美国引用排名前20的商法学者

At the end, there is a list of schools by the percentage of faculty who make it on one of the “most cited” lists.
BUSINESS LAW
(including corporate, securities regulation, commercial law, bankruptcy, antitrust)
Because this encompasses a huge range of really quite different topics, we list here the top 20 scholars working in some aspect of this broad area.
1. John Coffee (Columbia University): 2020 citations, age 63.
John C. Coffee
Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law
Email
jcoffee@law.columbia.edu
B.A., Amherst, 1966; LL.B., Yale, 1969; LL.M. (in taxation), New York University, 1976. Following graduation from law school, was a Reginald Heber Smith fellow for one year, doing poverty law litigation in New York City. Corporate lawyer with Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 1970-76. From 1976 until coming to Columbia in 1980, was a professor at Georgetown University Law Center. Visiting professor at Harvard Law School (2001), Stanford University Law School (1988), the University of Virginia Law School (1978), and the University of Michigan Law School (1979). Reporter for the American Bar Association for its Model Standards on Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures and for the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance. Member or former member, Economic Advisory Board to Nasdaq; National Academy of Sciences panel studying empirical research on sentencing; the National Research Council's Standing Committee on Law and Justice; the Advisory Panel on Environmental Sentencing Guidelines to the United States Sentencing Commission; SEC Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes; the Subcouncil on Capital Markets of the United States Competitiveness Policy Council; the Legal Advisory Board to the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD); Legal Advisory Committee to the board of directors of the New York Stock Exchange. Former chairperson of the Section on Business Associations of the Association of American Law Schools. Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; listed by the National Law Journal as one of "The 100 Most Influential Lawyers in the United States." Publications include Cases and Materials on Securities Regulation (with Seligman, 9th ed., 2003); Knights, Raiders and Targets: The Impact of the Hostile Takeover (with Lowenstein and Rose-Ackerman, 1988); Cases and Materials on Corporations (with Choper and Gilson, 6th ed., 2004); and Business Organization and Finance: Legal and Economic Principles (with Klein, 9th ed., 2004). Principal interests are corporations, securities regulation, class actions, criminal law, and white-collar crime.
2. Jonathan Macey (Yale University): 1600 citations, age 52.
Publications
Articles:
“Delaware: Home of the World’s Most Expensive Raincoat,” 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 1131 (2005).
“Stock Transfer Restrictions and Issuer Choice in Trading Venues,” 55 Case Western Reserve L. Rev. 587 (2005) (with Maureen O’Hara).
“Institutional and Evolutionary Failure and Economic Development in the Middle East,” 30 The Yale Journal of International Law 397 (2005) (with Ian Ayres).
“Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Governance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act,” 80 Notre Dame Law Review 951 (2005)
“Best Execution Regulation: From Orders to Markets,” 13 Journal of Financial Transformation 1 (2005);
“Legal Scholarship: A Corporate Scholar’s Perspective,” 41 San Diego Law Review, 1759 (2004);
“Wall Street in Turmoil: Federal State Relations Post Eliot Spitzer,” 70 Brooklyn Law Review 117 (2004);
“Was Arthur Andersen Different? An Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients,” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, July 2004, vol. 1, issue. 2, pp. 263-300(38) (with Ted Eisenberg);
“Monitoring, Corporate Performance: The Role of Objectivity, Proximity and Adaptability in Corporate Governance,” Cornell Law Review, 2004, vol. 89, issue 2, p. 356-393 (with Arnoud Boot);
“Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure and Enron,” Cornell Law Review,  2004, vol. 89, issue 2, p. 394-422;
“A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficiency of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 Washington University Law Quarterly, 329 (2003);
“Commodification, Independence, Governance, and the Demise of the Accounting Profession,” 48 Villanova Law Review 1167 (2003) (with Hillary Sale);
“The Corporate Governance of Banks,” 9 Economic Policy Review 91 (2003) (Publication of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York) (with Maureen O’Hara);
“Solving the Corporate Governance Problems of Banks: A Proposal” 120 The Banking Law Journal 309 (2003) (with Maureen O’Hara);
“The Economics of Stock Exchange Listing Fees and Listing Requirements” 11 Journal of Financial Intermediation 297 (2002) (with Maureen O’Hara);
“Displacing Delaware: Can the Feds Do a Better Job Than the States in Regulating Takeovers?” 57 The Business Lawyer 1025 (2002);
“Smith  v. Van Gorkom: Insights About C.E.O.s, Corporate Law Rules, and the Jurisdictional Competition for Corporate Charters” 96 Northwestern Law Review 607 (2002);
“Cynicism and Trust in Politics and Constitutional Theory” 87 Cornell Law Review 280 (2002);
“Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The Case Against the European Legal Capital Rules” 86 Cornell Law Review 1165 (2001), rewritten in Italian as “Raccolta di Capitale di Rischio e Tutela dei Creditori: Una Critica Radicale alle Regole Europee sul Capitale Sociale” (Capital Formation and Creditor Protection: A Radical Critique of the European Legal Capital Rules), 57 Rivista delle Società 78 (2002) (with Luca Enriques);
“Regulatory Competition in the US Federal System: Banking and Financial Services” in Regulatory Competition and Economic Regulation: Comparative Perspectives, edited by Daniel C. Esty and Damien Geradin (Oxford University Press 2001) at pages 95-110;
“The ‘Demand’ for International Regulatory Cooperation: A Public Choice Perspective” in Transatlantic Regulatory Co-operation: Legal Problems and Political Perspectives edited by George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen, & Peter L. Lindseth (Oxford University Press  2000) at pages 147-166;
“US and EU Structures of Governance as Barriers to Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation” in  Transatlantic Regulatory Co-operation: Legal Problems and Political Perspectives,  edited by George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen, & Peter L. Lindseth (Oxford University Press  2000) at pages 357-372;
“The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley” 25 The Journal of Corporation Law 691 (2000);
“Securities Trading: A Contractual Perspective” 50 Case Western L. Rev. 269 (1999);
“Information and Transaction Costs as the Determinants of Tolerable Growth Levels” 155 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 617 (1999) (with Enrico Colombatto);
“Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Non-shareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective,” 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1266 (1999);
“Globalization, Exchange Governance, and the Future of Exchanges” Brookings Wharton Papers on Financial Services 1999, the Brookings Institution (with Maureen O’Hara);
“Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and Economics Perspective” 28 Journal of Legal Studies 17 (1999 with Maureen O’Hara);
“Lawyers in Agencies: Economics, Social Psychology, and Process,” 61 Law & Contemporary Problems 109 (1998 (published in January, 1999));
“The Legality and Utility of the Shareholder Rights Bylaw,” 26 Hofstra Law Review 835 (1998);
“Wall Street Versus Main Street: How Ignorance, Hyperbole, and Fear Lead to Regulation,” 65 The University of Chicago Law Review 1487 (1998);
“Professor Simon on the Kaye Scholer Affair: Shock at the Gambling at Rick’s Place in Casablanca” 23 Law and Social Inquiry 323 (1998);
“Winstar, Bureaucracy and Public Choice,” 6 Supreme Court Economic Review 173 (1998);
“On the Failure of Libertarianism to Capture the Popular Imagination,” 15 Journal of Social Philosophy 372 (1998);
“Regulation and Disaster: Some Observations in the Context of Systemic Risk,” 1998 Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services 405;
“Public Choice and the Legal Academy” (reviewing Mashaw, Greed, Chaos and Governance), 86 Georgetown Law Journal 1075 (1998);
“Italian Corporate Governance: One American’s Perspective” 1998 Columbia Business Law Review 121 (1998);
“Measuring the Effectiveness of Different Corporate Governance Systems: Toward a More Scientific Approach” 10 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 16 (1998);
“The Legality of the Shareholder Rights By-Law in Delaware: Preserving the Market for Corporate Control” 10 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 63 (1998);
“The Law and Economics of Best Execution,” 6 Journal of Financial Intermediation 188 (1977, published in 1998, with Maureen O’Hara);
“An Economic Analysis of Conflict of Interest Regulation,” 82 Iowa Law Review 965 (1997, published in 1998, with Geoffrey P. Miller);
“Law and the Social Sciences” 21 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Pol’y 171 (1997);
“Flexibility in Determining the Role of the Board of Directors in the Age of Information” 19 Cardozo Law Review 291 (1997 with Enrico Colombatto);
“Public and Private Ordering and the Production of Legitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules” 82 Cornell Law Review 1123 (1997);
“Lessons from Transition in Eastern Europe: A Property-Right Interpretation,” 1 International Bulletin of the Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development 10 (1997 with Enrico Colombatto);
“Manipulation on Trial: Economic Analysis and the Hunt Silver Case” 35 Journal of Economic Literature 162 (1997) (book review);
“A Public Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State,” 18 Cardozo Law Review 925 (1996 with Enrico Colombatto);
“Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority,” 23 Yale Law & Policy Review/ Yale Journal on Regulation Symposium: Constructing a New Federalism 25 (1996);
“Exchange-Rate Management in Eastern Europe: A Public-Choice Perspective,” 16 International Review of Law and Economics 195 (1996 with Enrico Colombatto);
"Derivative Instruments: Lessons For the Regulatory State," 21 The Journal of Corporation Law 69 ((1995) published in 1996);
"Public Choice, Public Opinion, and the Fuller Court," 49 Vanderbilt Law Review 373 (1996) (book review);
"Originalism As An `Ism'," 19 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 301 (1996);
"Exchange-Rate Management in Eastern Europe:  A Public Choice Perspective," 6 Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humanines 259-275 (1995 with Enrico Colombatto);
"Reflections on Professional Responsibility in a Regulatory State," 63 George Washington Law Review 1105 (1995 with Geoffrey P. Miller);
"Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking:  A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States" 48 Stanford Law Review 73 (1995) (with Geoffrey P. Miller) reprinted in 9 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 57 (1997);
"Public Choice Theory and the Transition Market Economy in Eastern Europe:  Currency Convertibility and Exchange Rates" 28 Cornell International Law Journal 387 (1995) (with Enrico Colombatto);
"The Regulation of Corporate Acquisitions:  A Law and Economics Analysis of European Proposals for Reform" 1995 Columbia Business Law Review 495 (1995) (with Clas Bergström, Peter Högfeldt and Per Samuelsson);
"A Market Approach to Tort Reform via Rule 78" 80 Cornell Law Review 909 (1995) (with Geoffrey P. Miller);
"Language and Self-Interest:  Preliminary Notes Towards a Public Choice Approach to Legal Language" in Northwestern University/Washington University Law and Linguistics Conference, 73 Washington University Law Quarterly 1001 (1995);
"The Limited Liability Company:  Lessons for Corporate Law" in F. Hodge O'Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium:  Limited Liability Companies, 73 Washington University Law Quarterly 433 (1995);
"Path Dependence, Public Choice, and Transition in Russia:  A Bargaining Approach" 4 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 379 (1995) (with Enrico Colombatto);
"A Rejoinder" 16 Cardozo Law Review 1781 (1995);
"Deposit Insurance, the Implicit Regulatory Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure of Banks' Assets and Liabilities" 12 Yale Journal on Regulation 1 (1995) (with Geoffrey P. Miller);
"Towards a Regulatory Analysis of Deposit Insurance" in Prudential Regulation of Banks and Securities Firms" (Guido Ferrarini, editor, 1995) (with Geoffrey P. Miller);
"Packaged Preferences and the Institutional Transformation of Interests" 61 University of Chicago Law Review 1443 (1994);
"Health Care Reform:  Perspectives from the Economic Theory of Regulation and the Economic Theory of Statutory Interpretation: 79 Cornell Law Review 1434 (1994);
"Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure" 23 Journal of Legal Studies 627 (1994);
"Property Rights, Innovation and Constitutional Structure" 11 Social Philosophy and Policy 181 (1994);
"A Public Choice View of Transition in Eastern Europe" 2-3 Economia delle Scelte pubbliche 113 (1994) (with Enrico Colombatto);
"Chief Justice Rehnquist, Interest Group Theory, and the Founders' Design" 25 Rutgers Law Review 577 (1994);
"Comment:  Confrontation or Cooperation for Mutual Gain?" 57 Law and Contemporary Problems 45 (comment on Moe & Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure 1994);
"Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation:  A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty" 15 Cardozo Law Review 909 (1994);
"The Pervasive Influence of Economic Analysis on Legal Decisionmaking" 17 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 107 (1994);
"Civic Education and Interest Group Formation in the American Law School" 45 Stanford Law Review 1937 (1993);
"Corporate Law and Corporate Governance:  A Contractual Perspective" 18 The Journal of Corporation Law 185 (1993);
"Thayer, Nagel and the Founders' Design:  A Comment" 88 Northwestern Law Review 226 1993);
"The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945:  Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation" 68 New York University Law Review 13 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1993);
"The Transformation of the American Law Institute" 61 George Washington Law Review 1412 (1993);
"Corporate Stakeholders:  A Contractual Perspective" 43 University of Toronto Law Journal 401 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1993);
"Double Liability of Bank Shareholders:  A Look at the New Data" 28 Wake Forest Law Review 933 (1993);
"The Inevitability of Universal Banking" 19 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 203 (1993);
"Congress, the Court, and the Bill of Rights" 23 Cumberland Law Review 93 (Comment at Sixth Annual Federalist Society Symposium 1993);
"Kaye, Scholer, Firrea, and the Desirability of Early Closure:  A View of the Kaye, Scholer Case From the Perspective of Bank Regulatory Policy" 66 Southern California Law Review 1115 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1993);
"Representative Democracy" 16 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 49 (1993);
"The Community Reinvestment Act:  An Economic Analysis" 79 Virginia Law Review 291 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1993);
"Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Litigation:  A Rejoinder" 87 Northwestern Law Review 458 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1993);
"Bank Failure:  The Politicization of a Social Problem" 45 Stanford Law Review 289 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1992);
"Implementing the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991" in Rebuilding Public Confidence Through Financial Reform, Conference Proceedings Volume, Ohio State University Business School, June 25, 1992;
"Nondeposit Deposits and the Future of Bank Regulation" 91 Michigan Law Review 237 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1992);
"Judicial Discretion and the Internal Organization of Congress" 12 International Review of Law and Economics  280 (1992);
"Mandatory Pro Bono:  Comfort for the Poor or Welfare for the Rich?"  77 Cornell Law Review 1115 (1992);
"The End of History and the New World Order:  The Triumph of Capitalism and the Competition Between Liberalism and Democracy" 25 Cornell International Law Journal 277 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1992);
"Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory:  The Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies" 80 Georgetown Law Journal 671 (1992);
"Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies" 8 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 93 (1992);
"The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences" 45 Vanderbilt Law Review 647 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1992);
"Some Causes and Consequences of the Bifurcated Treatment of Economic Rights and `Other' Rights Under the U.S. Constitution" 9 Social Philosophy and Policy 141 (1992);
"Double Liability of Bank Shareholders:  History and Implications" 27 Wake Forest Law Review 31 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1992 Symposium);
"Origin of the Blue Sky Laws" 70 Texas Law Review 347 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1991);
"Toward Enhanced Consumer Choice in Banking:  Uninsured Deposit Facilities as Financial Intermediaries for the 1990's" 1991 New York University Annual Survey of American Law 865 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1991);
"The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory Revisited" 77 Virginia Law Review 1001 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1991);
"Lessons From Financial Economics:  Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson" 77 Virginia Law Review 1017 (with Geoffrey P. Miller, Mark L. Mitchell and Jeffry M. Netter 1991);
"The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:  Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform" 58 University of Chicago Law Review 1 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1991);
"The Glass-Steagall Act and the Riskiness of Financial Intermediaries" 14 Research in Law and Economics 19 (with M. Wayne Marr and S. David Young 1991);
"Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Corporations" 71 Boston University Law Review 315 (1991 Symposium);
"State and Federal Regulation of Corporate Takeovers:  A View From the Demand Side" 69 Washington University Law Quarterly 383 (1991);
"America's Banking System:  The Origins and Future of the Current Crisis" 69 Washington University Law Quarterly 769 (1991 Symposium);
"An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties" 21 Stetson Law Review 23 (1991 Symposium);
"Politics, Bureaucracies, and Financial Markets:  Bank Entry into Commercial Paper Underwriting in the United States and Japan" 139 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 369 (with David G. Litt, Geoffrey P. Miller and Edward L. Rubin 1990);
"The Role of the Democratic and Republican Parties as Organizers of Shadow Interest Groups" 89 Michigan Law Review 1 (1990);
"Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation" 75 Virginia Law Review 265 (1991);
"Good Finance, Bad Economics:  An Analysis of the Fraud on the Market Theory" 42 Stanford Law Review 1059 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1990);
"The Stock Exchange as a Firm:  The Emergence of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges" 76 Cornell Law Review 1007 (with Hideki Kanda 1990);
"Auction Theory, MBO's and Property Rights in Corporate Assets" 25 Wake Forest Law Review 85 (1990 Symposium);
"Firm-Specific Human Capital Investments and Hegelian Ethics:  A Comment on Cornell and Posner" 11 Cardozo Law Review 505 (1990);
"Courts and Corporations:  A Comment on Coffee" 89 Columbia Law Review 1692 (1990);
"Macey Responds to Lubet" 75 Cornell Law Review 959 (1990);
"The Fraud on the Market Theory:  Some Preliminary Issues" 74 Cornell Law Review 923 (1989);
"Restrictions on Short Sales:  An Analysis of the Uptick Rule and its Role in View of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash" 74 Cornell Law Review 799 (with Mark Mitchell and Jeffry Netter 1989);
"Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes" 1989 Duke Law Journal 173 (1989);
"The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk" 49 Ohio State Law Journal 1277 (1989);
"The Myth of `Re-Regulation':  The Interest Group Dynamics of Regulatory Change in the Financial Services Industry" 45 Washington & Lee Law Review 1275 (1989);
"Public Choice:  The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange" 74 Cornell Law Review 43 (1989);
"How Separation of Powers Protects Individual Liberties" 41 Rutgers Law Review 813 (1989);
"The Chicken Wars as a Prisoners' Dilemma:  What is in a Game?" 64 Notre Dame Law Review 447 (1989) (review of John A.C. Conybeare, Trade Wars:  The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry);
"The Dangers of Pop Thinking About Japan" 22 Cornell International Law Journal 623 (1989) (review of Daniel Burstein, Yen! Japan's New Financial Empire and its Threat to America);
"The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis" 65 Chicago-Kent Law Review 93 (Special Symposium Issue on Post-Chicago Law and Economics, 1989);
"Trans Union Reconsidered" 98 Yale Law Journal 127 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1988);
"The Missing Element in the Republican Revival" 97 Yale Law Journal 1673 (1988);
"Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring and the Market for Bank Control" 88 Columbia Law Review 1153 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1988);
"The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System" 73 Cornell Law Review 677 (with Henry N. Butler 1988);
"State Anti-Takeover Statutes:  Good Politics, Bad Economics" 1988 Wisconsin Law Review 467 (1988);
"Ethics, Economics and Insider Trading: Ayn Rand Meets the Theory of the Firm" 11 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 785 (1988);
"Alan Bloom and the American Law School" 73 Cornell Law Review 1038 (1988) (review of Alan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind);
"The Private Creation of Private Trusts" 37 Emory Law Journal 295 (1988);
"From Judicial Solutions to Political Solutions:  The New, New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading" 39 Alabama Law Review 355 (1988 Symposium); reprinted 30 Corporate Practice Commentator 459 (1989);
"Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model:  An application to Constitutional Theory" 74 Virginia Law Review 471 (1988 Symposium);
"Market Discipline by Depositors:  A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical Arguments" 5 Yale Journal on Regulation 215 (with Elizabeth H. Garrett 1988);
"Regulation on Demand:  Special Interest Groups and Insider Trading Law" 30 Journal of Law and Economics 311 (with David D. Haddock 1987);
"Competing Economic Views of the Constitution" 56 George Washington Law Review 50 (1987 Symposium);
"Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Process" 65 Washington University Law Quarterly 131 (with Jeffry M. Netter 1987 Symposium);
"Takeover Defensive Tactics and Legal Scholarship:  Market Forces vs. the Policymaker's Dilemma" 96 Yale Law Journal 342 (1987);
"A Coasian Model of Insider Trading" 88 Northwestern Law Review 1449 (with David D. Haddock 1987);
"Toward An Interest Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law" 65 Texas Law Review 469 (with Geoffrey P. Miller 1987);
"Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers" 73 Virginia Law Review 701 (with David D. Haddock and Fred S. McChesney 1987);
"Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:  An Interest Group Model" 86 Columbia Law Review 223 (1986);
"ESOP's and Market Distortions" 23 Harvard Journal on Legislation 103 (with Richard L. Doernberg 1986);
"From Fairness to Contract:  The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading" 14 Hofstra Law Review 6 (1985 Symposium); reprinted in 18 Securities Law Review (1986);
"A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail" 95 Yale Law Journal 13 (with Fred S. McChesney 1985);
"Controlling Insider Trading in Europe and America:  The Economics of the Politics" (with David D. Haddock) (1986); in Law and Economics and the Economics of Regulation 149 (International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, Volume 13, Kluwer Academic Publishers);
"Shirking at the SEC:  The Failure of the National Market System" University of Illinois Law Review, 315 (with David Haddock 1985);
"Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function:  The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall" 33 Emory Law Journal 1 (1984); Reprinted in 17 Securities Law Review 401 (1985);
"Toward a New Pedagogy" (Review of Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation) 93 Yale Law Journal 1173 (1984);
Books:
“Corporate Governance: Promises Made, Promises Broken,” (Princeton University Press, 2008)
“Cases and Materials on Corporations Including Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies,” (Thomson*West, Ninth Edition 2005) (with Robert Hamilton).
“Macey on Corporation Laws” (2 volume treatise), originally published in 1998, updated annually, Aspen Law & Business;
"Costly Policies:  State Regulation and Antitrust Exemption in Insurance Markets" (with Geoffrey P. Miller, The AEI Press 1993);
"Svensk Aktiebolags Rätt I Omvandling: En Rättsekonomisk Analys" (Swedish Corporate Law in Transition:  A Law and Economics Analysis (published in Swedish and English by SNS Förlag 1993);
"Banking Law and Regulation:  Cases and Materials" (Aspen Law &Business, second edition, 1997)  with Geoffrey P. Miller, (first addition, Little  Brown and Co., 1992);
"Third Party Legal Opinions:  Evaluations and Analysis" (Prentice Hall Law and Business, 1992);
"Insider Trading:  Economics, Politics, and Policy" (The AEI Press, 1991);
"An Introduction to Modern Financial Theory" (The American College of Trust and Estate Council Foundation (1991).
Miscellaneous Publications:
“From Orders to Markets: Who Should Decide What is ‘Best Execution’” Regulation, Vol. 28, No. 2, Summer 2005.
“A Misguided Proposal to Regulate Risk-Taking” (letter) The Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, April 5, 2005.
“A Risky Proposition” (book review) The Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, March 15, 2005;
“How Does the SEC Arrive at its Fines Against Corporate Wrongdoers” June 21, 2004, Forbes;
“Securities and Exchange Nanny” The Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, December 29, 2003, A10;
“A Poison Pill That Shareholders Can Swallow” The Wall Street Journal, Monday, May 4, 1998;
“A Critical Test of Corporate Governance” The Los Angeles Times, Sunday, February 22, 1998, M2;
“Shareholder Rights Will Be Next Battleground” The National Law Journal, Monday, February 16, 1998;
“Will Euro’s Heat Make U.S. Firms Wilt?” The National Law Journal, Monday, September 1, 1997
“Banking; A Reform Plan that Leaves Consumers Out” The Los Angeles Times, Sunday, May18, 1997;
“Fed Does End Run on Glass-Steagall” The National Law Journal, Monday, April 28, 1997;
“Blame Managers, Not Derivatives” The National Law Journal, Monday, August 26, 1996;
"Wealth Creation as a `Sin'," XVII The Journal of Corporate Governance 12 (1996), reprinted in Independent Policy Report, Independent Institute (1996);
"Appeals Court Decision Validates Shady Deals" The National Law Journal, Monday, September 25, 1995;
"The Court Gets It Half Right on Firrea" The Wall Street Journal Wednesday, September 13, 1995;
"The Lowdown on Lending Discrimination"  The Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, August 9, 1995;
"The '80s Villain, Vindicated" The Wall Street Journal, July 18, 1995;
"A Poison Pill to Destroy Banking Reform" The Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, June 7, 1995;
"Banking by Quota" The Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, September 7, 1994;
"Mutual Banks Take Your Money and Run" The Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, December 29, 1993;
"Porkbarrel Banking" The Wall Street Journal, Monday, July 19, 1993;
"Not All Pro Bono Work Helps the Poor" The Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, December 30, 1992;
"Naderite Mossbacks Lose Control Over Corporate Law" The Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, June 24, 1992;
"Needless Nationalization at the FDIC" The Wall Street Journal, Friday, February 14, 1992;
"The SEC Dinosaur Expands its Turf: The Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, January 29, 1992;
"Don't Blame Salomon, Blame the Regulators" The Wall Street Journal, Monday, August 19, 1991;
"In Wake of Bailout, Why are we Rewarding Banks?" The Los Angeles Times, Sunday, July 14, 1991;
"While Politicians Fiddle Banking Crises Explode" The Los Angeles Times, Sunday, September 23, 1990;
"S&L Bailout Plan Victim of Hysteria" The Wall Street Journal, Monday, June 25, 1990;
"A Good Idea Gone Sour:  Can Bank Insurance Fail?" The Los Angeles Times, Sunday, June 24, 1990;
"It's Time for Bush to Pay the Piper on the S&L Bailout" The Los Angeles Times, Sunday, April 22, 1990;
"The Politics of Denying an S&L Crisis" The Los Angeles Times, Sunday, December 10, 1990;
"Savings and Loan Regulations Create `Win-Win' Situation for Risk Takers" The Los Angeles Times, Sunday, February 5, 1989;
"The SEC's Insider Trading Proposal:  Good Politics, Bad Policy" Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 101, March 31, 1988;
"Market for Corporate Control" The Wall Street Journal, Friday, March 4, 1988;
"Senators Would Shoot SEC Messengers" The Wall Street Journal, Thursday, September 10, 1987;
"SEC Vigilant Against Insider Trading - But is it Within Law?  Too Strict a Crackdown Will Harm Markets" The Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, May 28, 1986;
"Financial Planners - A New Professional Cartel?" The Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, October 31, 1985;
"Conservative Judgment Time" The Wall Street Journal, Friday, August 23, 1985;
"Introduction" to Volume V (1989) of the Banking Law Anthology;
Remarks at Symposium on the First Amendment and Federal Securities Regulation, 20 Connecticut Law Review (assorted pages) 1988;
Remarks at Colloquium on the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 71 Cornell Law Review. (assorted pages) (1986);
"A Conduct Oriented Approach to the Glass-Steagall Act" 91 Yale Law Journal 102 (1981) (published as a student).
3. Robert Scott (Columbia University): 1390 citations, age 63.
4. Lucian Bebchuk (Harvard University): 1140 citations, age 52.
5. Ronald J. Gilson (Columbia University, Stanford University): 1080 citations, age 61.
6. Larry Ribstein (University of Illinois): 950 citations, age 61.
7. Alan Schwartz (Yale University): 930 citations, age 67.
8. Reinier Kraakman (Harvard University): 920 citations, age 58.
8. Donald Langevoort (Georgetown University): 920 citations, age 56.
8. Roberta Romano (Yale University): 920 citations, age 55.
11. Bernard Black (University of Texas): 880 citations, age 54.
12. Douglas Baird (University of Chicago): 850 citations, age 54.
13. Mark Roe (Harvard University), 800 citations, age 56.
14. Stephen Bainbridge (University of California, Los Angeles), 770 citations, age 49.
15. Henry Hansmann (Yale University), 740 citations, age 62.
16. Lynn Stout (University of California, Los Angeles), 730 citations, age 50.
17. Lynn LoPucki (University of California, Los Angeles), 700 citations, age 63.
18. James J. White (University of Michigan), 700 citations, age 73.
19. Elizabeth Warren (Harvard University), 680 citations, age 58.
20. Jay L. Westbrook (University of Texas), 660 citations, age 64.
Runners-up: Marcel Kahan (New York University), 620 citations; James Cox (Duke University), 610 citations; Jill Fisch (Fordham University), 610 citations; William Bratton (Georgetown University), 590 citations; Robert Thompson (Vanderbilt University), 580 citations; Stephen Choi (New York University), 570 citations; David Skeel (University of Pennsylvania), 560 citations; Lisa Bernstein (University of Chicago), 540 citations; Thomas Lee Hazen (University of North Carolina), 530 citations; Jeffrey Gordon (Columbia University), 520 citations; Margaret Blair (Vanderbilt University), 510 citations; Edward Rock (University of Pennsylvania), 500 citations.
Other highly-cited scholars who don’t work exclusively in this area: Eric Posner (University of Chicago), 2020 citations; Herbert Hovenkamp (University of Iowa), 1450 citations; Melvin Eisenberg (University of California, Berkeley), 1120 citations; Geoffrey Miller (New York University), 1090 citations; Robert S. Summers (Cornell University), 660 citations.