何新：此次金融危机是百年以来最严重最深刻的危机

(2010-06-12 00:11:54)转载
标签：杂谈
何新：此次金融危机是百年以来最严重的危机
何新去年在他的书中曾经说：
此次金融危机是百年以来世界经济史上所遭遇的最严重最深刻的一次危机，危机将一波接一波持续5-10年以上。
危机将引发一系列重大动变导致全球经济体系的根本性和结构性改变。在此过程中许多国家会陆续遭遇由于经济和社会问题触发的不同程度的震荡和动变。
我久已不想危言耸听，所以宁愿保持沉默。但是现在有种种迹象显示国家与世界都进入了多事之秋。有必要提示政治家和国人：此次全球危机绝对不可能在短短一两年间复苏。来得越慢发展越深，持续越久动变越大。中国这几年做错了一些事情。黄金时代已经结束。所谓收入倍增纯是一种梦呓。今后最好有过苦日子以至经历全球性动变的思想准备。
各国经济由开放市场转向不同程度的保护主义，实施有计划管理和资源以及物价的统制型体制，将是各国遏制兴风作浪的国际金融大鳄寻求自救和缓解国内危机的必要步骤。继续放任自流只能导致全面崩溃。但愿头脑清醒者对此有所警醒和及早筹谋。
（文论见《何新论金融危机与中国经济》一书，2009年出版）
索罗斯昨天说：“我们正在进入全球金融危机第二幕”
著名投资大师乔治·索罗斯(George Soros)表示：由于欧洲主权债务危机的恶化以及各国政府被迫缩减预算赤字可能导致全球经济重回衰退，“我们才刚进入全球金融危机第二幕”。
索罗斯在周四(6月10日)在维也纳出席一次会议时表示，“我们现在知道金融系统崩盘切实发生了，而危机恐怕远未结束。事实上，危机第二幕才刚刚开演。”
现年79岁的索罗斯称，当前的全球局势让人不免感觉与1930年代的大萧条存在颇多暗合，各国在经济复苏萎靡的同时还面临削减预算赤字的压力。
有关欧债危机可能扩散的担忧已经压制欧元／美元于6月7日时跌至4年低点，今年全球股市则已蒸发了4万亿美元市值。
希西葡三国欠债2.2万亿欧元。苏格兰皇家银行估计，欧洲银行界持有约2.2万亿欧元希西葡债务，当中约1.1万亿欧元为国债和其它商业债券，其余约1万亿欧元则是银行贷款。这笔债务中，作为债务危机核心的希腊只占少数，相反西班牙公私债务总额则多达1.5万亿欧元。法国银行界应为3国最大债主。
美国银行(Bank of America Corp。)的统计显示，负债累累的“欧洲各国”将被迫在未来3年内再融资2万亿欧元。
英国赤字危机渐深：惠誉“威胁”下调评级。报告称，英国现在面临“可怕”的财政挑战，2009－2010财年，英国的赤字水平已达到惊人的1670亿英镑，占到英国GDP水平的11.5%，这一比例距离现在希腊赤字13.6%的占比并不遥远，并显著高于西班牙和葡萄牙的水平。惠誉这一报告引发了巨大的金融市场动荡。
其实准确地说，2007年以来，世界从未真正摆脱危机和衰退，不当的政策在加剧问题的复杂性和危险性。大力神顶着那块债务加赤字的巨石已到了筋疲力尽的时刻，我们将再次回到1933年的拐点时刻，历史惊人地相似！
索罗斯指出：“当金融市场对主权债务的公信力产生怀疑，希腊和欧元便来到了舞台中心，但其产生的负面效应全球各国都将有所感知。”
索罗斯因其在1990年代成功狙击英镑而声名大噪，而在柏林墙在1989年推倒后，他也成功预言了马克升值和同年的日本股市大挫。
他还指出，原本旨在保护持有人免遭违约风险的信贷违约掉期合约(CDS)非常危险。他指出，仅有存在“可保利益”的情况下，才应允许信用违约掉期存在。
信用违约掉期是由信用卡贷款所衍生出来的一种金融衍生产品，可以被看作是一种金融资产的违约保险，债权人通过这种合同将债务风险出售，合同价格就是保费。购买信用违约保险的一方被称为买家，承担风险的一方被称为卖家。双方约定如果金融资产没有出现违约情况，则买家向卖家定期支付“保险费”，而一旦发生违约，则卖方承担买方的资产损失。
In the week following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 – global financial markets actually broke down and by the end of the week they had to be put on artificial life support. The life support consisted of substituting sovereign credit for the credit of financial institutions which ceased to be acceptable to counter parties.
As Mervyn King of the Bank of England brilliantly explained, the authorities had to do in the short-term the exact opposite of what was needed in the long-term: they had to pump in a lot of credit to make up for the credit that disappeared and thereby reinforce the excess credit and leverage that had caused the crisis in the first place. Only in the longer term, when the crisis had subsided, could they drain the credit and reestablish macro-economic balance. This required a delicate two phase maneuver just as when a car is skidding, first you have to turn the car into the direction of the skid and only when you have regained control can you correct course.
The first phase of the maneuver has been successfully accomplished – a collapse has been averted. In retrospect, the temporary breakdown of the financial system seems like a bad dream. There are people in the financial institutions that survived who would like nothing better than to forget it and carry on with business as usual. This was evident in their massive lobbying effort to protect their interests in the Financial Reform Act that just came out of Congress. But the collapse of the financial system as we know it is real and the crisis is far from over.
Indeed, we have just entered Act II of the drama, when financial markets started losing confidence in the credibility of sovereign debt. Greece and the euro have taken center stage but the effects are liable to be felt worldwide. Doubts about sovereign credit are forcing reductions in budget deficits at a time when the banks and the economy may not be strong enough to permit the pursuit of fiscal rectitude. We find ourselves in a situation eerily reminiscent of the 1930’s. Keynes has taught us that budget deficits are essential for counter cyclical policies yet many governments have to reduce them under pressure from financial markets. This is liable to push the global economy into a double dip.
It is important to realize that the crisis in which we find ourselves is not just a market failure but also a regulatory failure and even more importantly a failure of the prevailing dogma about financial markets. I have in mind the Efficient Market Hypothesis and Rational Expectation Theory. These economic theories guided, or more exactly misguided, both the regulators and the financial engineers who designed the derivatives and other synthetic financial instruments and quantitative risk management systems which have played such an important part in the collapse. To gain a proper understanding of the current situation and how we got to where we are, we need to go back to basics and reexamine the foundation of economic theory.
I have developed an alternative theory about financial markets which asserts that financial markets do not necessarily tend towards equilibrium; they can just as easily produce asset bubbles. Nor are markets capable of correcting their own excesses. Keeping asset bubbles within bounds have to be an objective of public policy. I propounded this theory in my first book, The Alchemy of Finance, in 1987. It was generally dismissed at the time but the current financial crisis has proven, not necessarily its validity, but certainly its superiority to the prevailing dogma.
Let me briefly recapitulate my theory for those who are not familiar with it. It can be summed up in two propositions. First, financial markets, far from accurately reflecting all the available knowledge, always provide a distorted view of reality. This is the principle of fallibility. The degree of distortion may vary from time to time. Sometimes it’s quite insignificant, at other times it is quite pronounced. When there is a significant divergence between market prices and the underlying reality I speak of far from equilibrium conditions. That is where we are now.
Second, financial markets do not play a purely passive role; they can also affect the so called fundamentals they are supposed to reflect. These two functions that financial markets perform work in opposite directions. In the passive or cognitive function the fundamentals are supposed to determine market prices. In the active or manipulative function market prices find ways of influencing the fundamentals. When both functions operate at the same time they interfere with each other. The supposedly independent variable of one function is the dependent variable of the other so that neither function has a truly independent variable. As a result neither market prices nor the underlying reality is fully determined. Both suffer from an element of uncertainty that cannot be quantified. I call the interaction between the two functions reflexivity. Frank Knight recognized and explicated this element of unquantifiable uncertainty in a book published in 1921 but the Efficient Market Hypothesis and Rational Expectation Theory have deliberately ignored it. That is what made them so misleading.
Reflexivity sets up a feedback loop between market valuations and the so-called fundamentals which are being valued. The feedback can be either positive or negative. Negative feedback brings market prices and the underlying reality closer together. In other words, negative feedback is self-correcting. It can go on forever and if the underlying reality remains unchanged it may eventually lead to an equilibrium in which market prices accurately reflect the fundamentals. By contrast, a positive feedback is self-reinforcing. It cannot go on forever because eventually market prices would become so far removed from reality that market participants would have to recognize them as unrealistic. When that tipping point is reached, the process becomes self-reinforcing in the opposite direction. That is how financial markets produce boom-bust phenomena or bubbles. Bubbles are not the only manifestations of reflexivity but they are the most spectacular.
In my interpretation equilibrium, which is the central case in economic theory, turns out to be a limiting case where negative feedback is carried to its ultimate limit. Positive feedback has been largely assumed away by the prevailing dogma and it deserves a lot more attention.
I have developed a rudimentary theory of bubbles along these lines. Every bubble has two components: an underlying trend that prevails in reality and a misconception relating to that trend. When a positive feedback develops between the trend and the misconception a boom-bust process is set in motion. The process is liable to be tested by negative feedback along the way and if it is strong enough to survive these tests, both the trend and the misconception will be reinforced. Eventually, market expectations become so far removed from reality that people are forced to recognize that a misconception is involved. A twilight period ensues during which doubts grow and more and more people lose faith but the prevailing trend is sustained by inertia. As Chuck Prince former head of Citigroup said, “As long as the music is playing you’ve got to get up and dance. We are still dancing.” Eventually a tipping point is reached when the trend is reversed; it then becomes self-reinforcing in the opposite direction.
Typically bubbles have an asymmetric shape. The boom is long and slow to start. It accelerates gradually until it flattens out again during the twilight period. The bust is short and steep because it involves the forced liquidation of unsound positions. Disillusionment turns into panic, reaching its climax in a financial crisis.
The simplest case of a purely financial bubble can be found in real estate. The trend that precipitates it is the availability of credit; the misconception that continues to recur in various forms is that the value of the collateral is independent of the availability of credit. As a matter of fact, the relationship is reflexive. When credit becomes cheaper activity picks up and real estate values rise. There are fewer defaults, credit performance improves, and lending standards are relaxed. So at the height of the boom, the amount of credit outstanding is at its peak and a reversal precipitates false liquidation, depressing real estate values.
The bubble that led to the current financial crisis is much more complicated. The collapse of the sub-prime bubble in 2007 set off a chain reaction, much as an ordinary bomb sets off a nuclear explosion. I call it a super-bubble. It has developed over a longer period of time and it is composed of a number of simpler bubbles. What makes the super-bubble so interesting is the role that the smaller bubbles have played in its development.
The prevailing trend in the super-bubble was the ever increasing use of credit and leverage. The prevailing misconception was the believe that financial markets are self-correcting and should be left to their own devices. President Reagan called it the “magic of the marketplace” and I call it market fundamentalism. It became the dominant creed in the 1980s. Since market fundamentalism was based on false premises its adoption led to a series of financial crises. Each time, the authorities intervened, merged away, or otherwise took care of the failing financial institutions, and applied monetary and fiscal stimuli to protect the economy. These measures reinforced the prevailing trend of ever increasing credit and leverage and as long as they worked they also reinforced the prevailing misconception that markets can be safely left to their own devices. The intervention of the authorities is generally recognized as creating amoral hazard; more accurately it served as a successful test of a false belief, thereby inflating the super-bubble even further.
It should be emphasized that my theories of bubbles cannot predict whether a test will be successful or not. This holds for ordinary bubbles as well as the super-bubble. For instance I thought the emerging market crisis of 1997-1998 would constitute the tipping point for the super-bubble, but I was wrong. The authorities managed to save the system and the super-bubble continued growing. That made the bust that eventually came in 2007-2008 all the more devastating.
What are the implications of my theory for the regulation of the financial system?
First and foremost, since markets are bubble-prone, the financial authorities have to accept responsibility for preventing bubbles from growing too big. Alan Greenspan and other regulators have expressly refused to accept that responsibility. If markets can’t recognize bubbles, Greenspan argued, neither can regulators—and he was right. Nevertheless, the financial authorities have to accept the assignment, knowing full well that they will not be able to meet it without making mistakes. They will, however, have the benefit of receiving feedback from the markets, which will tell them whether they have done too much or too little. They can then correct their mistakes.
Second, in order to control asset bubbles it is not enough to control the money supply; you must also control the availability of credit. This cannot be done by using only monetary tools; you must also use credit controls. The best-known tools are margin requirements and minimum capital requirements. Currently they are fixed irrespective of the market’s mood, because markets are not supposed to have moods. Yet they do, and the financial authorities need to vary margin and minimum capital requirements in order to control asset bubbles.
Regulators may also have to invent new tools or revive others that have fallen into disuse. For instance, in my early days in finance, many years ago, central banks used to instruct commercial banks to limit their lending to a particular sector of the economy, such as real estate or consumer loans, because they felt that the sector was overheating. Market fundamentalists consider that kind of intervention unacceptable but they are wrong. When our central banks used to do it we had no financial crises to speak of. The Chinese authorities do it today, and they have much better control over their banking system. The deposits that Chinese commercial banks have to maintain at the People’s Bank of China were increased seventeen times during the boom, and when the authorities reversed course the banks obeyed them with alacrity.
Third, since markets are potentially unstable, there are systemic risks in addition to the risks affecting individual market participants. Participants may ignore these systemic risks in the belief that they can always dispose of their positions, but regulators cannot ignore them because if too many participants are on the same side, positions cannot be liquidated without causing a discontinuity or a collapse. They have to monitor the positions of participants in order to detect potential imbalances. That means that the positions of all major market participants, including hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds, need to be monitored. The drafters of the Basel Accords made a mistake when they gave securities held by banks substantially lower risk ratings than regular loans: they ignored the systemic risks attached to concentrated positions in securities. This was an important factor aggravating the crisis. It has to be corrected by raising the risk ratings of securities held by banks. That will probably discourage loans, which is not such a bad thing.
Fourth, derivatives and synthetic financial instruments perform many useful functions but they also carry hidden dangers. For instance, the securitization of mortgages was supposed to reduce risk thru geographical diversification. In fact it introduced a new risk by separating the interest of the agents from the interest of the owners. Regulators need to fully understand how these instruments work before they allow them to be used and they ought to impose restrictions guard against those hidden dangers. For instance, agents packaging mortgages into securities ought to be obliged to retain sufficient ownership to guard against the agency problem.
Credit default swaps (CDS) are particularly dangerous they allow people to buy insurance on the survival of a company or a country while handing them a license to kill. CDS ought to be available to buyers only to the extent that they have a legitimate insurable interest. Generally speaking, derivatives ought to be registered with a regulatory agency just as regular securities have to be registered with the SEC or its equivalent. Derivatives traded on exchanges would be registered as a class; those traded over-the-counter would have to be registered individually. This would provide a powerful inducement to use exchange traded derivatives whenever possible.
Finally, we must recognize that financial markets evolve in a one-directional, nonreversible manner. The financial authorities, in carrying out their duty of preventing the system from collapsing, have extended an implicit guarantee to all institutions that are “too big to fail.” Now they cannot credibly withdraw that guarantee. Therefore, they must impose regulations that will ensure that the guarantee will not be invoked. Too-big-to-fail banks must use less leverage and accept various restrictions on how they invest the depositors’ money. Deposits should not be used to finance proprietary trading. But regulators have to go even further. They must regulate the compensation packages of proprietary traders to ensure that risks and rewards are properly aligned. This may push proprietary traders out of banks into hedge funds where they properly belong. Just as oil tankers are compartmentalized in order to keep them stable, there ought to be firewalls between different markets. It is probably impractical to separate investment banking from commercial banking as the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 did. But there have to be internal compartments keeping proprietary trading in various markets separate from each other. Some banks that have come to occupy quasi-monopolistic positions may have to be broken up.
While I have a high degree of conviction on these five points, there are many questions to which my theory does not provide an unequivocal answer. For instance, is a high degree of liquidity always desirable? To what extent should securities be marked to market? Many answers that followed automatically from the Efficient Market Hypothesis need to be reexamined.
It is clear that the reforms currently under consideration do not fully satisfy the five points I have made but I want to emphasize that these five points apply only in the long run. As Mervyn King explained the authorities had to do in the short run the exact opposite of what was required in the long run. And as I said earlier the financial crisis is far from over. We have just ended Act Two. The euro has taken center stage and Germany has become the lead actor. The European authorities face a daunting task: they must help the countries that have fallen far behind the Maastricht criteria to regain their equilibrium while they must also correct the deficinies of the Maastricht Treaty which have allowed the imbalances to develop. The euro is in what I call a far-from-equilibrium situation. But I prefer to discuss this subject in Germany, which is the lead actor, and I plan to do so at the Humboldt University in Berlin on June 23rd. I hope you will forgive me if I avoid the subject until then.
美国国债突破13万亿美元创历史新高
来源：(http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4b712d230100jb0l.html) - 何新：此次金融危机是百年以来最严重最深刻的危机_何新博客_新浪博客  2010年06月04日03:42  经济参考报
美国财政部6月2日公布数据显示，美国国债6月1日突破13万亿美元，创历史新高，相当于国内生产总值的近90%，国债数目过去10年间增加两倍多。
在近来美国财政赤字不断激增的背景下，其国债规模创下历史新高并不让人感到意外。面对随时可能到来的公众责难，美国国内两大政党开始互相推诿，总统奥巴马也赶快上演“政治秀”，表示政府没有忽视赤字问题。不过，毫无疑问，削减赤字面临着来自各方的政治压力，这一难题也绝非一日之功就能解决的，好在欧洲债务危机带来的避险浪潮给了美国政府一个很好的喘息机会。
两党互相归咎
面对国债高企，民主党和共和党互相归咎。
美国总统奥巴马2日说，前任共和党政府遗留高额财政赤字，致使国债攀升。“截至我(去年1月)就任总统时，联邦政府年度财政赤字超过1万亿美元……”奥巴马说：“有趣的是，指责我们(民主党)政府财政管理不负责的人，恰是那些(曾在共和党政府)参与决策、致使出现这种局面的人。”
不少共和党人士回应说，奥巴马上台后推进医疗保险改革，致使联邦政府支出增加。共和党参议员贾德·格雷格说：“13对于我们而言不是一个幸运数字……不能放任这一状况持续”。
资料显示，10年前美国国债是5 .7万亿美元，2005年增加至7.7万亿美元。6个月前，这一数字达到12万亿美元。有分析称，目前美国约有3亿900万人，13万亿美元国债代表平均每人负债超4.2万美元，利息2211美元。
奥巴马承诺减赤
美国专家警告称，美国国债如果持续攀升，终将导致恶性通货膨胀。他们建议政府放缓爆炸性开支和借贷，并尽快削减财政赤字。随着欧洲债务危机爆发，部分经济学家警告说，美国制定结束财政痛苦计划的时间有限。甚至一向谨慎的美联储主席伯南克也警告说，美国的财政赤字正处于不可持续的道路上，财政赤字可能最终会侵蚀债券投资人对于美国财政政策管理的信心，推升国债收益率，导致借贷成本上扬。
评级机构穆迪上月25日发布报告维持了对美国国债的3A评级，但称除非美国政府采取更多措施削减财政赤字，否则未来3A评级可能遭受压力。
对此，奥巴马总统也做出了回应。他6月2日在匹兹堡卡内基·梅隆大学发表演讲指出，美国必须启动全面的改革，为经济增长和繁荣奠定新的更加强健的基础；而要重铸美国经济基础，政府就必须采取有效措施削减过高的财政赤字。
不过，美国经济的脆弱性使奥巴马在应对赤字问题上“投鼠忌器”。屡创新高的财政赤字，居高不下的失业数字，这“两高”令面临中期选举的美国总统奥巴马头痛不已。白宫正受到互相矛盾的压力，一方面它需要减少开支，而另一方面却要想方设法创造就业机会。
美债短期或受欢迎
美国财政部5月17日公布的数据显示，截至3月底，外国债权人持有的美国国债总额达到了3.88万亿美元，较上月增加了3.5%。外界普遍认为，外国债权人增加美国国债，部分原因是欧洲债务危机导致一些资金转向更安全的投资领域，在欧债危机带来的避险浪潮中，美元资产仍可能坚挺一段时间。
不过，国内外很多专家学者都指出，尽管看上去比较“安全”，美国国债市场仍然存在很大泡沫，不排除某一天它忽然崩盘的可能性。“美国现在的财政赤字很大，每年大概有1.5万亿美元，并且不断增长，而美国自身经济的税收能力并不能支持。美国目前只能不停地印刷货币，并吸引全球的投资者来承担。我认为，美国国债配不上3A评级。”欧洲太平洋资本投资公司总裁彼得·席夫曾表示。
美国财政部5月17日的数据还显示，中国3月持有的美国国债达到8952亿美元，较上月增加2%，仍为美国最大债权国。这也是中国半年来首次增持美国国债。此外，3月份日本持有美国国债也增加了2.1%，达到7849亿美元；英国持有美国国债则大幅增加了19.5%，达到2790亿美元。中日英分列美国第一、第二和第三大债权国。
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记录今早何新先生的一次谈话
今早（6-12）何新先生要博主对楼下的那篇文章作了些修改和补充。何新说：希望这文和文后的新闻能给喜欢说梦话唱高调误导国人的媒体浇点冷水。
我问何先生：未来经济前景会如何？因为许多网友有问。
何先生叹一口气说：我的看法早都说过。不必有任何幻想，也没有任何悬念：今后几年物价会越来越高，房价并不会明显下跌，但人民币真实含金量会越来越稀薄，青年就业会越来越难，底层社会会越来越感到生存的艰辛。社会不安宁的现象会越来越显著。而社会问题的根源还是由于经济问题。
我说：前几年中国经济还如日中天，中国概念炒得火热，怎么忽然一下变成这样，就现出衰像了？是不是由于这次金融危机果真触发了货币战争？
何新说：哪有什么货币战争？谁和谁在打仗啦？纯属不实之词，广告语言而已。打仗要有目标，为什么目标打仗啊？天下继续会和平，短期内还看不到发生大型国际战争的阴影。别听那些危言耸听。
至于中美经济关系，我观察了多年，惊讶地发现：如今在美国与中国之间已经形成了一种非常奇特的共生性的经济动态互联结构：
1、美国靠高息和国家信用吸储，就是向全球借贷——如今美国是有史以来最幸福最快乐的债务国家。美国完全靠消费跟别人借的钱来过好日子——目前美国国债总额是13万亿美元，相当于美国“鸡地屁”（国内生产总值)的90%.其中借钱给美国最多的是中国。
2、美国用向世界（包括中国）借来的钱从中国买最多的东西。但是一边买，一边骂：你的商品为什么卖这么便宜？就是因为你卖的东西太便宜，让我不得不买这么多，而且只好买你的，害得我现在欠你的债越来越多！就是你中国卖便宜货，害得全世界发生金融危机，你中国是罪魁祸首！你必须快点采取措施让你的东西提价（就是让人民币汇率升值）。
3、同时，美国用跟世界和中国借到的钱（基本都是美元），通过高盛、索罗斯等金融大鳄到中国来进行投资。
4、从美国流进中国的美元，使得中国每年增发千万亿人民币，这些钱投入中国国内市场，拉动起内需（主要拉动在房地产和股市），维持着中国经济的外表一片繁荣。（这些人民币，其实也是各地政府财税增收的来源。）
5、美国基金在中国国境内外大量吸收囤积人民币，当做保值金融品。然后伺机利用人民币升值，套取巨额资金回兑成美元，再回流美国，滋养刺激美国经济复苏。
6、中国对流入境内的大笔美元不知所措——只有不断购买明知今后实际基本无法兑现的死美元国债——从而把能花销的活美元再还给美国。就这样，一轮一轮，周而复始。这就是当今中美之间的资金大循环模式，共生互补，各得其乐，哪有什么货币战争？什么金融战争？
就是这样一个可笑的循环金融模式，已经在中美两国之间循环运转了十来年。中国人很高兴，说这是"盛世"！——因为我们从来没有这么有钱，这么阔气过。（“盛世”这个词何新2002年最早用过——但是当时中美之间还未形成这样一种奇特的金融循环模式。）
所以，什么“货币战争”一类说法，都是言不及义的不实之词。实际上，中美之间非但没有战争而且如今倒结成了一种金融共生和寄生的紧密相互依存关系。
一些美国政客喜欢用高关税、贸易战来吓唬我们那些神经脆弱的商务官员。其实呢，中国商品特别是服装、鞋子、日用品、文具、家电、手提电脑，现在已经是美国国内中下层百姓日用所需，任凭美国国家债台高筑美元泛滥,价廉物美的中国货在却美国是避免物价飞涨的主要缓冲器。如果美国市场上的廉价中国货突然断档一年，那时美国下层不发生抗议物价上涨的骚乱才怪。
再讲一个比喻性的寓言吧：美国好比一条肥大的金融寄生虫，寄生在中国这个虚胖大胖子（脂肪就是3万亿外汇储备）的躯体上。
但是这条寄生虫在胖子体内所排泄的粪便，却在滋养着这个胖子，是胖子所必须的一部分营养的来源。如果摘除掉这个虫子，中国这个虚胖的身体也许会由于营养不良而枯萎。
所以，根本就没有发生什么“货币战争”（今后也不会发生）。如今中美之间已经结合成有史以来最奇特的一种金融寄生与伴生的关系：一条大虫子在拼命吸你的血，而你一旦离开这吸血虫，自己的机体就会饿死。
何新的智慧和知识不够，只能把这个故事告诉国人们，但何新却并不知道这个结应该怎么去解。
你可以把我的话记录下来发到网上，去向国内外的高人们请教吧！
来源：(http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4b712d230100jb0l.html) - 何新：此次金融危机是百年以来最严重最深刻的危机_何新博客_新浪博客
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