美国引用排名前20的商法学者
来源:百度文库 编辑:神马文学网 时间:2024/05/02 12:50:27
美国引用排名前20的商法学者
At the end, there is a list of schools by the percentage of faculty who make it on one of the “most cited” lists.
BUSINESS LAW
(including corporate, securities regulation, commercial law, bankruptcy, antitrust)
Because this encompasses a huge range of really quite different topics, we list here the top 20 scholars working in some aspect of this broad area.
1. John Coffee (
Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law
Email
jcoffee@law.columbia.edu
B.A.,
2. Jonathan Macey (
Publications
Articles:
“
“Stock Transfer Restrictions and Issuer Choice in Trading Venues,” 55 Case
“Institutional and Evolutionary Failure and Economic Development in the
“Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Governance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act,” 80 Notre Dame Law Review 951 (2005)
“Best Execution Regulation: From Orders to Markets,” 13 Journal of Financial Transformation 1 (2005);
“Legal Scholarship: A Corporate Scholar’s Perspective,” 41
“Wall Street in Turmoil:
“Was Arthur Andersen Different? An Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients,” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, July 2004, vol. 1, issue. 2, pp. 263-300(38) (with Ted Eisenberg);
“Monitoring, Corporate Performance: The Role of Objectivity, Proximity and Adaptability in Corporate Governance,” Cornell Law Review, 2004, vol. 89, issue 2, p. 356-393 (with Arnoud Boot);
“Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure and Enron,” Cornell Law Review, 2004, vol. 89, issue 2, p. 394-422;
“A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficiency of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 Washington University Law Quarterly, 329 (2003);
“Commodification,
“The Corporate Governance of Banks,” 9 Economic Policy Review 91 (2003) (Publication of the Federal Reserve Bank of
“Solving the Corporate Governance Problems of Banks: A Proposal” 120 The Banking Law Journal 309 (2003) (with Maureen O’Hara);
“The Economics of Stock Exchange Listing Fees and Listing Requirements” 11 Journal of Financial Intermediation 297 (2002) (with Maureen O’Hara);
“Displacing
“Smith v. Van Gorkom: Insights About C.E.O.s, Corporate Law Rules, and the Jurisdictional Competition for Corporate Charters” 96 Northwestern Law Review 607 (2002);
“Cynicism and Trust in Politics and Constitutional Theory” 87 Cornell Law Review 280 (2002);
“Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The Case Against the European Legal Capital Rules” 86 Cornell Law Review 1165 (2001), rewritten in Italian as “Raccolta di Capitale di Rischio e Tutela dei Creditori: Una Critica Radicale alle Regole Europee sul Capitale Sociale” (Capital Formation and Creditor Protection: A Radical Critique of the European Legal Capital Rules), 57 Rivista delle Società 78 (2002) (with Luca Enriques);
“Regulatory Competition in the US Federal System: Banking and Financial Services” in Regulatory Competition and Economic Regulation: Comparative Perspectives, edited by Daniel C. Esty and Damien Geradin (Oxford University Press 2001) at pages 95-110;
“The ‘Demand’ for International Regulatory Cooperation: A Public Choice Perspective” in Transatlantic Regulatory Co-operation: Legal Problems and Political Perspectives edited by George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen, & Peter L. Lindseth (Oxford University Press 2000) at pages 147-166;
“US and EU Structures of Governance as Barriers to Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation” in Transatlantic Regulatory Co-operation: Legal Problems and Political Perspectives, edited by George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen, & Peter L. Lindseth (Oxford University Press 2000) at pages 357-372;
“The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley” 25 The Journal of Corporation Law 691 (2000);
“Securities Trading: A Contractual Perspective” 50 Case Western L. Rev. 269 (1999);
“Information and Transaction Costs as the Determinants of Tolerable Growth Levels” 155 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 617 (1999) (with Enrico Colombatto);
“Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Non-shareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective,” 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1266 (1999);
“Globalization, Exchange Governance, and the Future of Exchanges” Brookings Wharton Papers on Financial Services 1999, the Brookings Institution (with Maureen O’Hara);
“Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and Economics Perspective” 28 Journal of Legal Studies 17 (1999 with Maureen O’Hara);
“Lawyers in Agencies: Economics, Social Psychology, and Process,” 61 Law & Contemporary Problems 109 (1998 (published in January, 1999));
“The Legality and Utility of the Shareholder Rights Bylaw,” 26 Hofstra Law Review 835 (1998);
“Wall Street Versus
“Professor Simon on the Kaye Scholer Affair: Shock at the Gambling at Rick’s Place in
“Winstar, Bureaucracy and Public Choice,” 6 Supreme Court Economic Review 173 (1998);
“On the Failure of Libertarianism to Capture the Popular Imagination,” 15 Journal of Social Philosophy 372 (1998);
“Regulation and Disaster: Some Observations in the Context of Systemic Risk,” 1998 Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services 405;
“Public Choice and the
“Italian Corporate Governance: One American’s Perspective” 1998 Columbia Business Law Review 121 (1998);
“Measuring the Effectiveness of Different Corporate Governance Systems: Toward a More Scientific Approach” 10 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 16 (1998);
“The Legality of the Shareholder Rights By-Law in
“The Law and Economics of Best Execution,” 6 Journal of Financial Intermediation 188 (1977, published in 1998, with Maureen O’Hara);
“An Economic Analysis of Conflict of Interest Regulation,” 82
“Law and the Social Sciences” 21 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Pol’y 171 (1997);
“Flexibility in Determining the Role of the Board of Directors in the Age of Information” 19 Cardozo Law Review 291 (1997 with Enrico Colombatto);
“Public and Private Ordering and the Production of Legitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules” 82 Cornell Law Review 1123 (1997);
“Lessons from Transition in
“Manipulation on Trial: Economic Analysis and the Hunt Silver Case” 35 Journal of Economic Literature 162 (1997) (book review);
“A Public Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State,” 18 Cardozo Law Review 925 (1996 with Enrico Colombatto);
“Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority,” 23 Yale Law & Policy Review/ Yale Journal on Regulation Symposium: Constructing a New Federalism 25 (1996);
“Exchange-Rate Management in
"Derivative Instruments: Lessons For the Regulatory State," 21 The Journal of Corporation Law 69 ((1995) published in 1996);
"Public Choice, Public Opinion, and the
"Originalism As An `Ism'," 19 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 301 (1996);
"Exchange-Rate Management in
"Reflections on Professional Responsibility in a Regulatory State," 63 George Washington Law Review 1105 (1995 with Geoffrey P. Miller);
"Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany,
"Public Choice Theory and the Transition Market Economy in
"The Regulation of Corporate Acquisitions: A Law and Economics Analysis of European Proposals for Reform" 1995
"A Market Approach to Tort Reform via Rule 78" 80 Cornell Law Review 909 (1995) (with Geoffrey P. Miller);
"Language and Self-Interest: Preliminary Notes Towards a Public Choice Approach to Legal Language" in Northwestern University/Washington University Law and Linguistics Conference, 73
"The Limited Liability Company: Lessons for Corporate Law" in F. Hodge O'Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium: Limited Liability Companies, 73
"Path Dependence, Public Choice, and Transition in
"A Rejoinder" 16 Cardozo Law Review 1781 (1995);
"Deposit Insurance, the Implicit Regulatory Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure of Banks' Assets and Liabilities" 12 Yale Journal on Regulation 1 (1995) (with Geoffrey P. Miller);
"Towards a Regulatory Analysis of Deposit Insurance" in Prudential Regulation of Banks and Securities Firms" (Guido Ferrarini, editor, 1995) (with Geoffrey P. Miller);
"Packaged Preferences and the Institutional Transformation of Interests" 61 University of
"Health Care Reform: Perspectives from the Economic Theory of Regulation and the Economic Theory of Statutory Interpretation: 79 Cornell Law Review 1434 (1994);
"Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure" 23 Journal of Legal Studies 627 (1994);
"Property Rights, Innovation and Constitutional Structure" 11 Social Philosophy and Policy 181 (1994);
"A Public Choice View of Transition in
"Chief Justice Rehnquist, Interest Group Theory, and the Founders' Design" 25
"Comment: Confrontation or Cooperation for Mutual Gain?" 57 Law and Contemporary Problems 45 (comment on Moe & Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure 1994);
"Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty" 15 Cardozo Law Review 909 (1994);
"The Pervasive Influence of Economic Analysis on Legal Decisionmaking" 17 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 107 (1994);
"Civic Education and Interest Group Formation in the
"Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: A Contractual Perspective" 18 The Journal of Corporation Law 185 (1993);
"Thayer, Nagel and the Founders' Design: A Comment" 88 Northwestern Law Review 226 1993);
"The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation" 68
"The Transformation of the American Law Institute" 61 George Washington Law Review 1412 (1993);
"Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective" 43
"Double Liability of Bank Shareholders: A Look at the New Data" 28
"The Inevitability of Universal Banking" 19
"Congress, the Court, and the Bill of Rights" 23
"Kaye, Scholer, Firrea, and the Desirability of Early Closure: A View of the Kaye, Scholer Case From the Perspective of Bank Regulatory Policy" 66
"Representative Democracy" 16 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 49 (1993);
"The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis" 79 Virginia Law Review 291 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1993);
"Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Litigation: A Rejoinder" 87 Northwestern Law Review 458 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1993);
"Bank Failure: The Politicization of a Social Problem" 45 Stanford Law Review 289 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1992);
"Implementing the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991" in Rebuilding Public Confidence Through Financial Reform, Conference Proceedings Volume, Ohio State University Business School, June 25, 1992;
"Nondeposit Deposits and the Future of Bank Regulation" 91
"Judicial Discretion and the Internal Organization of Congress" 12 International Review of Law and Economics 280 (1992);
"Mandatory Pro Bono: Comfort for the Poor or Welfare for the Rich?" 77 Cornell Law Review 1115 (1992);
"The End of History and the
"Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies" 80
"Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies" 8 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 93 (1992);
"The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences" 45 Vanderbilt Law Review 647 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1992);
"Some Causes and Consequences of the Bifurcated Treatment of Economic Rights and `Other' Rights Under the
"Double Liability of Bank Shareholders: History and Implications" 27
"Origin of the Blue Sky Laws" 70
"Toward Enhanced Consumer Choice in Banking: Uninsured Deposit Facilities as Financial Intermediaries for the 1990's" 1991
"The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory Revisited" 77 Virginia Law Review 1001 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1991);
"Lessons From Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson" 77 Virginia Law Review 1017 (with Geoffrey P. Miller, Mark L. Mitchell and Jeffry M. Netter 1991);
"The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform" 58
"The Glass-Steagall Act and the Riskiness of Financial Intermediaries" 14 Research in Law and Economics 19 (with M. Wayne Marr and S. David Young 1991);
"Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Corporations" 71
"State and Federal Regulation of Corporate Takeovers: A View From the Demand Side" 69
"
"An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties" 21 Stetson Law Review 23 (1991 Symposium);
"Politics, Bureaucracies, and Financial Markets: Bank Entry into Commercial Paper Underwriting in the
"The Role of the Democratic and Republican Parties as Organizers of Shadow Interest Groups" 89
"Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation" 75 Virginia Law Review 265 (1991);
"Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud on the Market Theory" 42 Stanford Law Review 1059 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1990);
"The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of Close Substitutes for the
"Auction Theory, MBO's and Property Rights in Corporate Assets" 25
"Firm-Specific Human Capital Investments and Hegelian Ethics: A Comment on Cornell and Posner" 11 Cardozo Law Review 505 (1990);
"Courts and Corporations: A Comment on Coffee" 89
"Macey Responds to Lubet" 75 Cornell Law Review 959 (1990);
"The Fraud on the Market Theory: Some Preliminary Issues" 74 Cornell Law Review 923 (1989);
"Restrictions on Short Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule and its Role in View of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash" 74 Cornell Law Review 799 (with Mark Mitchell and Jeffry Netter 1989);
"Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes" 1989 Duke Law Journal 173 (1989);
"The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk" 49
"The Myth of `Re-Regulation': The Interest Group Dynamics of Regulatory Change in the Financial Services Industry" 45 Washington & Lee Law Review 1275 (1989);
"Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange" 74 Cornell Law Review 43 (1989);
"How Separation of Powers Protects Individual Liberties" 41
"The Chicken Wars as a Prisoners' Dilemma: What is in a Game?" 64 Notre Dame Law Review 447 (1989) (review of John A.C. Conybeare, Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry);
"The Dangers of Pop Thinking About Japan" 22 Cornell International Law Journal 623 (1989) (review of Daniel Burstein, Yen!
"The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis" 65 Chicago-Kent Law Review 93 (Special Symposium Issue on Post-Chicago Law and Economics, 1989);
"Trans
"The Missing Element in the Republican Revival" 97 Yale Law Journal 1673 (1988);
"Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring and the Market for Bank Control" 88
"The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System" 73 Cornell Law Review 677 (with Henry N. Butler 1988);
"State Anti-Takeover Statutes: Good Politics, Bad Economics" 1988
"Ethics, Economics and Insider Trading: Ayn Rand Meets the Theory of the Firm" 11 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 785 (1988);
"Alan Bloom and the
"The Private Creation of Private Trusts" 37 Emory Law Journal 295 (1988);
"From Judicial Solutions to Political Solutions: The New, New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading" 39
"Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An application to Constitutional Theory" 74
"Market Discipline by Depositors: A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical Arguments" 5 Yale Journal on Regulation 215 (with Elizabeth H. Garrett 1988);
"Regulation on Demand: Special Interest Groups and Insider Trading Law" 30 Journal of Law and Economics 311 (with David D. Haddock 1987);
"Competing Economic Views of the Constitution" 56 George Washington Law Review 50 (1987 Symposium);
"Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Process" 65
"Takeover Defensive Tactics and Legal Scholarship: Market Forces vs. the Policymaker's Dilemma" 96 Yale Law Journal 342 (1987);
"A Coasian Model of Insider Trading" 88 Northwestern Law Review 1449 (with David D. Haddock 1987);
"Toward An Interest Group Theory of
"Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers" 73 Virginia Law Review 701 (with David D. Haddock and Fred S. McChesney 1987);
"Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model" 86
"ESOP's and Market Distortions" 23 Harvard Journal on Legislation 103 (with Richard L. Doernberg 1986);
"From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading" 14 Hofstra Law Review 6 (1985 Symposium); reprinted in 18 Securities Law Review (1986);
"A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail" 95 Yale Law Journal 13 (with Fred S. McChesney 1985);
"Controlling Insider Trading in Europe and
"Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market System"
"Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall" 33 Emory Law Journal 1 (1984); Reprinted in 17 Securities Law Review 401 (1985);
"Toward a New Pedagogy" (Review of Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation) 93 Yale Law Journal 1173 (1984);
Books:
“Corporate Governance: Promises Made, Promises Broken,” (
“Cases and Materials on Corporations Including Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies,” (Thomson*West, Ninth Edition 2005) (with Robert Hamilton).
“Macey on Corporation Laws” (2 volume treatise), originally published in 1998, updated annually, Aspen Law & Business;
"Costly Policies: State Regulation and Antitrust Exemption in Insurance Markets" (with Geoffrey P. Miller, The AEI Press 1993);
"Svensk Aktiebolags Rätt I Omvandling: En Rättsekonomisk Analys" (Swedish Corporate Law in Transition: A Law and Economics Analysis (published in Swedish and English by SNS Förlag 1993);
"Banking Law and Regulation: Cases and Materials" (Aspen Law &Business, second edition, 1997) with Geoffrey P. Miller, (first addition, Little Brown and Co., 1992);
"Third Party Legal Opinions: Evaluations and Analysis" (Prentice Hall Law and Business, 1992);
"Insider Trading: Economics, Politics, and Policy" (The AEI Press, 1991);
"An Introduction to Modern Financial Theory" (The
Miscellaneous Publications:
“From Orders to Markets: Who Should Decide What is ‘Best Execution’” Regulation, Vol. 28, No. 2, Summer 2005.
“A Misguided Proposal to Regulate Risk-Taking” (letter) The Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, April 5, 2005.
“A Risky Proposition” (book review) The Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, March 15, 2005;
“How Does the SEC Arrive at its Fines Against Corporate Wrongdoers” June 21, 2004, Forbes;
“Securities and Exchange Nanny” The Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, December 29, 2003, A10;
“A Poison Pill That Shareholders Can Swallow” The Wall Street Journal, Monday, May 4, 1998;
“A Critical Test of Corporate Governance” The
“Shareholder Rights Will Be Next Battleground” The National Law Journal, Monday, February 16, 1998;
“Will Euro’s Heat Make U.S. Firms Wilt?” The National Law Journal, Monday, September 1, 1997
“Banking; A Reform Plan that Leaves Consumers Out” The
“Fed Does End Run on Glass-Steagall” The National Law Journal, Monday, April 28, 1997;
“Blame Managers, Not Derivatives” The National Law Journal, Monday, August 26, 1996;
"Wealth Creation as a `Sin'," XVII The Journal of Corporate Governance 12 (1996), reprinted in Independent Policy Report, Independent Institute (1996);
"
"The Court Gets It Half Right on Firrea" The Wall Street Journal Wednesday, September 13, 1995;
"The Lowdown on Lending Discrimination" The Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, August 9, 1995;
"The '80s Villain, Vindicated" The Wall Street Journal, July 18, 1995;
"A Poison Pill to Destroy Banking Reform" The Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, June 7, 1995;
"Banking by Quota" The Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, September 7, 1994;
"Mutual Banks Take Your Money and Run" The Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, December 29, 1993;
"Porkbarrel Banking" The Wall Street Journal, Monday, July 19, 1993;
"Not All Pro Bono Work Helps the Poor" The Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, December 30, 1992;
"Naderite Mossbacks Lose Control Over Corporate Law" The Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, June 24, 1992;
"Needless Nationalization at the FDIC" The Wall Street Journal, Friday, February 14, 1992;
"The SEC Dinosaur Expands its Turf: The Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, January 29, 1992;
"Don't Blame Salomon, Blame the Regulators" The Wall Street Journal, Monday, August 19, 1991;
"In Wake of Bailout, Why are we Rewarding Banks?" The
"While Politicians Fiddle Banking Crises Explode" The
"S&L Bailout Plan Victim of Hysteria" The Wall Street Journal, Monday, June 25, 1990;
"A Good Idea Gone Sour: Can Bank Insurance Fail?" The
"It's Time for Bush to Pay the Piper on the S&L Bailout" The
"The Politics of Denying an S&L Crisis" The
"Savings and Loan Regulations Create `Win-Win' Situation for Risk Takers" The
"The SEC's Insider Trading Proposal: Good Politics, Bad Policy" Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 101, March 31, 1988;
"Market for Corporate Control" The Wall Street Journal, Friday, March 4, 1988;
"Senators Would Shoot SEC Messengers" The Wall Street Journal, Thursday, September 10, 1987;
"SEC Vigilant Against Insider Trading - But is it Within Law? Too Strict a Crackdown Will Harm Markets" The Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, May 28, 1986;
"Financial Planners - A New Professional Cartel?" The Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, October 31, 1985;
"Conservative Judgment Time" The Wall Street Journal, Friday, August 23, 1985;
"Introduction" to Volume V (1989) of the Banking Law Anthology;
Remarks at Symposium on the First Amendment and Federal Securities Regulation, 20
Remarks at Colloquium on the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 71 Cornell Law Review. (assorted pages) (1986);
"A Conduct Oriented Approach to the Glass-Steagall Act" 91 Yale Law Journal 102 (1981) (published as a student).
3. Robert Scott (
4. Lucian Bebchuk (
5. Ronald J. Gilson (
6. Larry Ribstein (
7. Alan Schwartz (
8. Reinier Kraakman (
8. Donald Langevoort (
8. Roberta Romano (
11. Bernard Black (
12. Douglas Baird (
13. Mark Roe (
14. Stephen Bainbridge (
15. Henry Hansmann (
16. Lynn Stout (
17. Lynn LoPucki (
18. James J. White (
19. Elizabeth Warren (
20. Jay L. Westbrook (
Runners-up: Marcel Kahan (New York University), 620 citations; James Cox (Duke University), 610 citations; Jill Fisch (Fordham University), 610 citations; William Bratton (Georgetown University), 590 citations; Robert Thompson (Vanderbilt University), 580 citations; Stephen Choi (New York University), 570 citations; David Skeel (University of Pennsylvania), 560 citations; Lisa Bernstein (University of Chicago), 540 citations; Thomas Lee Hazen (University of North Carolina), 530 citations; Jeffrey Gordon (Columbia University), 520 citations; Margaret Blair (Vanderbilt University), 510 citations; Edward Rock (University of Pennsylvania), 500 citations.
Other highly-cited scholars who don’t work exclusively in this area: Eric Posner (University of Chicago), 2020 citations; Herbert Hovenkamp (University of Iowa), 1450 citations; Melvin Eisenberg (University of California, Berkeley), 1120 citations; Geoffrey Miller (New York University), 1090 citations; Robert S. Summers (Cornell University), 660 citations.