主权财富基金:世界级最高身价俱乐部

Sovereign-wealth funds
主权财富基金
The world‘s most expensive club
世界级最高身价俱乐部
2007年5月24日
摘自经济学人印刷版
China‘s investment in Blackstone shows how government investors are flourishing at the heart of the financial system
中国投资黑石是政府投资大戏的开始

WITH $1.2 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves and the pool growing by more than $1 billion every day, China casts a giant‘s shadow over the global financial markets, even if it has mostly used the money to pile up American Treasury bonds. The announcement on May 21st that it would invest $3 billion of its reserves in Blackstone, a New York-based private-equity firm soon to issue shares, shows that it is prepared to barge into murky private markets as well as liquid public ones. It is not the only inscrutable country to be cosying up to the inscrutable private-equity industry. Around the world, a secretive society is emerging of governments flush with foreign assets, some of them petrodollars, that are increasingly calling the shots in international finance. The Blackstone deal is likely to stir others to invest their money even farther away from prying eyes than they do already.
尽管中国通常,并且愈来愈多地购买美国债券，其1万2千亿并且以每天10亿速度增长的外汇储备给全球的金融市场带来了巨大的阴影。 中国将以其外汇储备的30亿美元投资于黑石公司，该公司是一家位于美国的私人股本公司，不久将发行股票。这一发布于5月21日的消息表明中国将准备同时涉足隐秘的私人股权市场和高流通的公设市场。 神秘的中国偏好于神秘莫测的私人股权公司，这并不是唯一。 纵观全球，拥有巨额海外资产的政府悄然显现，其资产一部分是石油美元，他们愈来愈多地操纵着国际金融市场。 这次对黑石公司的交易很可能激起浪潮，使得资金投资更加远离公众的关注，比之于目前更甚。
Like China, whose proposed Blackstone stake is part of $300 billion that the government plans to set aside this year for investment purposes, dozens of countries have set up what are now commonly referred to as sovereign-wealth funds. They manage money drawn from reserves, natural-resource payments and the like. China is chiefly concerned to diversify its foreign reserves, but other sovereign-wealth funds own national, as well as international, assets.
中国计划中的黑石股份的投资是其政府为投资目的而计划预留的3千亿美元的一部分，和中国一样，十多个其它国家已经建立起普遍称之为的主权财富基金。 他们管理着从外汇储备，自然资源投资和其它类似的资源中抽取的资金。 中国主要是关心其外汇储备的多元化，而其它主权财富基金则同时拥有国有的和国际的资产。
The top 12 each have anything from $20 billion to hundreds of billions of dollars to invest (see table). Recently, Japan, Russia and India have reportedly been considering setting up funds along similar lines. Some estimates put the size of the funds at $2.5 trillion by the end of this year (in contrast, hedge funds are thought to have a mere $1.6 trillion), with another $450 billion in transfers from reserves being added annually. Including capital appreciation, the amount could swell to $12 trillion by 2015.
排名前12名的这些基金的投资从200亿美元到几千亿美元不等（见表）。 据报道，近来日本，俄罗斯和印度一直考虑按照同样的路线建立基金。 据估计到年底这些资金的规模将达到2万5千亿（而对冲基金据认为只有1万6千亿），另外每年将增加从储备资金转移来的4500亿美元。 算上资本增值，该数量到2015年可能膨胀到12万亿美元。

To the extent governments have traditionally held investment assets, it was to protect domestic currencies and banks from crisis. Since the funds were for emergencies, they were of a type that could be liquidated easily—initially the holdings were in precious metals, lately they have been in dollars. The idea of building up an endowment to replace shrinking natural resources did not exist.
传统上政府持有投资资产的最大目的是使其国内货币和银行免于金融危机的发生。 由于这些基金是为应付紧急事件而准备的，他们投资的类型就是容易兑现-因此最初他们持有贵金属，近来他们持有美元。 建立基金以替代日益减少的自然资源，这样的想法还不存在。
That process may have started inadvertently in 1956 when the British administration of the Gilbert Islands in Micronesia put a levy on the export of phosphates—bird manure—used in fertiliser. The manure has long since been depleted. However, a once-tiny set-aside of money has become the Kiribati Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund, a $520m investment portfolio that has grown to about nine times the tiny atoll‘s GDP.
这个过程在1956年本来可以自然开始的，那时在位于密克罗尼西亚的吉尔伯特群岛上英国管理部门对出口用作肥料的磷酸盐-鸟的粪肥-强制增税。 如今粪肥早已耗尽。 然而，一次少许的资金存留逐渐成为基里巴斯的国家收入平均储备基金。52亿美元的投资组合已经增长到大约是这个小小岛国GDP的九倍。
A similar approach is now common among oil-producing countries, which, it is estimated, account for two-thirds of the assets in these sovereign-wealth funds, and are keen to diversify their national revenues, aware that their wealth is being pumped away. They have typically invested along similar lines to central banks, holding bonds, dollars and bank deposits. Temasek, a Singaporean entity created in 1974 to pool state-owned investments, started to change the mindset. It subsequently evolved into an even more complex investment vehicle. The heady combination of state-control, success and secrecy, entranced other governments.
在产油国同样的方法普遍存在，据估计，这些国家占了主权财富基金总资产的三分之二，意识到他们的财富正在被抽离，因而急于使他们的国民收入投资多元化。 很有代表性地，他们同样投资于中央银行，持有债券，持有美元，同时持有银行存款。 创建于1974年，管理着国有资产投资的新加坡淡马锡公司开始改变这样的投资思维。 并随后发展成为一种更为复杂的投资手段。 它把国家控股，成功，隐秘，机智有效的结合起来，因而对其它国家的政府极具吸引力。
Recently, central bankers have also begun wondering whether they have a fiduciary duty to make higher returns from the public wealth under their supervision, which could mean placing at least some part of foreign-exchange reserves in high-yielding, if less liquid, investments. In Asia this question has become increasingly pertinent in the past two years, as reserves have mushroomed.
近来，中央银行的银行家们也开始对之困惑，他们作为受托方是否有责任在他们的监管下为其委托人从社会财富中谋取更高的回报，这可能意味着至少把一部分的外汇储备用于低流通，但产出高的投资。 在亚洲，随着外汇储备的迅速增加，这个问题变得愈加紧迫。
The result has been a torrent of money into a finite pool of assets. There is no precedent for such fortunes suddenly to find their way into global financial markets, and they help explain the waterfall of liquidity that has driven up the value of risky (and less risky) assets of all descriptions around the world. The world‘s entire supply of shares is $55 trillion, and bonds account for a similar amount. Sovereign-wealth funds could soon become the most important buyers of such assets, and many others besides. If so, the world will witness the intriguing spectacle of its largest private companies being owned by governments whose belief in capitalism is often partial.
其结果已经演变为有限资产市场中泛滥的资金洪流。 像这样大量的财富突然涌入全球的金融市场，还没有先例。这是迅猛的流通性增长推高全球各种各样风险资产（和非风险资产）价值的原因 。 全世界全部的股票供应量是55万亿美元，债券占有同样的数量。 主权财富基金不久有可能成为这些资产最重要的买家，包括许多其它资产。 如果真是这样的话，人们将见证这有趣的奇观，其最大的私营企业为对资本主义半信半疑的一些政府所拥有。
The last time governments were this involved in sinking money into private assets, the process tended to be called nationalisation. Now the funds are invested both abroad and domestically. A new term will have to be coined: internationalisation, perhaps.
上次政府涉及在私有资产上花费金钱，其过程常常被称之为国有化. 现在这些基金同时投资在国内和国外。 由此可能杜撰出新的名词： 国际拥有化。
Northern light
来自北方的曙光
Of the biggest sovereign funds, only Norway‘s provides anything close to transparency. Each year it discloses its investment portfolios and returns. Without such a window on their investments, it is hard to fathom the interests of other funds—how they vote on shareholder motions, for example. There are likely to be questions about strategic objectives, too. What will they care about most? Economic returns, political objectives, securing strategic resources? It will be hard to tell.
在所有最大的主权基金中，唯有挪威的基金更趋透明度。 每年它都会披露其投资组合和盈利。 如果其它基金没有提供这样一个披露其投资的窗口，很难弄清楚他们的偏好-比如，他们怎样对股东提议进行表决。 也可能存在关于战略目标的问题。 他们关心最多的是什么？ 经济收益，政治目标，还是战略资源的安全保障？ 都很难说。
Andrew Rozanov, of State Street Bank, argues that the lack of well-defined obligations and the ability to retain funds indefinitely while not having to reveal results is an investment advantage. The funds can harvest the benefits of volatility and illiquidity unavailable to the risk averse. It would not be surprising if some did particularly well. On the other hand, the same factors that could lead to higher returns could also lead to corruption and untoward political intervention.
State Street Bank银行的Andrew Rozanov认为，缺少规范的职责，能无限期的保持基金，同时不必透露其投资成效是这些基金投资的优势。 这些基金能从市场的波动中以及因风险规避而必然的高流通性中获益， 如果有些基金特别地成功，这并不稀奇。 另一方面，导致更高回报的这些因素同样也能产生腐败以及有害的政治干预。
But the kind of assets the funds invest in—big ones—can generate frictions even when run properly. Temasek has been embroiled in controversy in Thailand after it bought Shin Corp, one of the country‘s telecoms companies, from Thaksin Shinawatra, the country‘s deposed prime minister. China is no stranger to such tensions. In an event that still rankles, CNOOC, the state-controlled oil company, was blocked in America, supposedly on national-security grounds from acquiring Unocal, an oil company. It is quite possible that by purchasing a non-voting interest in Blackstone, China will be able to bypass the restrictions that might prevent it doing Unocal-style deals in Europe and America.
主权基金投资的这种资产-特别是大型的-可能产生冲突，甚至运行良好时也会发生。 淡马锡公司由于从泰国前总理Thaksin Shinawatra手中购买了该国电信企业Shin Corp而卷入和泰国的争吵中。 中国对于此类紧张事件并不陌生。 国家控股的石油公司中海油CNOOC因美国以国家安全为由的阻击而未能成功收购美国石油公司优尼科，这起事件的恶劣影响至今尤在。 很有可能，中国这次通过购买黑石公司无投票权股权而绕过在欧美类似优尼科事件中阻止其交易的限制。
By choosing a private-equity firm, China will also be able to invest directly in a partner that, notwithstanding its forthcoming share offering, can keep many of its operations out of the public eye. But this is where the ironies of the deal are most apparent. “Crony capitalism? It is a marriage made in heaven—a partnership that does not want investors to ask questions with a country whose firms do not want investors to ask questions. I worry about the serious conflicts of interest this generates. More generally, government entities shouldn‘t be in the business of investing in private firms,” opines Raghuram Rajan, of the University of Chicago‘s Graduate School of Business.
通过选择私人股权公司，中国也能够直接投资在合伙人方，他们可以使投资运作免于公众的关注，尽管即将到来的股权交割众所周知。 而这也是此次交易最具讽刺意味的方面。  芝加哥大学商业研究所的Raghuram Rajan说，“是裙带资本主义吗？ 真是绝佳的联姻-和其公司投资者无权过问的国家进行的其投资者无权过问的合作。 我担心这会产生严重的利益冲突。 一般来讲，政府法人不应该投资在私人公司。”
Moreover, it is widely believed that by having China as a partner, Blackstone will receive preferential access to China‘s market (as well as providing China with experience it clearly covets on how to set up its own domestic private-equity industry). This is an advantage for Blackstone, and for its shareholders, China included, particularly so when other private-equity firms complain that the impediments to operating in China are growing.
再者，据广泛认为，由于和中国合作，黑石集团能优先进入中国的市场（同时为中国提供其明显渴望得到的怎样建立国内私人股本企业的经验）。 这对黑石集团，对其董事，包括中国在内都有利。尤其是当其它私人股本公司抱怨在中国操作的阻碍愈来愈大时。
However, providing an economic incentive to a lucky few, even if that includes the government itself, impedes China‘s broader need to create a fair and transparent financial market for all participants. That is what would produce the most efficient market for capital.
然而，为少数幸运者提供经济鼓励，即使其中包括政府自己，也会阻止中国为所有参与者创建公平透明的金融市场的广泛需求。 而这样的需求会产生高效运作的资本市场。
China still has vast holdings of state assets, and its embryonic stockmarket is bubbling over—if anything it needs more publicly traded companies. Like other countries with sovereign-wealth funds, it would appear to need more expertise in selling companies that it owns, rather than learning how to buy the ones it does not.
中国仍然拥有非常大量的国有资产，她新生的股票市场正在迅猛增长-如果她还需要什么的话，那就是更多的上市公司。 正像其它拥有主权财富基金的国家一样，中国似乎需要更多的专业技术使其公司上市出售，而不是学会怎样购买她还没有的公司。