈仪以台湾省卫戍部队总司令兼台湾省行政长官公署行政长官的身份迅速建立并巩固了庞大的政治经济力量。他宣称要用日本殖民者留下来的财富让台湾成为“三民主义试验的孵化器”。孙中山的三民主义即民族主义、民权主义和民生主义。
陈仪的国有化行动要求日本和台日合资的工矿企业转为国民党的新型国有企业。名为《台湾接管计划纲要》的法律条文使得他的转化工作合法可行。依据计划，陈仪命令政府将所有工矿生意（第32条），公私运输系统（第52条）、食品生产销售（第68条）以及日本人所有土地（第82条）一律收归国有，资产转换工作自1945年11月一直持续到1946年6月。
陈仪命学校资产委员会（the School Property Committee）管理所有校舍和教育资产，土地委员会处理土地纠纷。日本占领时期四家最大的国有糖业公司合并为台湾糖业公司。六家油企则被并入中国石油集团。
陈仪政府也设置了一些新的经济调控机构。贸易局决定主要物资和原材料的进出口。专卖局制定重量长度的度量标准，监管食盐、樟脑、鸦片、火柴、酒、烟草以及其他一些产品的生产销售。私人制造销售这些物品会遭到严厉惩罚。食品局制定食品政策、征收土地税、监管食品生产。煤炭调控委员会垄断了能源供应，强制私人矿主将煤卖给委员会。
到1946年晚期，台湾省政府控制了70%的工业资本和72%的全岛土地，在此基础上建立起了台湾的计划经济模式，但陈仪的计划模式却没能使这个海岛取得发展。反而铸成了以1945年为界的原住民与移民之间的矛盾。经济上的垄断腐蚀了陈仪的政府，并逐渐演变为依靠军警力量维护垄断的局面。
陈仪政府面临的挑战越来越多。1946年末，失望和不满充斥全岛，城市中的矛盾尤其不可调和。通货膨胀演变为恶性通胀，失业率屡创新高，大陆移民与1945年前的原住民政治裂痕恶化。台湾人对省政府和大陆人的憎恨濒临一触即发的境地。
二二八事变与蒋介石的内心变化
1947年2月27日，一场起义终于爆发了。台北的一名烟草小贩遭到了专卖局人员的殴打。愤怒的人群包围了专卖局人员逃进的大楼，要求交出这些打人者。
第二天早晨暴力事件发生了。2月28日，行政长官公署的安保人员向抗议人群扣下了机关枪的扳机，数人死亡。台湾民众很快就控制了局面，因为蒋介石为了对付大陆上的共产党将大部分部队都调走了，岛上只有5000名警察和士兵。
起义持续了一周时间，随后蒋介石从福建派遣了大量部队镇压了这次起义。镇压行动造成的破坏很严重，死者估计达到2万。（在接下来的日子里，“二二八事变”成了台湾的禁语。然而现在台湾将每年的这一天作为和平纪念日。）
这次事件的影响是巨大的。多数历史学家和政治学家认为这是台湾二战后影响最为深远的单一事件。胡佛档案馆的蒋介石日记印证了这种看法。起初身在南京的蒋介石并未特别看重此次事件，甚至一直到起义爆发后的3月1日都对此只字未提。蒋介石在日记中将这次起义的绝大多数责任归咎于陈仪的“愚蠢和无能”。但蒋介石也知道，之前正是由于陈仪对台湾局势的牢牢掌控，才使自己决定将“多数军队转移到大陆”。
当蒋介石意识到问题在逐渐恶化，他开始认真对待台湾的安全形势。他召李翼中（国民党台湾省委主席）回到南京介绍事态，同时派遣杨亮功（闽台监察使）赴台调查起义的起因经过。
3月8日，李翼中呈蒋介石的报告称，对政治经济过紧的控制是此次事件爆发的主要原因。为了换取台湾民众对国民党政府的支持，李翼中做出了四点建议：废除台湾行政长官公署；设立台湾省政府，拔擢更多的台湾人进入管理层；加速推进地方选举；减少国有企业数量增加私人企业数量。
蒋介石认真的听取了他的意见，认识到起义分裂了台湾民众。他开始相信起义激起的台湾民众要多于他事先所想，国民党如想要赢得台湾民众的尊重，政府必须先获得岛民的支持。蒋介石视台湾为党和政府的最后堡垒，不能再把这里输给共产党了。根据记载，在与国民党其他领导人讨论李翼中的建议之后，蒋介石对他们的计划仅“略加修改”即付诸实施。
3月9日，蒋介石派遣白崇禧赴台湾表达他对民众的同情，安抚他们并声明首要任务是恢复秩序。当夜，蒋介石在他的日记中写下“研究要如何出售国有企业”必须成为首要事项并在之后的日子里严格执行，这是他首次考虑出售国企的事项，与他之前一直笃信的计划经济压倒一切的治国理念大相径庭。
白崇禧和杨亮功在3月末返回了南京，他们报告蒋介石的结论是——僵化的经济政策是导致起义的主要原因。
1947年4月17日白崇禧对国民党中央委员会的报告中建议，政经改革必须尽快实施。他强调政府应该帮助私人企业发展，同时必须限制国有企业的数量和影响力。
杨亮功建议撤销声名狼藉的专卖局和贸易局，重组政府，征召更多的台湾本地人进入省政府高层。
台湾新经济胎动
蒋介石确信台湾脆弱的安全形势和糟糕的社会状况需要政府和政党的改革，并因此密切关注了李翼中、白崇禧和杨亮功的建议。5月15日，在他们的建议下，蒋介石废置了台湾行政长官公署，成立了新的省政府，以魏道明取代了陈仪。（两年后，陈仪被控勾结大陆共产党，1950年被处决。）
魏道明（曾任行政院秘书长和驻美大使）政府着手逐步恢复之前的损失。他改革了专卖局，撤销了贸易局，将一些如台湾火柴公司、印务局和台湾矿业公司等公有企业私有化，公有制企业开始为一般民众和私营企业生产消费品服务。魏道明政府还把公有土地转手给台湾农民，鼓励食物和特殊农作物以自由市场的形式流通。
魏道明雇佣更多台湾本地人，任命高素质、有经验的本地人进入政府高层。尽管他的行动并没有大幅削减计划经济这头巨兽，但提供了对私有企业的新的激励方式，私有企业得以为市场经济生产产品，而市场经济也因此开始壮大。
二二八事变不会是蒋介石转变的唯一原因，但蒋的日记表明，这次事件挑战了他和一些国民党领导人的既有认识，他们开始思考“计划经济出了什么错？”之后，当蒋介石看到一个新的国家控制的僵化经济体系时，他就意识到了这将是众多问题的温床。
作者郭岱君，斯坦福大学胡佛研究所研究员。曾是斯坦福大学东亚研究中心客座讲师（2003）和台湾淡江大学美国研究所副教授（1997-2000）。她曾做过中华民国总统的新闻秘书（1990-1995），总统府第一局副局长（1989-1997）和波士顿的中华民国信息办公室主任（1987-1988）。
英文原文：
A Turning Point for Taiwan
by Tai-Chun Kuo
Newly released volumes of the Chiang Kai-shek diaries illuminate a pivotal moment： the generalissimo’s turning away from a command economy. By Tai-chun Kuo.
Scholars have long been curious about how the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek turned aside from a command economy on Taiwan and instead built a market economy more productive than any in Chinese history. A pivotal moment in that transformation took place in 1947， midway between the Allies’ defeat of Imperial Japan and Chiang’s own defeat on the Chinese mainland by communist forces. The catalyst was violence： that year， an uprising on Taiwan was suppressed by the Nationalists， and as Chiang pondered the causes of that revolt， according to newly available volumes of the generalissimo’s diaries housed at the Hoover Institution， he decided to change course.
STATE CONTROL AFTER JAPANESE RULE
In the fall of 1945， soon after the Japanese surrender， Chiang appointed Chen Yi as the first governor-general of the Taiwan Provincial Administration Executive Office whose duties were to help Taiwan recover from Japanese colonial rule. Chiang’s Nationalist (Kuomintang) government， still based in Nanjing， was struggling with the communists led by Mao Zedong. During the next two years， Chen nationalized all physical assets on Taiwan having to do with industry， trade， commerce， and transportation.
A half century of Japanese rule and heavy war damage had taken their toll. Taiwan was plagued by lack of industrial production， distortions in agriculture， a foreign exchange shortage， serious inflation， and a rapidly increasing population. Chen， a devoted believer in Sun Yat-sen’s doctrines， interpreted Sun’s theory of “restricting private capital while promoting state capital” (jiezhi siren ziben， fada guojia ziben) to mean that transactions should be bankrolled and approved by the state.
Chen， who often said that “there would be no future for China if we failed to develop state enterprises，” complained that all capitalists were selfish and wanted to create monopolies.
Chiang shared Chen’s belief that state enterprises were superior to private enterprises and that a planned， command economy would strengthen China’s national security and improve people’s welfare. Most Nationalist leaders， in fact， believed in the power of a command economy during the 1930s and 1940s. In his 1943 book China’s Destiny， Chiang stressed that “only a state-controlled planned economy could integrate defense with economic development.”
Thus， with Chiang’s support， Chen rapidly consolidated his enormous political and economic power as garrison commander and executive administrator of the Taiwan Provincial Administration Executive Office. He declared that he would use the Japanese wealth produced during the colonial period to make Taiwan “an experimental incubator of the Three People’s Principles”： Sun’s doctrine of nationalism， democracy， and people’s livelihood.
Chen’s consolidation of Taiwan’s assets called for all Japanese and Japanese- Taiwanese industrial and mining organizations to transfer their wealth to the new Nationalist state enterprises. The compendium of laws making this transfer legal and workable was called “An Outline Plan for the Take- Over of Taiwan’s Wealth” (Taiwan jieguan jihua gangyao). Following the plan， Chen ordered the provincial government to confiscate all industrial and mining business (Article 32)， all public and private transportation (Article 52)， all food production and distribution (Article 68)， and all land previously owned by the Japanese (Article 82)， a transfer of wealth that took place from November 1945 through June 1946.
Chen ordered that the School Property Committee manage all educational structures and property and the Land Committee manage land disputes. The four largest private sugar companies under Japanese control were amalgamated into the Taiwan Sugar Company. Taiwan’s six oil companies were merged into the China Petroleum Corporation.
Taiwan’s first postwar governor often said that “there would be no future for China if we failed to develop state enterprises，” and he complained that all capitalists were selfish and wanted to create monopolies.
Chen’s administration also set up new economic control agencies. The Trade Bureau dictated the import and export of major goods and raw materials. The Monopoly Bureau regulated weights and measures and oversaw the production and marketing of salt， camphor， opium， matches， liquor， tobacco， and other products. Privately manufacturing or selling those products was strictly prohibited. The Food Bureau set up food policy， purchased foodstuffs， levied land taxes， and oversaw food production. The Coal Adjustment Committee monopolized the energy supply， forcing private miners to sell all their coal to the committee.
By late 1946， Taiwan’s provincial government controlled a command economy made up of 70 percent of industrial wealth and 72 percent of Taiwan’s land， but Chen’s command system was unable to revitalize the island’s economy. Moreover， it poisoned relations between the pre-1945 and post- 1945 inhabitants of Taiwan. The power of economic monopoly corrupted Chen’s administration and led it to rely on police power to eliminate competitors.
The challenges confronting Chen’s administration quickly grew more serious. By the end of 1946， frustration and grievances were widespread in Taiwan， especially in the cities. Inflation had become hyperinflation， unemployment was skyrocketing， and the political rift between the mainlanders and the pre-1945 Taiwanese had worsened. Taiwanese resentments toward the provincial administration and the mainlanders were on the verge of boiling over.
A REVOLT AND CHIANG’S CHANGE OF HEART
Thus on February 27， 1947， a revolt finally erupted. The flashpoint came when a Taipei cigarette vendor was roughed up by an agent of the Monopoly Bureau. Angry crowds surrounded a building where the agent had fled， demanding that he be brought forth.
Violence ensued the following morning， February 28， when security forces at the governor-general’s office fired machine guns at demonstrators protesting the incident， killing several. The Taiwanese soon took control because Chiang had transferred the bulk of his forces to the mainland to fight communists， leaving only some 5，000 police officers and soldiers on the island.
The command economy poisoned relations between pre-1945 and post-1945 inhabitants of Taiwan. Chen Yi’s administration grew corrupt and leaned on police power to eliminate black-market competitors.
The uprising lasted a week， at which time a large force of Chiang’s troops arrived from Fujian to suppress it. Damage was extensive， and the death toll was estimated to be as high as 20，000. (In the following years， the “228 uprising” was a taboo subject in Taiwan. Today， however， Taiwan commemorates every February 28 as Peace Memorial Day.)
The uprising’s impact was enormous. Most historians and political scientists agree that it had a more profound and enduring effect on Taiwan than any other single event after World War II. The Chiang diaries at the Hoover Archives bear this out. Chiang， then in Nanjing， didn’t take the uprising seriously at first， not mentioning it in his diary until March 1， the day after the revolt broke out. In his diary， Chiang wrote that Chen was mostly responsible for the uprising because of his “ignorance and incapability.” Chiang also acknowledged that his own decision to transfer “most of the troops to the mainland” contributed to Chen’s inability to control the situation.
As Chiang realized that the problem was worsening， he began to take Taiwan’s security seriously. He summoned Li Yizhong (chairman of the Kuomintang Taiwan Provincial Commission) back to Nanjing to apprise him of the situation and， at the same time， sent Yang Lianggong (the censor of Fukien and Taiwan from the Control Yuan) to Taiwan to investigate why and how the uprising had occurred.
On March 8， Li reported to Chiang that tight political and economic control had mainly provoked the disaster. To win Taiwanese support for the Nationalist government， Li made the following four suggestions： abolish the Taiwan Provincial Administration Executive Office and replace it with a new provincial government； appoint more Taiwanese to top provincial administrative positions； speed up local elections； and downsize state enterprises and create private ones.
Chiang listened carefully， for he now realized that the uprising had divided Taiwan’s people. He also came to believe that the uprising had infuriated more Taiwanese than he had first realized and that his government must win the support of the island’s people if the Kuomintang were to win their respect and admiration. Chiang， also seeing Taiwan as the last bastion of his government and party， could not face another loss to the communists. After discussing Li’s suggestions with other Nationalist leaders， Chiang accepted them “with a little revision，” according to one published account.
On March 9， then， Chiang sent Defense Minister Bai Chongxi to Taiwan to express Chiang’s sympathy to the people and to calm them by insisting that order should now prevail. That evening， Chiang noted in his diary that “studying how to sell state enterprises” must become an important objective and be taken seriously in the coming days， marking the first time that Chiang indicated he was thinking of selling out state enterprises， a tone very different from his previously stated beliefs in the superiority of a command economy.
Both Bai and Yang returned to Nanjing in late March and reported to Chiang their conclusion that applying rigid economic policies was the major reason behind the uprising.
Thus in his report to the Kuomintang Central Committee on April 17， 1947， Bai recommended that political and economic reforms take place as quickly as possible. He stressed that the government should help the private sector develop and reform the state enterprises by restricting their number and limiting their influence.
Yang suggested abolishing the notorious Monopoly Bureau and Trade Bureau， reorganizing the administration government， and recruiting more Taiwanese to top jobs in the provincial government.
TAIWAN’S ECONOMIC SHIFT BEGINS
Chiang， by now convinced that Taiwan’s weak security and social disability were major problems demanding government and party reform， paid close attention to the suggestions offered by Li， Yang， and Bai. Accepting their ideas， Chiang abolished the Taiwan Provincial Administration Executive Office， installed a new provincial government， and replaced Chen with a new governor， Wei Tao-ming， on May 15， 1947. (Two years later， Chen was accused of collaborating with the mainland communists. He was executed in 1950.)
Chiang believed that Taiwan was the last bastion for his government and party. He could not tolerate another loss of territory to the communists.
Governor Wei (who had previously served as secretary-general of the Executive Yuan and ambassador to the United States) took steps to repair the damage. He reformed the Monopoly Bureau， abolished the Trade Bureau， privatized some public enterprises—such as the Taiwan Matches Company， the Printing Department， and the Taiwan Mining Company—and undertook to make public enterprises responsible for producing intermediate products and the private sector， for consumer goods. The Wei administration also sold public land to Taiwanese farmers and encouraged free markets for the distribution of food and special crops.
Wei also hired more Taiwanese and began appointing qualified， experienced Taiwanese to high positions in the administration. Although Wei’s actions did not greatly reduce the huge command economy， they did provide new incentives to form private enterprises to manufacture products for a market economy that had now begun to expand.
The February 28 uprising is not the only explanation for Chiang’s shift， but his diaries show that the uprising challenged him and other Nationalist leaders to ask， “What has gone wrong with the planned economy？” As Chiang looked anew at an economic system rigidly controlled by the state， he realized that it was the source of many problems.
Tai-chun Kuo is a research fellow at Hoover Institution， Stanford University. Previously， she was a visiting lecturer at the Center for East Asian Studies， Stanford University (2003) and an associate professor at the Graduate Institute of American Studies， Tamkang University (Taiwan， 1997–2000). She served as press secretary to the Republic of China (ROC) president (1990–95)， deputy director–general of the First Bureau of the Presidential Office (1989–97)， and director of the ROC Government Information Office in Boston (1987–88).
来源:东西网
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长久以来学者们都在关心着一个问题，蒋介石的国民政府在台湾摆脱计划经济建立市场经济制度，相应的生产力达到了中国历史上的最高水平，这一转变是如何产生的？1947年是转变发生的一个重要年份，这一年恰好是日本帝国被盟军击败和蒋自己被中共击败的中间时点。引起变化的是一场暴力运动：根据胡佛研究所最近开放的蒋公日记，一场发生在台湾的起义被国民党镇压，蒋介石思索是什么引发了这场暴动，他决定改变一些东西。
日本统治结束后的国有经济
1945年秋天，日本投降后不久，蒋介石任命陈仪为首任台湾省行政长官公署行政长官，他的任务就是让台湾从日本殖民统治下恢复过来。此时，蒋介石的南京国民政府仍然在与毛泽东领导的共产党进行殊死对抗。上任后两年，陈仪将台湾一切工商业、贸易和交通设施国有化。
日军占领台湾的半个世纪时间里，殖民统治和兵灾使得海岛万象凋敝。台湾面临着工业物资匮乏、农业衰败、与外国贸易不足、严重通胀以及迅速增长的人口等种种问题。陈仪作为孙中山思想的忠实追随者，秉承了其“节制私人资本，发达国家资本”的教诲，这意味着所有商业贸易都要在国家的批准支持下进行。
陈仪常挂在嘴边的话是“如果我们没有发展好国有企业，中国就没有未来。”他认为所有资本家都自私自利，妄图制造垄断。
蒋介石接受了陈仪笃信的东西——国有企业要优于私有企业，计划经济会增强国家安全、增进人民福祉。事实上在20世纪三四十年代，大多数国民党领导人都相信计划经济的力量。蒋介石在1943年出版的《中国之命运》中强调说“只有国家控制的计划经济能够使经济发展与国防安全有机结合。”
因此，在蒋介石的支持下，陈仪以台湾省卫戍部队总司令兼台湾省行政长官公署行政长官的身份迅速建立并巩固了庞大的政治经济力量。他宣称要用日本殖民者留下来的财富让台湾成为“三民主义试验的孵化器”。孙中山的三民主义即民族主义、民权主义和民生主义。
陈仪的国有化行动要求日本和台日合资的工矿企业转为国民党的新型国有企业。名为《台湾接管计划纲要》的法律条文使得他的转化工作合法可行。依据计划，陈仪命令政府将所有工矿生意（第32条），公私运输系统（第52条）、食品生产销售（第68条）以及日本人所有土地（第82条）一律收归国有，资产转换工作自1945年11月一直持续到1946年6月。
陈仪命学校资产委员会（the School Property Committee）管理所有校舍和教育资产，土地委员会处理土地纠纷。日本占领时期四家最大的国有糖业公司合并为台湾糖业公司。六家油企则被并入中国石油集团。
陈仪政府也设置了一些新的经济调控机构。贸易局决定主要物资和原材料的进出口。专卖局制定重量长度的度量标准，监管食盐、樟脑、鸦片、火柴、酒、烟草以及其他一些产品的生产销售。私人制造销售这些物品会遭到严厉惩罚。食品局制定食品政策、征收土地税、监管食品生产。煤炭调控委员会垄断了能源供应，强制私人矿主将煤卖给委员会。
到1946年晚期，台湾省政府控制了70%的工业资本和72%的全岛土地，在此基础上建立起了台湾的计划经济模式，但陈仪的计划模式却没能使这个海岛取得发展。反而铸成了以1945年为界的原住民与移民之间的矛盾。经济上的垄断腐蚀了陈仪的政府，并逐渐演变为依靠军警力量维护垄断的局面。
陈仪政府面临的挑战越来越多。1946年末，失望和不满充斥全岛，城市中的矛盾尤其不可调和。通货膨胀演变为恶性通胀，失业率屡创新高，大陆移民与1945年前的原住民政治裂痕恶化。台湾人对省政府和大陆人的憎恨濒临一触即发的境地。
二二八事变与蒋介石的内心变化
1947年2月27日，一场起义终于爆发了。台北的一名烟草小贩遭到了专卖局人员的殴打。愤怒的人群包围了专卖局人员逃进的大楼，要求交出这些打人者。
第二天早晨暴力事件发生了。2月28日，行政长官公署的安保人员向抗议人群扣下了机关枪的扳机，数人死亡。台湾民众很快就控制了局面，因为蒋介石为了对付大陆上的共产党将大部分部队都调走了，岛上只有5000名警察和士兵。
起义持续了一周时间，随后蒋介石从福建派遣了大量部队镇压了这次起义。镇压行动造成的破坏很严重，死者估计达到2万。（在接下来的日子里，“二二八事变”成了台湾的禁语。然而现在台湾将每年的这一天作为和平纪念日。）
这次事件的影响是巨大的。多数历史学家和政治学家认为这是台湾二战后影响最为深远的单一事件。胡佛档案馆的蒋介石日记印证了这种看法。起初身在南京的蒋介石并未特别看重此次事件，甚至一直到起义爆发后的3月1日都对此只字未提。蒋介石在日记中将这次起义的绝大多数责任归咎于陈仪的“愚蠢和无能”。但蒋介石也知道，之前正是由于陈仪对台湾局势的牢牢掌控，才使自己决定将“多数军队转移到大陆”。
当蒋介石意识到问题在逐渐恶化，他开始认真对待台湾的安全形势。他召李翼中（国民党台湾省委主席）回到南京介绍事态，同时派遣杨亮功（闽台监察使）赴台调查起义的起因经过。
3月8日，李翼中呈蒋介石的报告称，对政治经济过紧的控制是此次事件爆发的主要原因。为了换取台湾民众对国民党政府的支持，李翼中做出了四点建议：废除台湾行政长官公署；设立台湾省政府，拔擢更多的台湾人进入管理层；加速推进地方选举；减少国有企业数量增加私人企业数量。
蒋介石认真的听取了他的意见，认识到起义分裂了台湾民众。他开始相信起义激起的台湾民众要多于他事先所想，国民党如想要赢得台湾民众的尊重，政府必须先获得岛民的支持。蒋介石视台湾为党和政府的最后堡垒，不能再把这里输给共产党了。根据记载，在与国民党其他领导人讨论李翼中的建议之后，蒋介石对他们的计划仅“略加修改”即付诸实施。
3月9日，蒋介石派遣白崇禧赴台湾表达他对民众的同情，安抚他们并声明首要任务是恢复秩序。当夜，蒋介石在他的日记中写下“研究要如何出售国有企业”必须成为首要事项并在之后的日子里严格执行，这是他首次考虑出售国企的事项，与他之前一直笃信的计划经济压倒一切的治国理念大相径庭。
白崇禧和杨亮功在3月末返回了南京，他们报告蒋介石的结论是——僵化的经济政策是导致起义的主要原因。
1947年4月17日白崇禧对国民党中央委员会的报告中建议，政经改革必须尽快实施。他强调政府应该帮助私人企业发展，同时必须限制国有企业的数量和影响力。
杨亮功建议撤销声名狼藉的专卖局和贸易局，重组政府，征召更多的台湾本地人进入省政府高层。
台湾新经济胎动
蒋介石确信台湾脆弱的安全形势和糟糕的社会状况需要政府和政党的改革，并因此密切关注了李翼中、白崇禧和杨亮功的建议。5月15日，在他们的建议下，蒋介石废置了台湾行政长官公署，成立了新的省政府，以魏道明取代了陈仪。（两年后，陈仪被控勾结大陆共产党，1950年被处决。）
魏道明（曾任行政院秘书长和驻美大使）政府着手逐步恢复之前的损失。他改革了专卖局，撤销了贸易局，将一些如台湾火柴公司、印务局和台湾矿业公司等公有企业私有化，公有制企业开始为一般民众和私营企业生产消费品服务。魏道明政府还把公有土地转手给台湾农民，鼓励食物和特殊农作物以自由市场的形式流通。
魏道明雇佣更多台湾本地人，任命高素质、有经验的本地人进入政府高层。尽管他的行动并没有大幅削减计划经济这头巨兽，但提供了对私有企业的新的激励方式，私有企业得以为市场经济生产产品，而市场经济也因此开始壮大。
二二八事变不会是蒋介石转变的唯一原因，但蒋的日记表明，这次事件挑战了他和一些国民党领导人的既有认识，他们开始思考“计划经济出了什么错？”之后，当蒋介石看到一个新的国家控制的僵化经济体系时，他就意识到了这将是众多问题的温床。
作者郭岱君，斯坦福大学胡佛研究所研究员。曾是斯坦福大学东亚研究中心客座讲师（2003）和台湾淡江大学美国研究所副教授（1997-2000）。她曾做过中华民国总统的新闻秘书（1990-1995），总统府第一局副局长（1989-1997）和波士顿的中华民国信息办公室主任（1987-1988）。
英文原文：
A Turning Point for Taiwan
by Tai-Chun Kuo
Newly released volumes of the Chiang Kai-shek diaries illuminate a pivotal moment： the generalissimo’s turning away from a command economy. By Tai-chun Kuo.
Scholars have long been curious about how the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek turned aside from a command economy on Taiwan and instead built a market economy more productive than any in Chinese history. A pivotal moment in that transformation took place in 1947， midway between the Allies’ defeat of Imperial Japan and Chiang’s own defeat on the Chinese mainland by communist forces. The catalyst was violence： that year， an uprising on Taiwan was suppressed by the Nationalists， and as Chiang pondered the causes of that revolt， according to newly available volumes of the generalissimo’s diaries housed at the Hoover Institution， he decided to change course.
STATE CONTROL AFTER JAPANESE RULE
In the fall of 1945， soon after the Japanese surrender， Chiang appointed Chen Yi as the first governor-general of the Taiwan Provincial Administration Executive Office whose duties were to help Taiwan recover from Japanese colonial rule. Chiang’s Nationalist (Kuomintang) government， still based in Nanjing， was struggling with the communists led by Mao Zedong. During the next two years， Chen nationalized all physical assets on Taiwan having to do with industry， trade， commerce， and transportation.
A half century of Japanese rule and heavy war damage had taken their toll. Taiwan was plagued by lack of industrial production， distortions in agriculture， a foreign exchange shortage， serious inflation， and a rapidly increasing population. Chen， a devoted believer in Sun Yat-sen’s doctrines， interpreted Sun’s theory of “restricting private capital while promoting state capital” (jiezhi siren ziben， fada guojia ziben) to mean that transactions should be bankrolled and approved by the state.
Chen， who often said that “there would be no future for China if we failed to develop state enterprises，” complained that all capitalists were selfish and wanted to create monopolies.
Chiang shared Chen’s belief that state enterprises were superior to private enterprises and that a planned， command economy would strengthen China’s national security and improve people’s welfare. Most Nationalist leaders， in fact， believed in the power of a command economy during the 1930s and 1940s. In his 1943 book China’s Destiny， Chiang stressed that “only a state-controlled planned economy could integrate defense with economic development.”
Thus， with Chiang’s support， Chen rapidly consolidated his enormous political and economic power as garrison commander and executive administrator of the Taiwan Provincial Administration Executive Office. He declared that he would use the Japanese wealth produced during the colonial period to make Taiwan “an experimental incubator of the Three People’s Principles”： Sun’s doctrine of nationalism， democracy， and people’s livelihood.
Chen’s consolidation of Taiwan’s assets called for all Japanese and Japanese- Taiwanese industrial and mining organizations to transfer their wealth to the new Nationalist state enterprises. The compendium of laws making this transfer legal and workable was called “An Outline Plan for the Take- Over of Taiwan’s Wealth” (Taiwan jieguan jihua gangyao). Following the plan， Chen ordered the provincial government to confiscate all industrial and mining business (Article 32)， all public and private transportation (Article 52)， all food production and distribution (Article 68)， and all land previously owned by the Japanese (Article 82)， a transfer of wealth that took place from November 1945 through June 1946.
Chen ordered that the School Property Committee manage all educational structures and property and the Land Committee manage land disputes. The four largest private sugar companies under Japanese control were amalgamated into the Taiwan Sugar Company. Taiwan’s six oil companies were merged into the China Petroleum Corporation.
Taiwan’s first postwar governor often said that “there would be no future for China if we failed to develop state enterprises，” and he complained that all capitalists were selfish and wanted to create monopolies.
Chen’s administration also set up new economic control agencies. The Trade Bureau dictated the import and export of major goods and raw materials. The Monopoly Bureau regulated weights and measures and oversaw the production and marketing of salt， camphor， opium， matches， liquor， tobacco， and other products. Privately manufacturing or selling those products was strictly prohibited. The Food Bureau set up food policy， purchased foodstuffs， levied land taxes， and oversaw food production. The Coal Adjustment Committee monopolized the energy supply， forcing private miners to sell all their coal to the committee.
By late 1946， Taiwan’s provincial government controlled a command economy made up of 70 percent of industrial wealth and 72 percent of Taiwan’s land， but Chen’s command system was unable to revitalize the island’s economy. Moreover， it poisoned relations between the pre-1945 and post- 1945 inhabitants of Taiwan. The power of economic monopoly corrupted Chen’s administration and led it to rely on police power to eliminate competitors.
The challenges confronting Chen’s administration quickly grew more serious. By the end of 1946， frustration and grievances were widespread in Taiwan， especially in the cities. Inflation had become hyperinflation， unemployment was skyrocketing， and the political rift between the mainlanders and the pre-1945 Taiwanese had worsened. Taiwanese resentments toward the provincial administration and the mainlanders were on the verge of boiling over.
A REVOLT AND CHIANG’S CHANGE OF HEART
Thus on February 27， 1947， a revolt finally erupted. The flashpoint came when a Taipei cigarette vendor was roughed up by an agent of the Monopoly Bureau. Angry crowds surrounded a building where the agent had fled， demanding that he be brought forth.
Violence ensued the following morning， February 28， when security forces at the governor-general’s office fired machine guns at demonstrators protesting the incident， killing several. The Taiwanese soon took control because Chiang had transferred the bulk of his forces to the mainland to fight communists， leaving only some 5，000 police officers and soldiers on the island.
The command economy poisoned relations between pre-1945 and post-1945 inhabitants of Taiwan. Chen Yi’s administration grew corrupt and leaned on police power to eliminate black-market competitors.
The uprising lasted a week， at which time a large force of Chiang’s troops arrived from Fujian to suppress it. Damage was extensive， and the death toll was estimated to be as high as 20，000. (In the following years， the “228 uprising” was a taboo subject in Taiwan. Today， however， Taiwan commemorates every February 28 as Peace Memorial Day.)
The uprising’s impact was enormous. Most historians and political scientists agree that it had a more profound and enduring effect on Taiwan than any other single event after World War II. The Chiang diaries at the Hoover Archives bear this out. Chiang， then in Nanjing， didn’t take the uprising seriously at first， not mentioning it in his diary until March 1， the day after the revolt broke out. In his diary， Chiang wrote that Chen was mostly responsible for the uprising because of his “ignorance and incapability.” Chiang also acknowledged that his own decision to transfer “most of the troops to the mainland” contributed to Chen’s inability to control the situation.
As Chiang realized that the problem was worsening， he began to take Taiwan’s security seriously. He summoned Li Yizhong (chairman of the Kuomintang Taiwan Provincial Commission) back to Nanjing to apprise him of the situation and， at the same time， sent Yang Lianggong (the censor of Fukien and Taiwan from the Control Yuan) to Taiwan to investigate why and how the uprising had occurred.
On March 8， Li reported to Chiang that tight political and economic control had mainly provoked the disaster. To win Taiwanese support for the Nationalist government， Li made the following four suggestions： abolish the Taiwan Provincial Administration Executive Office and replace it with a new provincial government； appoint more Taiwanese to top provincial administrative positions； speed up local elections； and downsize state enterprises and create private ones.
Chiang listened carefully， for he now realized that the uprising had divided Taiwan’s people. He also came to believe that the uprising had infuriated more Taiwanese than he had first realized and that his government must win the support of the island’s people if the Kuomintang were to win their respect and admiration. Chiang， also seeing Taiwan as the last bastion of his government and party， could not face another loss to the communists. After discussing Li’s suggestions with other Nationalist leaders， Chiang accepted them “with a little revision，” according to one published account.
On March 9， then， Chiang sent Defense Minister Bai Chongxi to Taiwan to express Chiang’s sympathy to the people and to calm them by insisting that order should now prevail. That evening， Chiang noted in his diary that “studying how to sell state enterprises” must become an important objective and be taken seriously in the coming days， marking the first time that Chiang indicated he was thinking of selling out state enterprises， a tone very different from his previously stated beliefs in the superiority of a command economy.
Both Bai and Yang returned to Nanjing in late March and reported to Chiang their conclusion that applying rigid economic policies was the major reason behind the uprising.
Thus in his report to the Kuomintang Central Committee on April 17， 1947， Bai recommended that political and economic reforms take place as quickly as possible. He stressed that the government should help the private sector develop and reform the state enterprises by restricting their number and limiting their influence.
Yang suggested abolishing the notorious Monopoly Bureau and Trade Bureau， reorganizing the administration government， and recruiting more Taiwanese to top jobs in the provincial government.
TAIWAN’S ECONOMIC SHIFT BEGINS
Chiang， by now convinced that Taiwan’s weak security and social disability were major problems demanding government and party reform， paid close attention to the suggestions offered by Li， Yang， and Bai. Accepting their ideas， Chiang abolished the Taiwan Provincial Administration Executive Office， installed a new provincial government， and replaced Chen with a new governor， Wei Tao-ming， on May 15， 1947. (Two years later， Chen was accused of collaborating with the mainland communists. He was executed in 1950.)
Chiang believed that Taiwan was the last bastion for his government and party. He could not tolerate another loss of territory to the communists.
Governor Wei (who had previously served as secretary-general of the Executive Yuan and ambassador to the United States) took steps to repair the damage. He reformed the Monopoly Bureau， abolished the Trade Bureau， privatized some public enterprises—such as the Taiwan Matches Company， the Printing Department， and the Taiwan Mining Company—and undertook to make public enterprises responsible for producing intermediate products and the private sector， for consumer goods. The Wei administration also sold public land to Taiwanese farmers and encouraged free markets for the distribution of food and special crops.
Wei also hired more Taiwanese and began appointing qualified， experienced Taiwanese to high positions in the administration. Although Wei’s actions did not greatly reduce the huge command economy， they did provide new incentives to form private enterprises to manufacture products for a market economy that had now begun to expand.
The February 28 uprising is not the only explanation for Chiang’s shift， but his diaries show that the uprising challenged him and other Nationalist leaders to ask， “What has gone wrong with the planned economy？” As Chiang looked anew at an economic system rigidly controlled by the state， he realized that it was the source of many problems.
Tai-chun Kuo is a research fellow at Hoover Institution， Stanford University. Previously， she was a visiting lecturer at the Center for East Asian Studies， Stanford University (2003) and an associate professor at the Graduate Institute of American Studies， Tamkang University (Taiwan， 1997–2000). She served as press secretary to the Republic of China (ROC) president (1990–95)， deputy director–general of the First Bureau of the Presidential Office (1989–97)， and director of the ROC Government Information Office in Boston (1987–88).
来源:东西网
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