Phenomenology - Wikipedia, the free encyclope...

Phenomenology
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to:navigation,search
This article is about the philosophical movement. For other uses, seePhenomenology (disambiguation).
Phenomenology has at least three main meanings inphilosophical history: one in the writings ofG.W.F. Hegel, another in the writings ofEdmund Husserl in1920, and a third, deriving from Husserl‘s work, in the writings of his former research assistantMartin Heidegger in1927:
ForG.W.F. Hegel, phenomenology is an approach tophilosophy that begins with an exploration ofphenomena (what presents itself to us in conscious experience) as a means to finally grasp the absolute, logical, ontological and metaphysical Spirit that is behind phenomena. This has been called a "dialectical phenomenology".
ForEdmund Husserl, phenomenology is "the reflective study of the essence of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view"[1] Phenomenology takes the intuitive experience ofphenomena (what presents itself to us in phenomenological reflexion) as its starting point and tries to extract from it the essential features of experiences and theessence of what we experience. When generalized to the essential features of any possible experience, this has been called "transcendental phenomenology". Husserl‘s view was based on aspects of the work ofFranz Brentano and was developed further by philosophers such asMaurice Merleau-Ponty,Max Scheler,Hannah Arendt,Dietrich von Hildebrand andEmmanuel Levinas.
Martin Heidegger believed that Husserl‘s approach overlooked basic structural features of both the subject and object of experience - what he called their "being", and expanded phenomenological enquiry to encompass our understanding and experience of Being itself, thus making phenomenology the method (in the first phase of his career at least) of the study of being:ontology.
The difference in approach between Husserl and Heidegger influenced the development ofexistential phenomenology andexistentialism inFrance, as is clear from the work ofJean-Paul Sartre andSimone de Beauvoir;Munich phenomenology (Johannes Daubert,Adolf Reinach,Alexander Pfänder inGermany andAlfred Schütz in Austria), andPaul Ricoeur. Readings of Husserl and Heidegger have also been crucial aspects of the philosophies ofJacques Derrida andBernard Stiegler.
Contents
[hide]
1 Historical overview of the use of the term2 Husserl and the origin of his Phenomenology2.1 Precursors and influences
3 Husserl‘s Logische Untersuchungen (1900/1901)4 Transcendental phenomenology after the Ideen (1913)5 Realist phenomenology6 Existential phenomenology7 Criticisms of phenomenology8 Phenomenology in architecture9 List of Phenomenologists and Phenomenology-Derived Theorists10 See also11 Further reading12 External links12.1 Journals
13 References
Historical overview of the use of the term
While the term "phenomenology" was used several times in thehistory of philosophy beforeHusserl, modern use ties it more explicitly to his particular method. Following is a list of thinkers in rough chronological order who used the term "phenomenology" in a variety of ways, with brief comments on their contributions:[2]
Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702 - 1782)Germanpietist, for the study of the "divine system of relations".
David Hume (1711 – 1776)Scottishphilosopher, called variably askeptic or a common sense advocate. While this connection is somewhat tendentious, Hume, inA Treatise of Human Nature, does seem to take a phenomenological or psychological approach by describing the process of reasoning causality in psychological terms. This is also the inspiration for the Kantian distinction betweenphenomenal andnoumenal reality.
Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728–1777) (mathematician,physician andphilosopher) for the theory of appearances underlying empirical knowledge.
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), in theCritique of Pure Reason, distinguished between objects asphenomena, which are objects as shaped and grasped by human sensibility and understanding, and objects as things-in-themselves ornoumena, which do not appear to us in space and time and about which we can make no legitimate judgements.
Georg Hegel (1770–1831) challenged Kant‘s doctrine of the unknowable thing-in-itself, and declared that by knowing phenomena more fully we can gradually arrive at a consciousness of the absolute and spiritual truth of Divinity. Hegel‘s Phenomenology of Spirit, published in 1807, prompted many opposing views including the existential work ofSøren Kierkegaard,Martin Heidegger andJean-Paul Sartre, as well as the materialist work ofMarx and his many followers.
Franz Brentano (1838-1917) seems to have used the term in some of his lectures atVienna, whereEdmund Husserl studied with him and came under his influence.
Carl Stumpf (1848-1936), student of Brentano and mentor to Husserl, used it to refer to an ontology of sensory contents.
Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) established phenomenology at first as a kind of "descriptive psychology" and later as a transcendental andeidetic science of consciousness. He is considered as the founder of contemporary phenomenology.
Max Scheler (1874-1928) developed further the phenomenological method of Edmund Husserl and extended it to include also a reduction of thescientific method. He influenced the thinking ofPope John Paul II andEdith Stein.
Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) criticized Husserl‘s theory of phenomenology as he attempted to develop a theory of ontology that led him to his original theory of Dasein, the non-dualistic human being.
Alfred Schütz (1899-1959) developed a phenomenology of the social world on the basis of everyday experience which has influenced major sociologists such asHarold Garfinkel,Peter Berger andThomas Luckmann.
Later usage is mostly based on or (critically) related to Husserl‘s introduction and use of the term. This branch of philosophy differs from others in that it tends to be more "descriptive" than "prescriptive".
Husserl and the origin of his Phenomenology
Husserl derived many important concepts that are central to phenomenology from the works and lectures of his teachers, the philosophers and psychologistsFranz Brentano andCarl Stumpf.[3] An important element of phenomenology that Husserl borrowed from Brentano wasintentionality, the notion that the main characteristic ofconsciousness is that it is always intentional. Intentionality, which could be summarised as the "directedness" or "aboutness" of mental acts, describes the basic structure of consciousness. Every mental act is directed at or contains an object — the so-called intentional object. Every belief, desire, etc. has an object to which it refers: the believed, the desired. The property of being intentional, of having an intentional object, is the key feature which distinguishes mental/psychical phenomena from physical phenomena (objects), because physical phenomena lack intentionality altogether. Intentionality is the key concept by means of which phenomenology attempts to overcome the subject/object dichotomy prevalent in modern philosophy.
Precursors and influences
Skepticism (for the concept of theepoché)Descartes (Methodological doubt, cogito)British empiricism (Locke, Hume, Berkeley, Mill)Immanuel Kant andneokantianism (for Husserl‘s transcendental turn)Bernard Bolzano (for his ideas on Logic as Wissenschaftslehre)Karl Weierstrass (Husserl studied under him in Berlin and took over many elements for hisPhilosophy of Arithmetic)Franz Brentano (for the concept of intentionality and the method of descriptive psychology)Carl Stumpf (psychological analysis, influenced Husserl‘s early works)
Husserl‘s Logische Untersuchungen (1900/1901)
In the first edition of theLogical Investigations, still under the influence of Brentano, Husserl describes his position as "descriptive psychology". Husserl analyzes the intentional structures of mental acts and how they are directed at both real and ideal objects. The first volume of the Logical Investigations, the Prolegomena to Pure Logic, begins with a devastating critique of psychologism, i.e., the attempt to subsume the a priori validity of the laws of logic under psychology. Husserl establishes a separate field for research in logic, philosophy and phenomenology, independently from the empirical sciences.[4]
Transcendental phenomenology after the Ideen (1913)
Some years after the publication of the Logical Investigations, Husserl made some key elaborations which led him to the distinction between the act of consciousness (noesis) and the phenomena at which it is directed (the noemata).
"noetic" refers to the intentional act of consciousness (believing, willing, hating and loving ...) "noematic" refers to the object or content (noema) which appears in the noetic acts (respectively the believed, wanted, hated and loved ...).
What we observe is not the object as it is in itself, but how and inasmuch it is given in the intentional acts. Knowledge ofessences would only be possible by "bracketing" all assumptions about the existence of an external world and the inessential (subjective) aspects of how the object is concretely given to us. This procedure Husserl called epoché.
Husserl in a later period concentrated more on the ideal, essential structures of consciousness. As he wanted to exclude any hypothesis on the existence of external objects, he introduced the method of phenomenological reduction to eliminate them. What was left over was the pure transcendental ego, as opposed to the concrete empirical ego. Now (transcendental) phenomenology is the study of the essential structures that are left in pure consciousness: this amounts in practice to the study of the noemata and the relations among them. The philosopherTheodor Adorno criticised Husserl‘s concept of phenomenological epistemology in hismetacritique "Against Epistemology", which is anti-foundationalist in its stance.
Transcendental phenomenologists include:Oskar Becker,Aron Gurwitsch andAlfred Schutz.
Realist phenomenology
After Husserl‘s publication of the Ideen in 1913, many phenomenologists took a critical stance towards his new theories. Especially the members of theMunich group distanced themselves from his newtranscendental phenomenology and preferred the earlierrealist phenomenology of the first edition of the Logical Investigations.
Realist phenomenologists include:Adolf Reinach,Alexander Pfänder,Johannnes Daubert,Max Scheler,Roman Ingarden,Nicolai Hartmann, andHans Köchler.
Existential phenomenology
Existential phenomenology differs from transcendental phenomenology by its rejection of the transcendental ego. Merleau-Ponty objects to the ego‘s transcendence of the world, which for Husserl leaves the world spread out and completely transparent before the conscious. Heidegger thinks of conscious being as always already in the world. Transcendence is maintained in existential phenomenology to the extent that the method of phenomenology must take a presuppositionless starting point - transcending claims about the world arising from, for example, natural or scientific attitudes or theories of theontological nature of the world.
WhileHusserl thought philosophy to be a scientific discipline that had to be founded on a phenomenology understood asepistemology,Heidegger held a radically different view. Heidegger himself phrases their differences this way:
For Husserl, the phenomenological reduction is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things and persons back to the transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic experiences, in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness. For us, phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being, whatever may be the character of that apprehension, to the understanding of the Being of this being (projecting upon the way it is unconcealed).[5]
According to Heidegger, philosophy was not at all a scientific discipline, but more fundamental than science itself. According to him science is only one way of knowing the world with no specialized access to truth. Furthermore, the scientific mindset itself is built on a much more "primordial" foundation of practical, everyday knowledge. Husserl was skeptical of this approach, which he regarded as quasi-mystical, and it contributed to the divergence in their thinking.
Instead of taking phenomenology asprima philosophia or a foundational discipline, Heidegger took it as a metaphysical ontology: "being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy".[5] Yet to confuse phenomenology and ontology is an obvious error. Phenomena are not the foundation or Ground of Being. Neither are they appearances, for as Heidegger argues inBeing and Time, an appearance is "that which shows itself in something else," while a phenomenon is "that which shows itself in itself."
While for Husserl, in the epochè, being appeared only as a correlate of consciousness, for Heidegger being is the starting point. While for Husserl we would have to abstract from all concrete determinations of our empirical ego, to be able to turn to the field of pure consciousness, Heidegger claims that: "the possibilities and destinies of philosophy are bound up with man‘s existence, and thus with temporality and with historicality".[5]
However, ontological being and existential being are different categories, so Heidegger‘s conflation of these categories is, according to Husserl‘s view, the root of Heidegger‘s error. Husserl charged Heidegger with raising the question of ontology but failing to answer it, instead switching the topic to the Dasein, the only being for whom Being is an issue. That is neither ontology nor phenomenology, according to Husserl, but merely abstract anthropology. To clarify, perhaps, by abstract anthropology, as a non-existentialist searching for essences, Husserl rejected the existentialism implicit in Heidegger‘s distinction between being (sein) as things in reality from Being (Da-sein) as the encounter with being, as when being becomes present to us, i.e. is unconcealed.[6]
Existential phenomenologists include:Martin Heidegger (1889 –1976),Hannah Arendt (1906 –1975),Emmanuel Levinas (1906 –1995),Gabriel Marcel (1889 –1973),Jean-Paul Sartre (1905 –1980),Paul Ricoeur (1913 -2005), andMaurice Merleau-Ponty (1908 –1961).
Criticisms of phenomenology
Please helpimprove this article by expanding this section.
Further information might be found on thetalk page or atrequests for expansion. Please remove this message once the section has been expanded.
This article has been tagged since April 2007.
Daniel Dennett has criticized phenomenology on the basis that its explicitly first-person approach is incompatible with the scientific third-person approach, going so far as to coin the term "autophenomenology" to emphasize this aspect and to contrast it with his own alternative, which he callsheterophenomenology. Dennett‘s criticism reflects a more general attitude among analytic philosophers of mind. Phenomenologists, however, are often quick to point out that the relationship between phenomenological and natural scientific methods has been a major theme in phenomenology since at least Husserl [see The Crisis of the European Sciences], though Dennett makes no real attempt to engage with the work of phenomenologists on this issue. Many proponents of phenomenology argue that natural science can make sense only as a human activity, i.e., an activity which presupposes the fundamental structures of the ‘first-person perspective.‘ While not hostile to the natural sciences per se, many thinkers in the phenomenological tradition would regard criticisms such as Dennett‘s metaphysical rather than purely scientific claims, and thus susceptible to the usual criticisms directed at metaphysical theories of all kinds [see anything by Heidegger]. Powerful defenses of the phenomenological approach against science-inspired reductive naturalism have been made by Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor among others.
Phenomenology in architecture
Main article:Phenomenology (architecture)
Beginning in the 1970s, phenomenology, with a strong influence from the writings ofMartin Heidegger, began to have a major impact on architectural thinking.Christian Norberg-Schulz was an important figure in this movement. A Norwegian, he graduated from the Eidgenossische Technische HochschuleETH in Zurich in 1949 and eventualy became Dean of the Oslo School of Architecture. His most important writings were Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture (New York: Rizzoli, 1980) and Intentions in Architecture (1963). These books were widely read in architectural schools the 1960s and 1970s. Another architect associated with the phenomenology movement wasCharles Willard Moore, who was Dean of the School of Architecture at Yale from 1965 to 1970. Though interest in phenomenology has waned in recent times, several architects, such asSteven Holl andPeter Zumthor, claim to be phenomenologists.Alberto Pérez-Gómez, professor of architectural history atMcGill University, is also known as a defender of phenomenology.[7]
List of Phenomenologists and Phenomenology-Derived Theorists
Peter BergerMaurice BlanchotStanley CavellJacques DerridaHans-Georg GadamerAron GurwitschMartin HeideggerEdmund HusserlKarl JaspersRichard LaniganEmmanuel LevinasThomas LuckmannGabriel MarcelMaurice Merleau-PontyChristian Norberg-SchulzJose Ortega y GassettAlexander PfänderGeorges PouletAdolf ReinachPaul RicoeurJean-Paul SartreMax SchelerAlfred SchützHerbert SpiegelbergEdith SteinPierre ThevenazHerman Van BredaKarol Wojty?a
See also
Phenomenology of religionHermeneuticsGeneva SchoolStructuralismPoststructuralismSocial constructionismGestalt therapyDark Star, in which anartificially-intelligent superbomb is taught phenomenology, with unexpectedly dire results.
ExistentialismDeconstructionGestalt therapyPhenomenographyPhilosophy of technologyEmergyPersonhood TheoryImportant publications in phenomenological psychology
Further reading
TheIAP LIBRARY offers very fine sources for Phenomenology. TheLondon Philosophy Study Guide offers many suggestions on what to read, depending on the student‘s familiarity with the subject:Phenomenology Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (Oxford: Routledge, 2000) - Charting phenomenology from Brentano, through Husserl and Heidegger, to Gadamer, Arendt, Levinas, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida. Robert Sokolowski, "Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000) - An excellent non-historical introduction to phenomenology.Herbert Spiegelberg, "The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction," 3rd ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983). The most comprehensive source on the development of the phenomenological movement. David Stewart and Algis Mickunas, "Exploring Phenomenology: A Guide to the Field and its Literature" (Athens: Ohio University Press 1990) Michael Hammond, Jane Howarth, and Russell Kent, "Understanding Phenomenology" (Oxford: Blackwell 1995) Christopher Macann, Four Phenomenological Philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty (New York: Routledge: 1993)Jan Pato?ka, "Qu‘est-ce que la phénoménologie?" In: Qu‘est-ce que la phénoménologie?, ed. and trans. E. Abrams (Grenoble: J. Millon 1988), pp. 263–302. An answer to the question, What is phenomenology?, from a student of both Husserl and Heidegger and one of the most important phenomenologists of the latter half of the twentieth century. William A. Luijpen and Henry J. Koren, "A First Introduction to Existential Phenomenology" (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 1969) Richard M. Zaner, "The Way of Phenomenology" (Indianapolis: Pegasus 1970)Hans Köchler, Die Subjekt-Objekt-Dialektik in der transzendentalen Phänomenologie. Das Seinsproblem zwischen Idealismus und Realismus. (Meisenheim a.G.: Anton Hain, 1974) (German)Hans Köchler, Phenomenological Realism: Selected Essays (Frankfurt a. M./Bern: Peter Lang, 1986)Mark Jarzombek, The Psychologizing of Modernity (Cambridge University Press, 2000). Pierre Thévenaz, "What is Phenomenology?" (Chicago: Quadrangle Books 1962) ed. James M. Edie, "An Invitation to Phenomenology" (Chicago: Quadrangle Books 1965) - A collection of seminal phenomenological essays. ed. R. O. Elveton, "The Phenomenology of Husserl: Selected Critical Readings" (Seattle: Noesis Press 2000) - Key essays about Husserl‘s phenomenology. eds. Richard Zaner and Don Ihde, "Phenomenology and Existentialism" (New York: Putnam 1973) - Contains many key essays in existential phenomenology.Albert Borgmann and his work in philosophy of technology. eds. Natalie Depraz,Francisco Varela, Pierre Vermersch, "On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing" (Amsterdam: John Benjamins 2003) - searches for the sources and the means for a disciplined practical approach to exploring human experience. Don Idhe, "Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction" (Albany, NY: SUNY Press) Sara Ahmed, "Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects Others" (Durham: Duke University Press 2006)
External links
What is Phenomenology?About PhenomenologyAbout Edmund HusserlStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entryOrganization of Phenomenology OrganizationsRomanian Society for PhenomenologyPhenomenology OnlineDialectical PhenomenologyThe New Phenomenology
Journals
Bulletin d‘analyse phénoménologiqueJanus Head: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature, Continental Philosophy, Phenomenological Psychology, and the ArtsJournal of the British Society for PhenomenologyResearch in PhenomenologyStudia PhaenomenologicaNewsletter of PhenomenologyIndo-Pacific Journal of PhenomenologyThe Roman Ingarden Philosophical Research CentrePhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
References
^ Smith, David Woodruff (2007), Husserl, London-New York: Routledge^ Partially based on Schuhmann, Karl (2004), ""Phänomenologie": Eine Begriffsgeschichtilche Reflexion", in Leijenhorst, Cees & Piet Steenbakkers, Karl Schuhmann. Selected Papers on Phenomenology, Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer, at 1-33^ Rollinger, Robin (1999), Husserl‘s Position in the School of Brentano, Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer^ On the Logical Investigations, see Zahavi, Dan & Frederik Stjernfelt, eds. (2002), One Hundred Years of Phenomenology (Husserl‘s Logical Investigations Revisited), Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer; and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, ed. (1977), Readings on Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations, Den Haag: Nijhoff ^abcHeidegger, Martin (1975),"Introduction", The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Indiana University Press^ I have attempted to respond to the request for clarification of Heidegger‘s distinction between being and Being. My info source washttp://www.uni.edu/boedeker/NNhHeidegger2.doc. It was not copied and pasted but rephrased for copyright reasons.^Mark Jarzombek - The Psychologizing of Modernity (Cambridge University Press, 2000) - has tried to contextualized this history by showing the way in which phenomenology grew out of and yet critiqued the psychology movement in the arts.