中国抗通胀遭遇政治阻力Beijing faces tough choices as rising prices turn political

Wang Qishan, the Chinese vice-premier, likes to tell foreign visitors who urge a particular course of action on Beijing: “You know, we also have politics here.”

在面对敦促中国政府采取某项行动的外国来访者时，中国国务院副总理王岐山喜欢说：“你知道，我们这里也有政治。”

One of the defining narratives of the global financial crisis is that China’s Communist party technocrats outplayed partisan Washington and an incoherent Europe.

对于全球金融危机，有一个概括性说法是，中国共产党技术派官员的表现，胜过了多党派的美国政府和不团结的欧洲。

There is a good deal of truth in this. Beijing’s 2008 stimulus plan was earlier and more decisive than any other big economy and proved very successful at maintaining growth.

这种说法很符合实情。中国政府2008年推出刺激方案，比其他任何一个大型经济体都更早，更果断，而且非常成功地保住了增长。

Yet as Beijing tries to come off its stimulus high, its leaders are in danger of getting hemmed in by domestic politics. Their thorny problem is rising inflation, which hit 5.1 per cent last month.

但在北京试图退出刺激政策时，其领导人有可能会被国内政治束缚住手脚。他们面临的棘手问题是不断上升的通胀——上月达到了5.1%。

Inflation is one of the red-line political issues in China because ordinary people suffer a double whammy. Not only do living costs rise but the nearly $2,000bn that households hold in deposit accounts start to earn negative returns. Indeed, the current round of inflation is transferring wealth from households to the big borrowers in the corporate and state sectors.

通胀在中国是一个敏感政治议题，因为这会普通民众承受双重打击——不仅生活成本上升，而且近2万亿美元的家庭存款的回报率也开始变为负值。实际上，本轮通胀正将财富从家庭转移至企业和国有部门的大型借款人手中。

Yet politics is restraining the obvious policy responses. Despite the jump in inflation, Beijing has increased interest rates only once in the past year and by only 0.25 per cent.

然而政治却令有关部门无法做出显而易见的政策应对措施。尽管通胀快速上升，但中国政府过去一年只加息一次，而且幅度只有0.25个百分点。

One reason for the caution is that higher rates could hurt the state-owned companies that borrowed so heavily over the past two years for stimulus-related construction.

如此谨慎的一个原因在于，国有企业在过去两年大举借债，从事与刺激政策相关的建设工程，而加息可能会损害这些企业。

The political sensitivities are especially acute in the property sector. In many places, developers are often an extension of the local government. So if Beijing increases borrowing costs, a thunder of criticism can be expected through the party-state system.

房地产行业尤其具有政治敏感性。在许多地区，开发商经常是地方政府的延伸，因此如果中央政府提高借贷成本，这个一党制国家体系中很可能会发出巨大的批评之声。

Exchange-rate moves would offer another obvious tool to damp inflation. Yet intense backroom lobbying by China’s exporters has limited appreciation against the US dollar to little more than 3 per cent this year. Indeed, despite high growth and a still-large current-account surplus, the renminbi has actually been getting weaker against a basket of trading partners’ currencies recently.

汇率调整本来是抑制通胀的另一个常用工具。然而中国出口商私下进行的紧锣密鼓的游说，将人民币兑美元汇率今年的升幅限制在了略高于3%。实际上，尽管经济高速增长，经常账户盈余仍然巨大，但人民币兑一篮子贸易伙伴货币的汇率最近却在下降。

The crucial question is: how stubborn is the present bout of inflation? It is certainly possible that inflation will peak soon and gradually subside next year. The main driver has been food prices, particularly vegetables, which were affected by bad summer weather. If it is only a short-term supply problem, inflation will ease with the next harvest.

关键问题在于：当前这轮通胀有多顽固？存在一种可能性，就是通胀将很快达到峰值并在明年逐渐减退。推动通胀上升的主要因素是食品价格，尤其是受到夏季恶劣天气影响的蔬菜价格。如果只是短期供应问题，通胀将在下一个收获季节得到缓解。

Yet even if this current rise in prices is short lived, there are plenty of reasons to be fearful that higher inflation lurks ahead. Factory wages appear to be rising faster than before. Some economists think the huge overcapacity in industry that held back prices over the past decade is much lower today.

但即便当前的物价上涨只是短期的，人们也有充分的理由担心，未来通胀还有可能继续上升。工厂薪资看上去正在以高过从前的速度增长。一些经济学家认为，工业产能过剩目前已得到明显缓解，而正是这种严重过剩在过去十年抑制了价格上涨。

In addition, there is the potential impact from the ocean of new credit in the economy. Loans doubled last year and money supply has risen by about 50 per cent over the past two years. Informal lending also seems to be growing.

此外，经济中新增的巨额信贷也有潜在影响。贷款量在过去一年中翻了一番，货币供应量在两年内增长了大约50%。非正式信贷看上去也在增长。

Fitch, the rating agency, has calculated that new credit outside the formal banking system has been Rmb3,000bn ($450bn) this year – more than a quarter of the total. “Lending has not moderated; it has merely found new channels,” said Fitch.

评级机构惠誉(Fitch)估计，正式银行体系以外的新增信贷今年达到3万亿元人民币（合4500亿美元）——超过信贷总额的四分之一。惠誉表示：“放贷并未减少，只是找到了新的渠道。”

Given China’s impressive economic record, it may seem unfair that investors talk of the “Wen Jiabao put” – the idea that the premier will always boost lending whenever growth slows below 8 per cent, just as Alan Greenspan provided a backstop for the US stock market.

鉴于中国令人惊叹的经济记录，投资者关于“温家宝对策”的说法也许有失公允。这种说法大意是，每当经济增长放缓至8%以下，温家宝都会加大放贷力度，就像艾伦•格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)为美国股市提供支持一样。

With two years left in office for Mr Wen, however, the natural tendency might be to put off tough political decisions for the next generation. Plenty of Chinese officials are lobbying Mr Wen for another year of generous lending in 2011 to keep growth humming. While Beijing has stepped up the rhetoric on structural reforms to boost consumption, few signs of substance have been noted.

然而，在温家宝的任期只剩两年之际，将艰难的政治决策推给下一代领导人也许是个自然选择。许多中国官员正在游说温家宝，希望在2011年能够再次大举放贷，以保持经济的快速增长。虽然中国政府关于实施结构性改革以促进消费的言辞明显增加，但却没有什么将采取实质性举措的迹象。

If inflation subsides, China can continue to muddle along, allowing just enough lending to sustain strong growth. But a persistent rise in prices will leave Mr Wen unable to avoid some hard choices: between slower growth or higher inflation and a potentially destabilising bubble; between negative real rates or higher nominal rates; and between exporters and households. At that point, the politics of China’s response to the crisis will start to get interesting.

如果通胀消退，中国可能会在这条路上继续走下去，提供足够的放贷以支持强劲增长。但物价的持续上涨将让温家宝无法回避一些艰难的抉择：是选择较低的增长速度，还是选择较高的通胀和可能破坏稳定的泡沫；是选择实际利率为负，还是提高名义利率；是选择出口商，还是家庭。在这一点上，中国应对此次危机的政治开始变得更耐人寻味起来。