摩根斯坦利：中国经济的微观结构与紧缩难题

 
提要：地方政府如同企业，彼此间进行经济增长速度的竞争；在各自的辖区中，地方政府又如同垄断企业。这种结构，成为中国独特的微观经济基础。它既是中国经济增长的基石，也是中国经济过热的源头，并导致行政调控和货币政策等紧缩措施效力大减。
（外脑精华·北京）政府主导的增长之路
中央向地方下放权力是决定中国改革成功的基石。然而，这种转变也给中国带来了众多独特的挑战。
举例来说，虽然人们普遍怀疑中国投资增长的持续能力，但自1992年以来，中国的投资一直保持着强劲增长，仅仅在1996—1998年间出现了小幅调整。再如，中国一方面是投资率在高位不断上升，另一方面，经常项目却逐步出现巨额盈余。换言之，中国的国民储蓄比固定资产投资增长更快。
在经济发展的初级阶段，政府主导发展是至关重要的。美国和日本先后在19世纪和20世纪经历了类似的阶段。之所以如此，原因在于初级发展阶段的风险很大，而且与有限的市场规模相比，固定资产投资的规模相对较大，因此需要政府的参与乃至主导。
经济发展的微观基础
中国的宏观经济之所以与众不同，原因在其独特的微观经济基础。中国的经济发展是地方政府主导的。地方政府实际上如同企业，彼此间进行经济增长速度的竞争；而在各自的辖区中，地方政府又如同垄断企业。这些特点决定了地方政府的行为方式：由于GDP与投资正相关，为了增加未来的GDP，地方政府会尽可能增加收入，以支撑固定资产投资。
这种发展模式的一个特点是储蓄率随经济增长率的提高而上升。从政府收入的角度来看，高房价、高速公路费或销售税并无区别，都是地方政府动员金融资源、支持投资的工具。这些收入具有顺周期性质。换言之，在经济增速高于趋势增长率时，它们的增速高于经济增速，反之则相反。而这些收入主要用于固定资产投资，因此其用途同样具有顺周期性。正因为如此，中国经济的周期性很强，而经济过热则不会表现为经常项目赤字。
根据世行一份报告（How Would China’s Savings-Investment Balance Evolve?）的数据，1996—2005年间，中国的居民储蓄率由54%下降为35%。导致这种转变的一个主要原因就在于中央向地方下放权力，从而使地方能够动员资源，尽可能增加固定资产投资。
产能过剩也是这种模式的一个副产品。在这种独特的垄断竞争环境中，竞争者会进行激烈的投资竞争，从而形成过剩投资，以求阻止竞争对手通过投资来争夺市场份额。
紧缩措施难有效果
中国的经济增长模式既带来了经济的高增长，也为宏观经济管理创造了独特的挑战。
在中国，经济过热的典型现象未必存在。例如，由于居民部门收入增长有限，因此在过热时期，反映居民支出水平的消费物价指数并不会快速攀升。相比之下，反映投资需求的价格走势更能够反映中国经济是否过热。
不过，在当前的模式下，最能够表明中国经济是否过热的标志是政府部门在经济中所占份额的上升。因此，中国的经济紧缩实质上是抑制与政府相关的支出。
然而，由于地方政府已经成为经济发展的主导者，经济紧缩的难度就大大增加了。目前，中国地方经济已经非常复杂，因此中央政府的行政性措施只能起到指导路线的作用，地方可以在政策的实施上做文章，从而架空中央的紧缩措施。
在这种情况下，唯一有效的宏观紧缩工具是运用货币政策，限制信贷和货币增长。然而，地方政府可以启动大批项目，造成既成事实，以阻挠中央的宏观紧缩举措，因为削减流动性意味着这些项目无法完工。换言之，宏观紧缩将造成高昂的代价。此外，与监管机构领导人相比，地方政府领导人的行政级别通常较高，因此在宏观政策上具有决定性的发言权。正因为如此，2004年4月以来，中国的宏观紧缩一直犹豫不决。
因而，中国经济的有效收缩可能要依靠外部变化。中国的过剩流动性来自资本流入和出口收入，因此经济过热也决定于这两个因素。由于全球通胀压力已经摆脱了中国经济的束缚，各大央行必须以超出市场预期的力度收缩银根，这将减少流入中国的资本，并抑制中国的出口。因此，要评估中国经济的周期性前景，关键是要密切关注其出口走势。
调整微观结构，提高经济效率
虽然中国的经济发展模式存在低效率问题，但确实非常成功。毕竟，在经济发展的初级阶段，资本形成是最重要的因素，过高的资本形成好过过低的资本形成。更何况，即使中国经济偏离了最优轨道，长远来看并无严重恶果。中国经济的最大风险在于过热，而非经济增长模式本身。
不过，中国确实有可能在解决过热问题的同时，通过结构调整提高其经济发展模式的效率。例如，可有以下选择：一是增加直辖市数量。在垄断竞争的行业中，企业数量的增加可以提高效率。二是削弱地方获取收入的能力，这可以降低中国的储蓄率。三是向国民发放国企股份。四是中央政府发行债券，以支付教育、医疗等社会性开支。
 
英文原文：China: Development Model and Tightening Challenges
China‘s development model appears to complicate macro management: Local governments dominate China‘s development, benefiting from overheating arising from investment, while the central government ultimately bears responsibility for the subsequent bad debts in the banking system.
Monetary policy is the only effective tightening instrument: Even though China‘s development model is government-led, as in a private sector-led economy the only effective means of tightening macro policy is through limiting credit and monetary growth.
Administrative measures are not effective: China‘s economy has become so complicated that central government administrative measures can only be guidelines. Local governments can design the implementation rules to circumvent the spirit of the central government tightening measures.
Effective tightening could come externally: China is no longer deflationary for the global economy due to its overheating, and global central banks may tighten more than expected. Both capital inflows and exports could weaken during global tightening, which would remove China‘s excess liquidity and normalize its interest rates.
Summary and conclusions
Local government dominance in China‘s economy appears the most important factor in China‘s macro behaviour. Local governments are similar to monopoly businesses that compete among themselves for GDP maximization. Similar to monopolistic competition in industries with high fixed costs, predatory investment that deters similar investments on the part of one‘s neighbours drives the competitive dynamic. As in a monopolistic competition model, the equilibrium entails excess investment (e.g., the excess capacity is to deter one‘s neighbours from investing in a similar industry).
As local governments control key factors in production (e.g., land price, taxes, etc.), even as businesses in each local economy engage in price competition among themselves to maximize their profits, the shares of local government revenues in their economies are really similar to monopoly profits. This could explain why the household sector‘s share in China‘s economy continues to decline. In a sense, China‘s savings are driven more by local government than household behaviour.
In addition, local governments can raise debt or equity capital through their affiliated businesses. Economic overheating is a by-product of investment funded by these means. When liquidity is loose for cyclical reasons, monopolistic competition compels local governments to raise as much money as possible to fund fixed investment that would cement their competitive position against their neighbours. Overheating means more overcapacity. The usual indicators for overheating in a market economy (e.g., CPI inflation or current account deficit) do not apply.
China‘s micro model has made macro tightening difficult. First, local governments can create a fait accompli by starting numerous projects to deter macro tightening by the central government, as cutting off liquidity would keep these projects unfinished, i.e., there is a massive fixed cost of macro tightening. Second, local government leaders often have a more senior rank than their regulators in the Communist Party hierarchy and, hence, have a major say in macro policy. This is why China‘s macro tightening has been irresolute since it began in April 2004.
Effective tightening in China is thus likely to come externally. Capital inflows and exports have driven China‘s overheating as they define excess liquidity. As China is no longer holding global inflation down, major central banks will have to tighten much more than expected, which would decrease capital flows into China and weaken China‘s exports. These would likely happen simultaneously. Thus, export watching is the most important exercise in assessing China‘s cyclical outlook, in my view.
China‘s monopolistic competition model for development
Power devolution from central to local government is the most important anchor for China‘s development success; but, it has also brought a host of challenges that are unique to the country.
For example, despite mounting concerns about its sustainability, China‘s investment boom has essentially kept going since 1992, with a small correction between 1996 and 1998. Moreover, China‘s current account has gone into massive surplus despite the rising share of fixed asset investment (‘FAI‘) in its GDP, which implies that China‘s gross savings have risen even faster than its FAI or the gross savings rate has been rising.
Government-led development is essential in the early stages of development. The US in the 19th century and Japan in the 20th century showed a similar phenomenon. The rationale for government involvement is that risk is high in the early stages of economic development, and the fixed investment is high relative to market size.
What sets China apart is the extent of government dominance. The monopolistic competition among GDP-maximizing local governments could explain many of China‘s unique features.
Unique features of China‘s development model
China‘s macro characteristics could be explained by its unique micro foundation. China‘s economic development is local government-led. Local governments are essentially businesses that compete among themselves for GDP maximization. They are essentially monopoly businesses within their local economies and maximize their revenues through multiple collection channels to fund FAI. In principle, the bigger the FAI, the greater the future GDP, as GDP is positively correlated with capital stock. As a first order approximation, FAI maximization is equivalent to GDP maximization.
One characteristic of this model is that the savings rate rises in tandem with the economic growth rate. High property prices, highway tolls, or sales taxes are not distinguishable from a revenue perspective. They are just instruments for local governments to mobilize financial resources to fund investment. Such revenues are pro-cyclical, i.e., they rise faster than the economy when growth rates are above trend and vice versa. As these revenues tend to fund FAI, their use is also pro-cyclical. This is why China‘s economy is very cyclical, but the current account deficit is not a notable feature of overheating.
A World Bank study (How Would China‘s Savings-Investment Balance Evolve? by Louis Kuijs, May 2006) suggests that China‘s household savings as a percentage of total growth savings declined from 54% in 1996 to 35% in 2005. A major factor of the trend is that, since 1998, central and local governments shed unprofitable businesses, consolidated some industries to achieve monopoly power, monetized land and other natural resources to fund investment, and decreased social expenditure in healthcare, education and public housing.
China‘s high and rising savings rate reflects its political system that empowers local governments to mobilize resources to maximize FAI. Unless the political system changes, the trend is not likely to change.
Overcapacity is another by-product of China‘s development model. In monopolistic competition, each business invests more than it expects to use as a deterrent to prevent its competitors from gaining market share through increasing investment. Such strategic behaviour in competition among regions permeates most aspects of FAI. Industry clusters, downtown skylines, seaports and airports are some examples.
In such a model, success begets success and growth depends on the snowball effect. Hence, political power is an essential ingredient for economic success. Provincial capital cities, for example, are more likely to succeed than other cities. Shenzhen, Qingdao and Dalian are notable exceptions, however. The first is China‘s first economic SEZ, and the other two are coastal cities in provinces with interior capital cities.
China‘s unique macro management challenges
China‘s development model creates unique challenges in its macro management. The usual benchmarks for overheating are not necessarily present in China‘s case. The decentralization of political power could generate an equilibrium path of boom-burst cycles despite its economic inefficiency.
As local governments tend to collect a rising share of revenue during rapid economic growth, China‘s household sector has no income base to become overheated. Hence, CPI that reflects household spending does not rise rapidly during periods of overheating. Hence, if one looks for CPI inflation as a sign of overheating in China‘s economy, it would not be there.
A more relevant indicator is the trend in prices that reflects the investment demand. China‘s overheating began in mid-2003. CPI has averaged 2.4%, PPI 4.4%, and RPI 8.4% since that date. The order reflects that overheating expenditure is directed at investment and, especially, construction-related expenditure.
Price indicators that reflect investment expenditure would still not accurately reflect overheating. Either the central or local governments own most companies that produce investment goods. The prices that they charge can be kept down anyway － after all, the money comes out of and goes into the same pocket.
The ultimate sign for overheating in China‘s model is the rapidly rising share of the government sector in the economy on either the income side, demand side or both. Hence, tightening in China is really to rein in government-related spending, which begs the question: how can the government regulate itself?
Of course, the Chinese government is not monolithic. The decentralization of political power among local governments makes macro tightening even more difficult. Limiting credit growth is likely to restrict capital access for less developed provinces first, which is inconsistent with a major political goal.
Administrative tightening has become ineffective, as local economies are so complicated that the administrative measures from the centre could only be guidelines, and the implementation rules must come from local governments and could be designed to circumvent the spirit of the central government tightening measures.
Why should China worry about overheating? The reason is that the available funds during overheating are not sustainable and local governments that start many projects on the assumption that money would remain plentiful could be in for an unpleasant surprise. Hence, limiting credit now would decrease waste.
Local governments benefit from overheating as they can ramp up FAI as much as possible. They do not suffer as much from the consequence － namely bad debts. The central government picked up the tab from the overheating during the previous cycle and is expected to do so again in future.
The irony is that, even though China is a government-led economy, its only effective tightening policy is to limit credit through monetary policy as in a market-led economy. What makes its monetary policy ineffective is the lack of an independent central bank.
Is it possible to have an independent central bank in a one-party-led economy? It sounds unfeasible. However, independent central banks have risen out of necessity in other countries. It is possible that, after a difficult experience following a period of overheating, China would give the central bank independence.
Efficiency enhancement possibilities
Even though there is much inefficiency associated with China‘s model, it is a successful model. After all, capital formation is the most important factor in the early stages of economic development, and too much capital formation is probably better than too little. Under-investment is a common problem for developing countries. China may have too much of a good thing.
Further, China‘s inefficiency is probably paid for by under-consumption. While it deviates from the optimal path, it may not carry serious long-term harm. Overheating rather than the development model per se poses the bigger risk as it could lead to bad debt and wastage.
However, China could improve the efficiency of its development model structurally and deal with overheating at the same time. First, China could increase the number of cities that enjoy province status. Currently, only four cities enjoy such a status. In a monopolistic competition model, the efficiency level rises with the number of firms.
Second, China could decrease the ability of local governments to collect revenues. For example, revenues from selling land and natural resources could be distributed to the population first. This action alone could decrease China‘s savings rate by five percentage points, which would eliminate China‘s current account surpluses and cause interest rates to rise by 3-4 percentage points.
Third, China could distribute the shares of the state-owned enterprises among the population. The transfer of this government asset to the household sector would decrease the household savings rate due to its wealth effect. It could also limit the ability of local governments to use such companies to fund low-return investments.
Fourth, the central government could crowd out local governments in accessing funds by issuing bonds to fund social expenditure like education, healthcare, or supporting rural development. By global standards, China under-spends in social sectors even though the government is in excellent financial condition.
In summary, the main threat to China‘s economy is overheating as a result of overinvestment, in my view; however, the current political system makes tightening difficult. The only effective tightening instrument is using monetary policy to limit credit growth. I believe that there are also a number of structural measures that China can take to improve its government-led development model.
 
来源：摩根斯坦利，作者：Andy Xie（Hong Kong）
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