SOCIAL DEMOCRATIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT STRATE...

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO NEOLIBERALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA?
Journal of Third World Studies,  Fall 2007  byVellinga, Menno
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INTRODUCTION
This essay will review the relevancy of the social democratic model as a possible source of inspiration for political change and a reorientation of development strategy in Latin America. The social democratic option includes an emphasis on economic growth with equity and favors social policies supporting the great majorities. As such, it would represent an alternative to present neoliberal and neopopulist strategies.
Social democracy has gained respectability in the deliberation about alternatives to the dominant neoliberal development paradigm in Latin America. In this debate social democracy could serve as a source of inspiration for progressive forces striving for economic growth with equity, democracy and the provision of basic needs. The recent redrawing of the political map in Latin America has produced a large number of center-left or left leaning governments that find in social democracy an option that merits consideration.1 This is a remarkable phenomenon. Just a few decades ago, social democracy was often despised by the Latin American left as a betrayal of the ideals of original socialism. It is apparent now that this opinion has changed. From a second-best option to socialism, the social democratic strategy-more reformist than revolutionary, more pragmatic and less ideological, more compromising and less antagonistic towards capitalism-became for many a course that the socialist movement maybe should have considered pursuing from the beginning.2

Social democracy claims to be more than just a mode of political intervention. It aims to cover the entire realm of societal development. The question, then, of to what extent social democracy would be able to inspire a development paradigm as an alternative to neoliberalism, is relevant. In this debate, social democracy has operated with a theoretical frame of reference in which elements of modernization theory - in particular those pertaining to the organization of the economy and the evolution of institutional arrangements that do not necessarily have a class reference- are combined with insights from a dependency analysis that recognizes external dependencies as well as internal, structurally generated antagonisms of interests between social groups or categories. At the same time, social democracy stands for political interventions that will combine an emphasis on economic growth with structural reform directed towards a reduction of the socioeconomic inequities that threaten to tear most Latin American societies apart. The project of radical democracy connects with this debate, viewing any open democratic system that fails to generalize socioeconomic welfare to wide sectors of the population as not sustainable.
In Western Europe, the social democratic movement -without negating contradictions among classes, social categories or interest groups-pursued welfare for all, building a "model" in which political pluralism, constitutional liberties, democratic participation and welfare policies were combined with economic efficiency. In Latin America, such a strategy to organize economy and society has remained a challenge: attractive because of its content; hard to realize because the basic conditions that made the "model" possible in Western Europe are not present in Latin America. This inspired Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in an interesting essay written one and a half decades ago, to view the future of social democracy in Latin America as heavily dependent on serendipity effects: unforeseen results of an unplanned historical development.3
How did this regard for social democracy as a source of inspiration for development strategies arise? Initially, European social democracy tried to create a sphere of influence in Latin America, in particular during the authoritarian regimes of the 1970s. This influence, however, weakened in subsequent decades when the United States activities in the region increased while West European social democracy found itself increasingly preoccupied with problems on its home territory. In this same period, however, the interest among Latin American progressive forces increased in a democratization that would include (à la T.H. Marshall) not only civil and political but also social citizenship, including the rights to socioeconomic welfare. These elements have always been a solid part of the social democratic creed. In Western Europe, the defense of (autonomous) worker organizations, support for improvement in wages and working conditions, a belief in the effectiveness of the parliamentary system, in free elections, in the state's responsibility for creating equity and social justice, were added and became generally accepted. In Latin America, however, this creed would have represented at the time a challenge to the dominant development paradigm of almost revolutionary proportions.
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC STRATEGY
Social democracy in Europe and in Latin America originated in sharply differing socio-historical contexts and evolved along different lines. European social democracy has been characterized by the dominance of social categories over political ones. It was strongly identified with the rise of the labor movement. In Latin America, political categories have mostly prevailed over social ones in movements of a populist nature. This is an important difference. Of course, there is not a one and only type of European social democracy. Considerable differences exist between the Scandinavian, German and Dutch types on the one hand and the French, Italian and Spanish ones on the other, with the British and Belgians somewhere in between. All share, however, strong roots in the labor movement and emphasize the role of the state in promoting conditions of general welfare and equity. Socialism in its pure form has always been a political, rather than a social, force. At an early stage already it had problems resisting more pragmatic, reformist positions. In practice, the workers opted for short-term material gains. All through the history of the labor movement, it has been hard to mobilize the rank and file for long-term projects of massive socioeconomic transformation. Those political parties or movements that made such attempts suffered disastrous defeats at the polls and fell into decline. All major West European social democratic parties experienced at one time or another internal opposition movements defending "pure" socialism, movements that without exception were crushed by the moderate majority.
The reformist approach within the social democratic movement has developed within a context of dynamic capitalist development. Strong economic growth made it possible to honor demands for wage increases, to improve working conditions, and to finance social welfare policies while leaving the capitalist a still-important part of the economic surplus, neutralizing possible opposition. Pluralist political structures with a parliamentary system based on general and free elections made it very worthwhile to secure power and influence over the state. This became even more important when the state assumed important functions in the mobilization of resources, in particular with regard to the distribution and allocation of capital and labor. Since the 1930s, the state role has been defined increasingly by Keynesian economics. In the reconstruction years following the Second World War, the plan to create a welfare state emerged. The basic characteristics of such a configuration were accepted by a broad national consensus, and this general agreement on the basic structure of the welfare state edifice has remained, even under governments dominated by the Christian Democrats and/or the Liberal Conservatives and in which social democracy had no presence. Changes in the elements to be included in the "model" have been marginal. Germany and France provide good examples of such development.
The shift within the social democratic movement from the goal of societal transformation to the very pragmatic course of piecemeal reformism is viewed by Przeworski4 as an inevitable development. Any rational mass movement in a situation governed by liberal-democratic freedoms will not be able to resist the enticement of short-term material gains. The transition toward socialism under those circumstances will be viewed as too costly a process, loaded with sacrifices for an ideal that present generations may not live to see put into practice.
One can debate if such developments, as presented by Przeworski, represent a situation of "free" choice or a development "forced" by the mechanisms of a capitalist system that may leave little room for alternatives. But regardless of whether the decision for reformism will be viewed as a positive or a negative development, it is hard to deny that Przeworski's analysis is convincing in the light of what has happened historically. For European social democracy, there always has been little separation between the logic behind the functioning of the economy and the one directing the course of political action. This explains its pragmatism. Social democracy has its origins in the labor movement but, once in power, it has de-emphasized class identities and in political practice has provided a context for a wide constituency left of the center of the political spectrum. The challenge to capitalism and the free-market economy was replaced by an emphasis on the responsibility of the state to provide regulations that would prevent excesses and repair nasty consequences of market action. Where necessary, the state should take an active entrepreneurial role and establish a "mixed' economy. These elements of social democracy, added to a considerable flexibility and ability to adapt to changing circumstances -in the absence of a rigid ideological framework with strong prescriptive powers -have appealed to political strategists not only in Latin America but also in other regions that have suffered severe economic and political crises, such as in Eastern Europe.
Ironically, this debate about social democracy as an attractive and viable option between state socialism and free-market capitalism or between neoliberalism and national populism has been carried on at a point in time when, in Western Europe itself, the social democratic movement has entered into a crisis, forcing it to radically redefine positions. Its political base of support in society underwent dramatic changes as a result of changes in the economic structure. De-industrialization and the shift toward the service sector changed the face of many an economy. The traditional industrial proletariat employed by the "heavy" industry has strongly decreased in size. The employees in the new tertiary and "quarternary" sectors feel less motivated toward the social democratic movement. It has become increasingly difficult to build the coalition that in the past had been so successful: the one between the "haves" and the "have-nots," between the lower layers of society and the intellectual elite. Ironically, several of social democracy's problems have resulted from past successes in the realization of its general objectives. Its original targets in the areas of social security and workingman's protection against the consequences of illness, old age, or unemployment were achieved. The state has extended its responsibilities to virtually all areas that involve a medical, social or economic risk. As a result, the mobilizing power of the social democratic movement has declined. Also, the policies that it had inspired created problems of their own. In all Northern and West European countries, the state came to absorb more than half of GNP. An elaborate bureaucracy had been created to manage the state-run or state subsidized programs. Bureaucratic excesses and increasing demands made on the state when so many individual problems were made part of a collective responsibility, combined with critically high levels of payments for taxes and social security, fed the neoconservative criticism of the welfare state, even in social democracy's stronghold, Sweden. In several countries, social democracy lost elections to center-right governments. In the political opposition, an often painful process of evaluation and redefinition of objectives and strategy began. In political practice, the social democratic movement seldom operated from a well-defined and consistent theoretical perspective. In most cases, action was guided by a few rather general principles. The more lofty ideals for which the social democratic movement stands were temporarily put on hold as distant reference points. The dynamic relationship between these general principles and new developments in society were the movement's main source of creativity and inspiration for further theoretical development. Paradoxically, this has been one of its weaknesses and at the same time one of the movement's strengths.
The debates within the movement about a new course all share an acute awareness of the importance of the market system with the need to support a competitive, efficient and innovative business sector. This position has gained, so it appears, priority rather than full employment, an objective that has dominated the social democratic action programs since the world crisis in the 1930s. Past vitriolic criticisms of capitalism have subsided, quite a change from positions that were taken in the 1970s when the distributive side received most attention over the productive side of the economy.
Returning to the original theme of this essay: given these developments, what -realistically- would be the viability of the social democratic alternative in Latin America?
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: TOWARD A NEW DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM?
The social democratic movement has lacked strong roots in Latin America. In Europe, the movement's growth ran parallel to the development of an industrial structure. It was above all a workers' movement. In Latin America, the political debate on the left -from the end of the 19th century on-was in a way "free floating" and encountered difficulty in translating theoretical socialist discourse to the more concrete spheres of organization and action in defense of long-term objectives of working class emancipation. The Second International initially continued to use Marxist theory as its prime source of inspiration and maintained the establishment of socialism as its primary objective. In the selection of the means of realization though -free elections, parliamentary procedures, gradual change, liberal democratic rules of the game-a strategy was chosen in political practice that created a considerable distance towards the more radical sectors on the left. This gap increased in subsequent decades when Marxism continued to dominate the political discourse among social democrats. However, much of the debate remained on the level of phraseology and lacked real prescriptive power over the course of the movement.
Sociohistorically, Latin America does not seem to have been the most ideal breeding ground for social democratically styled politics. The heritage of Iberian bureaucratic patrimonialism with its emphasis on a strong presidentialism, political centralism, authoritarianism, corporatism, clientelism, personalism, all of which -in combination with a weak capitalist industrial development-normally will not correlate easily with the emergence of independent social democratic mass organizations in which the working class might be integrated. In the more industrialized countries, the labor movement rapidly became integrated into corporatist structures and lost its autonomy. Following the populist formula, its leadership was co-opted into official political networks. The workers were being bought off through small improvements in working and living conditions which defined them as "privileged" in comparison with those not belonging to the unionized urban-industrial world. Striking examples are the regimes of Perón in Argentina (1946-1955), Vargas in Brazil (1930-1945, 1951-1954) and Cárdenas in Mexico (1934-1940), but populist scenarios have also been functioning in other countries and until the present day populism has remained an attractive alternative for many a politician. Those bargaining structures through which social democracy was able to cash in on the expansion of its base of support among workers, intellectuals and part of the middle classes, however, have remained very much a European phenomenon. The lack of maturity of capitalism and the presence of pre-capitalist formations with an absence of bourgeois hegemony, has been a much debated explanatory factor. Obviously "it takes two to tango." Class formation among the working population at the levels of identity, organization, ideology and action will need a party to define itself against. But even then, capitalist maturity in all spheres may not result. Latin America present various cases of regional bourgeoisies whose behavior in the economic sphere will conform to classical capitalist criteria, but whose actions in the social and political spheres are governed by traditional rules that are totally different. Labor-management relations are often archaic and totally opposed to an institutionalization of class conflict with an emphasis on cooperation, compromise and bargaining with an independent labor movement.
While viewing the social democratic heritage in the various countries, it becomes clear that in many cases it has been tied up in the populist regimes of the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s that we mentioned earlier. These regimes were characterized by caudillismo and the ample use of clientelism as a mechanism of class control next to the integration of labor into corporatist structures. There were few exceptions. The socialist movement in Chile and APRA of Peru could be mentioned. However, their deviation from the pattern probably had more to do with the lack of access to government power than with anything else.
The formal membership of the international social democratic movement has remained small. When the Latin American section of the Socialist International was founded in 1955, it counted only three members from Latin America and two from the Caribbean. This total number of five had increased to only eight in 1971. The explosive growth in membership dates from later years in the 1970s and 1980s. The failure of social democracy to develop a strong power position
in Latin American politics during the period of import-substituting industrialization after World War II is almost as striking as its success in Europe during the same period. We have mentioned the more important factors that, in combination, may explain this phenomenon. From the continued presence of such factors one could easily conclude that any development paradigm inspired by social democracy is bound to fail. Various countries suffered long years of a ruthless brand of authoritarianism. Others carry a suffocating heritage of populist rule. The processes of democratization in these countries are fragile and vulnerable. Full democratization implies social citizenship for all, next to civil and political citizenship, embodied in a system of government which guarantees pluralist political participation with full political and civil liberties in order to level out economic, social and cultural inequities. Success in doing so is necessary in order to reproduce the system. Little imagination is needed to see the problems involved. At the same time it is obvious that old solutions to Latin America's economic and political problems have worn out. The model of a paternalist, distributive state, undermining the autonomy of the social sectors through their integration into centrally controlled structures with a strong input of authoritarian ism, has been exhausted. The populist formula will always be tempting, but it is difficult to resuscitate in countries that do not benefit from a continuing source of income, as does Venezuela.
The present conjuncture has been forcing most countries along the road of neoliberal policy options. All of these deepen existing inequities, erode the social responsibilities of the state and identify with the interests of the upper layers of society. Contradictions have grown between the trend toward democratization, which has been generating claims from previously unrepresented and/or repressed segments of society, and the trend toward state reform which has included measures that cut deep into the state- run or state-subsidized programs that would have to respond to these claims. These contradictions have led to riots and revolts and have generated a generalized discontent in many countries with the pace of democratization.5 The most logical way to establish social democracy would, again, be through a victory of capitalism, the formation of an entrepreneurial class and the organization of a worker movement that would force state intervention on behalf of workers' interests and lead to an industrial democracy. This is the ideal Western model and at the moment only one country appears to be moving in this direction: Chile. Still, the position of labor would need to be strengthened further through a reduction of pressures on the labor market which is complicated by the massive size of the informal sector and a continued presence of neoliberal strategies and policies.
The classical social democratic recipe would involve the institutionalization of class conflict through an emphasis on cooperation, compromise and bargaining with a labor movement that would structure the greater part of its activities around an economism that would change the distribution of income and power, but would leave the basic elements of a capitalist free-market system intact. Such development is still far from materializing, and also in those countries that recently opted for left-leaning positions in politics, neoliberal strategies and policies prevail, with the exception of Venezuela.
Alain Touraine6 has noted, in an article published several years ago, that all new political strategies, whether populist, anti-liberal or social democratic appear to lead to neoliberal policies because these represent a very basic way of running any economy. Past political formulas have been exhausted and have lost relevance. The solution, according to Touraine, would be to combine the basic economic strategies of neoliberalism with an advanced social policy, however strange this combination may seem to be. Such development could be the starting point for a Latin American brand of social democracy. At the same time it would offer a way to avoid the combined phenomenon of the impoverishment of the middle classes and the increased exclusion of the lower classes. Such a development may include the newly elected left-wing regimes in the region (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia and possibly Venezuela) as part of a process of social democratization that has happened rather as a result of an unexpected course of action with even more unexpected consequences, than as the outcome of a consciously planned strategy of social reform. All recently changed regimes emphasize the need to give proper attention to the productive side of the economy and, in the second instance, to the distributive side, which traditionally has been social democracy's main concern. This emphasis on economic growth, coupled with an awareness of the international dimensions resulting from a globalizing world, has to be reconciled, however, with the rational medium-term interests and claims of various social groups. This balance between support for redistributive policies aimed at social equity on the one hand and the maintenance of those elements in the economy that will continue to motivate individual groups to move ahead, on the other, is a very delicate one. The state will have to play an important role here. There is no institution capable of taking its place. In almost all Latin American countries, the neoliberal offensive has pushed toward the creation of a "minimal" state. It is obvious, however, that such a creation will not be able to take on the responsibilities envisioned in the social democratic conception of the socially necessary state. To steer between these neoliberal strategies and the heritage of a populist-corporatist state will be one of the main challenges for the social democratic movement in Latin America.
A major source of inspiration could be the way in which Spanish social democracy a few decades ago engineered the change from an authoritarian state with strong corporatist features to a state that has withdrawn from many areas and practices a very selective intervention in the economy and society as part of a strategy combining basic neoliberal measures with "social protectionism." When in power, social democracy employed a methodology rather than a consistent model of development. The party operated with a number of basic general objectives -social justice, a reduction of socioeconomic inequalities, a limited free market economy-and means which are basically those of an open, pluralist and democratic parliamentary system. In the Spanish case, social democracy's flexibility in adapting to local circumstances proved again to be its strength. The Iberian heritage has often been pointed out as responsible for the political backwardness of Latin America. The developments in Spain after the Franco regime show that such heritage does not have to be an insurmountable stumbling block on the road toward the creation of a social democracy. Many factors that hinder the realization of social democratically inspired reforms in Latin America also figured in the Iberian situation, and the strong role for social democracy was the outcome of an unplanned historical development rather than resulting from a well- defined project.
Finally, reform strategies are always difficult to accomplish. They often fall short of expectations because they must pursue such different objectives: those of justice, equity and growth. In addition, these goals given their abstract nature-can be put into practice in differing ways. Again, many Latin American countries need to implement processes of social democratization on the basis of a social program that makes a consensus possible in a new national pact, different from those pacts that in the past were forged under the banners of populism. Social democracy may be able to inspire a new general development paradigm that will not be tied to a specific national context, one nation-state or specific national circumstances. The present redrawing of the political map in Latin America shows a radical type of socialism (Cuba, Bolivia, Venezuela) next to a moderate type of social democracy (Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina).7 The push toward a regional development paradigm that will constitute an alternative to present neoliberal policies has been coming mainly from Venezuela. Its Socialismo Bolivariano is a new phenomenon with a radical neopopulist orientation. To what extent this movement will turn to social democracy or connect with Cuban style orthodoxy, remains to be seen.
The leftist movement in the other countries is diverse and runs from a radical brand of socialism to moderate tendencies approaching the political center. They all show, however, an emphasis on social egalitarianism and a critical attitude towards the neoliberal agenda of the Washington Consensus and its inability to realize growth with equity. That said, however, considerable differences of opinion remain regarding the course to be followed. The PT government of Brazil has chosen to leave the basic elements of the orthodox economic policies in place, practice fiscal austerity, maintain a favorable 'climate' for foreign investment, all under conditions of social stability. The 'social debt' is being handled through a new generation of social programs and conditional cash transfers to the poor.8 Similar programs exist in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Mexico.
The Kirchner government in Argentina has been operating against the background of a long legacy of populism. His administration presides over a remarkable economic recovery engineered by a mixture of orthodox measures and populist-type price controls on utilities and articles of popular consumption. A strong export economy with increases in volume of over 50 per cent since 2002 has supported these policies, including the decision to sever the ties with the IMF, whose policies are viewed as a main factor contributing to Argentina's continuing economic crisis during the last decades.9 The government announced an end to this "deadly embrace" and declared that it would pay its 9,9 billion debt to the Fund, a measure received with great enthusiasm by the general population, while being viewed with suspicion by the business community.
The Frente Amplio in Uruguay is a coalition of 21 political groups and movements covering the political spectrum from the radical left to the center. In economic policy, basically neoliberal options were chosen, also dictated by the political moderation such a wide coalition requires. However, social democratic influences pursuing social justice demanded a stronger role for the state and its responsibilities in the economic, political, social, legal and infrastructural fields, a role that conflicts with the neoliberal paradigm. The activities in these areas form the foundation for a new social contract, different from the one represented by the state-centered matrix of the import-substitution model of yesteryear. Participatory institutions with membership from the government, labor and the business sector have been formed to give stability to the course this new social contract has taken.10
The government of the Partido Socialista in Chile comes closest to one inspired by traditional social democracy. Its movement towards centrist positions concluded in the plebiscite of 1988 that ended the Pinochet government and has continued to characterize Chilean politics ever since. Its economic policies have to a great extent incorporated the free market reforms of the Pinochet era and with considerable political and economic success.11
The direction the Morales government of Bolivia has been taking strong nationalist overtones with an emphasis on the emancipation of the Indian population. The power base of the government in the Movimiento al Socialismo is unstable. Powerful regional movements may complicate any radical political initiative. Central elements in the government's course taken concern the role of foreign investment in the oil and natural gas sector and the reformation of coca production (coca si, cocaina no). One may expect Brazil -which has a sizable economic and political influence in Bolivia- to have an impact on the development strategy that eventually will be adopted. Growing pressure by the U.S. that will hurt Bolivian exports will undoubtedly have an adverse effect, pushing the Morales government towards the left, approaching Venezuela for support.12
The Venezuelan Socialismo Bolivariano is very different from the course taken by the other countries that are being discussed here. It represents a radical form of neo-populism with state-centered development under the direction of a charismatic leader. The government has moved to have absolute control over the economy, thanks to state ownership of the oil industry (representing more than a quarter of GDP) and a variety of measures, including exchange controls, price limits, credit regulations, active interventions in industry and in the agro sector, plus a wide range of subsidies and anti-poverty projects. Capitalism -as viewed by the Chavez government- is at the root of underdevelopment and will have to be changed by a development paradigm inspired by the ideals of socialism.13
CONCLUSION
Social democracy in Latin America has opted for market-friendly policies with social inclusion and decided for pragmatic solutions to the separation between its radical reformist ideals and the practice of an economy that is being run following basically neoliberal criteria. As such it has moved towards neo-structuralist options, including an activist role of the state, measured protection of the internal market and mediation of the impact of globalization. Neoliberal orthodoxy has produced elite democracies without social reform agendas that would be supported by a broad popular political participation. Democracy will not be sustainable under these conditions. There is an urgent need to modernize the state and make it more responsive to society's needs. This process of state reform should be carried out in coordination with market forces, the private sector and foreign direct investment. However, the state should assert its authority whenever the interests of the great majorities of the population are threatened. In these areas social democracy runs parallel to neo-structuralism. Both assert that social transformation should be driven internally, according to the country's economic and socio-political make up and its national priorities. The national economy's position within the world economy should be mediated through state action, with the objective to decrease its vulnerability and dependence. To map out a course between the Scylla of neoliberalism and the Charibdis of neopopulism will be the great challenge for social democracy in Latin America.
NOTES
1. "Latin America: Redrawing the Political Map." in The Economist, November 26, 2005, pp. 45-46
2. See the debate in Jorge G. Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed, The Latin American Left after the Cold War. (New York: Vintage Books, 1994)
3. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Desafíos de la Socialdemocrácia en América Latina," in: Menno Vellinga, ed. Democráciay Política en América Latina (México, D.F.: Siglo XXI Editores, 1993), pp. 383-414.
4. Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)
5. "The Latinobarómetro Poll: Democracy's Ten-Year Rut," in The Economist. October 29, 2005, pp. 39-40.
6. Alain Touraine, " América Latina: del Populismo a la Socialdemocrácia " in: Menno Vellinga, ed. Democrácia y Política en América Latina (México, D.F.: Siglo. XXI Editores, 1993), pp. 415-431.
7. Ricardo Soberón, "Un Nuevo Eje Geopolítico en América del Sur," in Gestión (Lima), January 10,2006; also Jorge G. Castañeda, "Latin America's Left Turn" in Foreign Affaires. May/June 2006
8. "Lula's Leap," in The Economist, March 4, 2006.
9. The Lula government in Brazil initiated the move to repay the debt with the IMF on December 13, 2005. Argentina followed two days later, cf. "Lula and Kirchner: Different ways to Give the Fund the Kiss Off," in The Economist, December 24, 2005.
10. Francisco E. Panizza, "The Social Democratization of the Latin American Left," in European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, No. 79 (October 2005), pp. 95-104.
11. Patricio Suva, "The New Political Order: Towards Technocratic Democracies?" in: Robert N. Gwynne and Cristobal Kay, Latin America Transformed: Globalization and Modernity (London: Arnold, 2004), pp. 157-170.
12. Alvaro Vargas Llosa, "Evo Morales No es Un Giro a la Izquierda," in Clarin (Buenos Aires), January 5, 2006.
13. "A Champion of Indigenous Rights- and of State Control of the Economy," in The Economist, December 17, 2005
By Menno Vellinga*
* Professor Vellinga is affiliated with the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Florida in Gainesville, Florida. 32611 In 2004 he held the Bacardi Chair for Emminent Visiting Scholars at the Center. Previously, Professor Vellinga served as a senior lecturer at the Center for Caribbean and Latin American Studies at the University of Utrecht.
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Vellinga, Menno "SOCIAL DEMOCRATIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO NEOLIBERALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA?". Journal of Third World Studies. Fall 2007. FindArticles.com. 02 May. 2008.http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3821/is_200710/ai_n21100165