中国能“和平”崛起吗？

Will China’s rise be peaceful?

我正在中国古都西安撰写此文。这里是著名的兵马俑的发现之地，他们默默地见证着古代中国之规模、资源和组织力量。西安地处中国中部，有800万人口。从机场到市区，沿途满是在建的高楼大厦，体现着近年来西安工程建设的繁荣。经济转变是切实可见的——在这个幅员辽阔的国家处处都是如此。

I am writing this in Xi’an, ancient capital of the Chinese empire. This is where the famous terracotta warriors were found, mute witnesses to the scale, resources and organising capacity of the ancient Chinese state. Xi’an is a city of 8m, in the middle of the country. The road from the airport is surrounded with half-finished buildings, a sign of the construction boom of recent years. The economic changes are palpable, as they are elsewhere in this vast country.

中国是个新兴的超级大国。根据大企业联合会(Conference Board)发布的一个令人惊叹的数据库，按购买力平价计算，中国2009年的国内生产总值(GDP)为美国的80%。在1978年，中国人均GDP仅为美国的3%；到2009年，这一比例已接近20%。

China is a nascent superpower. According to the wonderful database published by the Conference Board, its gross domestic product, at purchasing power parity, was 80 per cent of that of the US in 2009. Its GDP per head has risen from a mere 3 per cent of US levels in 1978 to close to 20 per cent in 2009.

按照当前两国的相对增长速度，以购买力平价计算，到2014年，中国经济的绝对规模将超过美国，成为世界第一大国。就算按市场价格计算，中国的GDP在本十年内似乎也几乎肯定会超过美国——部分是因为中国经济的快速增长，部分是因为人民币升值势在必行。

By 2014, at current rates of relative growth, China’s economy will pass the US, in absolute size, to be the biggest in the world, at PPP. Its GDP also seems almost certain to surpass that of the US at market prices before the end of this decade, partly because of its rapid growth and partly because of the inevitable appreciation of the renminbi.

总之，不管以什么方法衡量，中国不久都将取代美国成为世界第一大经济体。从大约1890年以来，美国就一直把持着这个位置。就此看来，这一转变的速度之快，甚至超过了高盛(Goldman Sachs)在其著名的首份“金砖四国”（BRIC，包括巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国）报告中所做的预测。

In short, however measured, China will shortly displace the US from the position it has held as the world’s biggest economy since approximately 1890. To put this in context, this transition is occurring even faster than Goldman Sachs predicted in its celebrated initial report on the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, Indian and China) economies in the early part of the last decade.

此外，中国已经是世界最大的商品出口国（按总量计算），大概也是世界最大的净债权国，尽管相关资产几乎全都投资于低收益率的发达国家政府债务，尤其是美国国债。

Moreover, China is already the world’s largest exporter of goods (in gross terms) and is probably the world’s largest net creditor nation, though almost all of these assets are invested in the low-yielding government debt of the advanced countries, especially the US.

我在此想要探讨的问题是，这一划时代的转变对世界将意味着什么？

The question I want to explore this week is what this epoch-making transition is going to mean for the world?

先来说说不会意味着什么。在相当长时期内，中国仍将是中等收入国家，平均生产率远低于美国及其它领先的高收入国家。

Let me start by suggesting what it will not mean. China will remain a middle-income country for quite a while longer, with average productivity far below that of the US and other leading high-income countries.

美国在今后几十年也必将保持世界科技领先地位，尽管由于其现行的教育、科技和移民等政策，这种优势的持久性已无法保障。另一方面，像中国这样容不得个人言论自由的国家，在科技领域最终能否赶上美国，仍然值得商榷。假如自由的印度在这方面最终领先于中国，我不会感到惊讶。

The US will also surely remain the world’s technological leader for many decades, though the durability of this advantage is no longer guaranteed, given its current policies towards education, science and immigration. At the same time, whether a country as inimical to free individual expression as China can catch up with the US scientifically and technologically, even in the long run, is open to question. I would not be surprised if free-wheeling India ended up doing better than China, in this regard.

由于技术差距等因素，中国的军力（就全球势力范围和技术能力而言）在未来几十年内仍将落后于美国。至于这是否会成为中国的一大障碍，有些人可能看法不同，但我的个人观点是：美国当前大量的军事开支不仅仅是浪费资源，也会诱人干蠢事。

Partly as a result of the technological gap, the Chinese military will also remain behind that of the US, in terms of global reach and technological capacity for quite a few decades. On whether this will prove a serious handicap for China, one might differ: my own view is that much of current US military spending is not only a waste of resources, but a temptation to folly.

此外，中国今后在政治、知识和文化方面所能施加的影响力，似乎不太可能赶上过去60年的美国。美国的流行文化仍具有非凡的吸引力。而且，尽管反美情绪在世界各地普遍存在，但不论是现在还是今后，美国自由、民主和法治的理想对全世界人民的吸引力，都是对本国人民采取压制态度的中国共产党的集权治理模式所不可匹敌的。

Furthermore, it seems unlikely that China will be able to exert the political, intellectual and cultural influence that the US has done over the past six decades. US popular culture remains extraordinarily attractive. Moreover, even though anti-Americanism is widespread, the appeal of American ideals of freedom, democracy and the rule of law to the people of the world is, and will remain, greater than the centralised communist party-state of China, with its oppressive attitudes towards its own population.

简言之，至少在未来几十年内，中国不会成为美国那样占据着绝对主导地位的强国。

China, in short, will not become the predominant power that the US has been, at least over the next few decades.

尽管如此，我们仍然必须认清中国崛起的明显意义。

Nevertheless, we have to recognise what the rise of China does obviously mean.

首先，我们不仅正在目睹美国自诩为“唯一超级大国”的短暂时期的结束，从更广泛的意义上说，我们也正目睹延续多个世纪的西方主导地位的终结。印度崛起成为全球最大的民主国家，加强了这一转变，尽管印度和西方较为亲近。今后几十年内，相对衰落的西方将不得不与世界其它地区合作。这是好事，但也将带来许多重大挑战。

First, we are seeing the end not only of the brief period of the US vision of itself as the “sole superpower”, but, more broadly, of centuries of western domination. The rise of India, though closer the west, as the world’s largest democracy, reinforces this transition. Over the next few decades a west in relative decline will be forced to co-operate with the rest of the world. This is a good thing. But it will create huge challenges.

其次，中国不仅是“非西方”的，也具有截然不同的历史、文化和政治体制。后者或许是最重要的一点。和一个政府不信任本国人民的国家维持信任关系是很困难的，和一个不能接受法治基本原则的政府达成具有约束力的协议同样困难——根据法治的基本原则，人民对政府，具有和政府对人民一样的约束。

Second, China is not only non-Western, but has a distinct history, culture and political system. The latter may be the most important point. It is hard to sustain trusting relations with a country whose government mistrusts its own people. It is no less difficult to enter into binding agreements with a government that cannot accept the fundamental principle of the rule of law - that the law binds the state to the people as much as the people to the state.

第三，我们必须认识到，权力更替总会引起重大摩擦。老牌大国试图维护它们所认为的“自然”秩序，而新兴大国则不满它们不断上升的实力和地位总是迟迟得不到承认。

Third, we have to recognise that transitions of power always create huge frictions, with the incumbents trying to protect what they see as the “natural” order of things and the insurgents resentful of always delayed recognition of their rising power and status.

但我们也必须理解，当前正在进行的转变的潜在好处。全世界人民——在运气好并且具备远见卓识的情况下——可以共享繁荣，为构建一个更美好的共同未来献策献力。

Yet we also need to understand the potential advantages of the transformation now under way. The population of the world could, with luck and judgement, share in prosperity and contribute its ideas and energy to securing a better future for everybody.

照此下去，结局会怎样呢？我设想了三种可能的结果：

So how might this end? I envisage three possible outcomes.

第一，“正和”观点胜出。假如各方意识到，相互之间并不存在任何深刻的意识形态冲突，彼此经济上互为依赖，大家必须共同面对这个星球的命运，在核时代不可能爆发战争，那么就有望促成可观的全球合作。要实现这种局面，各方也必须作出深刻的合作承诺。但近期在气候变化、全球失衡等领域看不到这种势头。

First, the “positive sum” view wins out. Awareness of the absence of any deep ideological conflict, of mutual economic dependence, of a shared planetary destiny and of the impossibility of war in a nuclear age force adequate levels of global co-operation. For this to happen there must also be a profound commitment to co-operation, not much evident recently in such areas as climate change or global imbalances.

第二，“负和”观点得胜。权力是相对的。老牌大国和新兴大国竞逐主导地位。资源同样是有限的。在这个世界上，经济混乱和对稀缺资源的争夺将导致全球化倒退，而均势政治将主导国际关系。或许会出现一个以制衡中国为宗旨的联盟，成员至少包括美国、欧洲、印度和日本，其它国家也有可能加入。

Second, the “negative sum” view wins out. Power is relative. The incumbent and the rising powers compete for dominance. Resources, similarly, are finite. In this world, economic disarray and the struggle for scarce resources lead to a retreat from globalisation, while balance of power politics dominate international relations. We may see the emergence of a balancing coalition against China, consisting, at the least, of the US, Europe, India and Japan, possibly joined by other powers.

第三，我们姑且设想一种混合了上述两种情景的结局：全球化和一定程度的全球合作“幸存下来”，但随着中国对自身在国际体系中的地位变得更加自信，典型的均势政治将变得更加重要。这大体上就是第一次世界大战前的局势——可不是一个鼓舞人心的先例。

Third, we muddle through, with a mixture of the above two approaches: globalisation and a degree of economic co-operation survive, but classic balance of power politics become more significant, as China, in turn, becomes more assertive of its rank in the world system. This, roughly speaking, was the world before the first world war - not an encouraging precedent.

这些不过是关于我们这个时代必将面临的一个根本挑战的初步想法。我们如何应对所有其它挑战，都将取决于这个根本挑战。

These are just preliminary thoughts on what is surely the fundamental challenge of our era and the one on which solution of all other challenges depends.

在应对上述大转变的过程中可能发生什么，应该怎么做，诸位读者有何看法？

What do readers think will and should happen to manage this great transition?