一個堅強而節制的台灣

柯慶生演說英文原文及譯文
【聯合報╱國際新聞中心編譯組】 2007.09.13 04:41 am
美國主管亞太事務的副助理國務卿柯慶生11日在美台國防工業會議以「一個堅強而節制的台灣」為題發表演說，以下是演說全文：
柯副部長承亨，蘇起博士，韓會長儒柏，各位貴賓，很高興今天能在這麼重要的場合演講。十分感謝各位到場，特別是來自台灣的朋友，他們遠道而來，而且從百忙之中撥冗出席。同時我也要感謝美台商會，商會使這個會議成為討論台灣安全問題的首要場合。
身為國務院代表，我今早的演說只會提到有關台灣安全的概略性問題，防衛策略和軍購方面的細節問題，則留給軍事專家去談。我所說的代表美國政府一致的看法，希望各位以這種觀點來看待我的談話。
這次會議正得其時，來年我們將再度慶祝台灣的民主，我們也會密切注意台灣領導人在台灣海峽兩岸艱難的情況中如何領航，他們的行動將是重要的決定因素，攸關台灣人民利益得到保護、台灣是否能夠繼續在和平與安全的環境下繁榮、以及台灣一切成就是否可能在兩岸緊張、甚至衝突的情況下遭到危險。
基於我即將闡述的理由，台海兩岸之間穩定而和平的關係，關乎美國的長期利益。任何能令台灣更強壯、安全的事情都對美國有利，不用說當然更對台灣有利。而任何置和平與穩定於險境的事情，直接違反美國的利益。因此之故，我們期待台灣對兩岸關係採取結合力量和穩健的策略。當我們看到偏離這些目標的政策時，我們覺得我們自己和台灣人民都應該說出來。
美國利益的來源
首先我想要談兩個基本的問題：美國為何要在乎台灣？安全，我們在這個重要題目上表達意見的基礎是什麼？第一個問題的答案直截了當。美國身為具有全球利益與義務的一個太平洋強權，美國當然關心整個亞洲的和平。由於台灣海峽是可能爆發衝突的熱點，這個區域需要我們不斷注意。同時，透過我們與台灣人民數十年親密的友誼，我們對他們在艱困環境下獲致的成就，產生了深深的敬意，對他們的民主、不受脅迫和繁榮也特別關切。成功的台灣是東亞及更廣大地區的一座燈塔。最後，美國支持台灣載於國內法台灣關係法之內。簡言之，戰略、道德和法律上的要求，使得美國必須一直關心台灣和它的安全。
同樣的論證也讓我們對有關台灣安全的問題具有合法的發言權。當然，對於如何防衛台灣最後要由台灣人民透過民主機制做成決斷。我們尊重這種權利。同時，為了保衛我們我們自身的利益，履行我們的法律義務，而且，說真心話，支持我們視為老朋友的人民，我們認為我們應該表達對於台灣安全政策的看法，包括一些真我們正關切的事項。由於台灣是個民主政體，台灣人民將自行決定如何回應美國朋友的看法。
這在個前提下，我今天要從最寬廣的角度談談台灣安全問題，以及支撐台灣安全的關鍵因素。我今天的談話是基於中華人民共和國對台灣的軍事威脅日益嚴重，包括中國在台灣對面的地區軍力快速增加、以及北京拒絕排除對台使用武力。美國已藉行動表明反對台灣受到脅迫的立場，包括出售防禦性武器給台北，以及保留在台灣遭到脅迫時片面反應的能力。觀其言不如觀其行，台海兩岸任何一方都沒有藉口忽略美國的期待，以及保護我們利益的決心。同時，我們堅決保衛這些利益數十年來也使這個地區受惠，提供了不可或缺的條件，使得海峽得以安定，兩岸繁榮程度大增，兩岸關係更豐富而且不斷增長，以及台灣令舉世為之鼓舞的民主轉變。
台灣需要堅強而節制
正如我一開始說的，美國認為一個堅強而節制的台灣對台灣人民立即及長期的安全需要而言，是不可或缺的。否則台灣就會變得脆強，危及區域和平，並可能危及美國的利益。且讓我談談這兩個基本要素。
一個堅強的台灣
堅強的台灣簡單說就是擁有可長期抵抗脅迫的軍事能力，台灣的軍事能力必須能夠讓北京知道，無法在國際社會有所反應之前迅速制服台灣。台灣的嚇阻力也而增強。台灣的繁榮和社會安定當然也是實力的來源，但軍事力量是卻不可或缺的。台灣能自衛是和平的重要因素。堅強的台灣也能以更大的自信去與北京談判，為海峽和平謀求更持久而對等的安排。
這幾年在這方面實在乏善可陳，最近卻有了好消息。單單在預算方面，台北就為國防做了不少事。有段時間，台灣的國防預算在國內生產毛額所占比例下降了，但即使在那段期間，也仍比絕大多數其他亞洲國家要高。這些預算作為大型經濟的一部分，可以成為進步的基礎。今年國防預算比例終於開始提高了，我們恭喜台灣各大政黨領袖找到了打破僵局的方法。
當然，資金只是台灣國防方程式的一部分。台灣同時也在追求更具智慧的優先項目和防衛策略。把更多錢用在加強防禦工事和持久力上，並採用更現代化的戰法，利用台灣最大的實用資產：它的地理。台灣和其四周環境天生易守難攻，明智運用國防預算並善加策畫，便可保持這種狀況。
美國軍售在保持台灣堅強上，一直扮演一個重要角色。當然，今天（在國防工業會議）的聽眾，對這項議題也特別關心。布希政府在二○○一年批准軍售案時，已展現了它對美國（對台）角色的認知。布希政府毫無疑問會履行台灣關係法的承諾。但台灣防禦的首要議題，不是台北購買特別的武器系統，或者該系統是由（台灣）國內或國外的工廠製造。首要的議題是台灣整體的防禦策略的實質內容，以及保持核心能力去維持。我再一次說，要依靠台灣人民，自己決定那項防禦策略。老實說，美國最關切的，是台灣無法就安全議題，進行美國認為台灣應該有的那種可持續和整體的辯論。選舉季節又要到了，我們希望台灣人民要求他們的政治候選人，在（台灣防禦）這項影響深遠的重要議題上，進行明智及有用的討論。
同時，我要讚揚台灣朝野兩大陣營，這些年來，雙方的確都有長足的進步。在陳總統的領導下，國防部著手編製進一步精算的預算，設法提高整體的經費來源。在野黨控制的立法院則克盡厥聯地審查並核准這些預算，盡可能滿足行政部門的需求。美國對這種情勢的發展表示歡迎，並將其視為希望的跡象，因為我們正在見證台灣的公共辯論日漸成熟：一邊的政治領袖放下相互質疑愛國情操的傷人指控，同意把國防置於政黨政治之上。這些近來的事件能否演變成一種長期的趨勢，端視所有政黨的作為，包括今天許多在座的貴賓在內。
節制的台灣
我現在要轉而談論台灣安全問題的另一個不可或缺面向，即以穩健、成熟而有效的政治手腕處理兩岸關係。不論台北花多少錢在國防上，不論多麼有效運用這些經費，只要沒有節制，就會危及台灣安全。換句話說，一切都必須講求對等，台北在兩岸關係上採取節制做法，將會減少台灣武裝部隊所面臨的挑戰。
台灣的政治地位相當微妙，而且其實很獨特。台海兩岸爭議若無法解決，會造成許多人產生想像得到的失望之情，不過這是台灣多數公民所了解的活生生事實。這項理解反映在維持現狀始終在民調中獲得強烈支持。
從戰略安全的角度來看，問題十分簡單：只要台灣維持足夠防衛能力，對台灣福祉最大的威脅，是來自台北本身可能引發北京動武的政治動作。美國政府一再清楚強調：不接受使用武力，也再三敦促北京要提高軍事透明度、並停止對台灣的軍力擴張，減少對台的武力恫嚇。
美國堅決反對北京動武，並很嚴肅看待動武的可能性，我們同樣鄭重的認為，台北當局應秉持同樣態度。基於上述原因，台灣安全端繫於避免沒有必要的挑釁作為。這不是說台灣政府面對北京壓力時只能被動以待，而是說負責任的台灣領導者需要判斷中國的紅線與中國的反應，以避免沒有必要、又沒有實質效益的挑釁動作。
美國政府近來對於陳總統政府所表達的關切，也是出於這些角度。我要在此強調，美、台關係一如以往的密切和互惠。美國和台灣人民之間的友誼具備深厚基礎，目前雙方的一些政治歧見只是美台廣泛關係的一小部分，但這一部分直接關係到和平與穩定，所以這些歧見非常重要。
美國對於陳水扁政府推動台灣入聯公投表達了特別關切，台灣方面對於美國立場的說法，有很多是錯誤的，在此我要有所澄清。
美國並不反對公投，台灣和所有民主社會一樣，具有舉行公投的權利。但必須考量的是公投的題目與內容，台灣加入聯合國的公投，如果沒有牽涉更改國號，美方的反應可能不會這麼強烈。大家都知道台灣大多數民眾支持台灣申請進入聯合國，而公投並無法實際幫助台灣達到這項目標，大家心知肚明，這樣的公投只有對台灣國內政治立場的操作有影響。美國的反應很直截了當：我們重申不支持台灣加入以國家地位為資格的國際組織，因此美國不支持這項公投。
陳總統支持的入聯公投，美國特別在意的部分，就是國號更改這個議題，公投草案引發國際社會應如何稱呼台灣的問題，且這個議題將被很多人詮釋為據法律效力的公民投票。其實各方都普遍稱呼「台灣」這個名稱，美國國務院用、台灣人民也用，連北京也這樣稱呼，那為什麼要擔心在這比較具正式政治與法律的架構中使用「台灣」？簡單的事實就是，從兩岸關係的角度，政治象徵意涵很重要，而兩岸對於這個議題的歧見將是嚴重緊張甚至衝突的源頭。陳總統也認知到「政治意涵」這個議題的重要性，所以在2000年和2004年兩度向美國總統以及國際社會承諾，不會更改台灣的正式名稱，而且他也一再重申這項承諾。
因此這項公投明顯就是尋求更改國名，因此，美國認為這個行動就是有意改變現狀的一步。有人主張，這個公投就算通過，也不代表當局會尋求更改國號，老實說，我們認為這純粹是條文主義的說詞。如果這個稱號不是關鍵要點，為何要列入公投？公投支持者以這種論點來爭論，似乎就是不認真看待台灣對美國與國際社會的承諾，也不惜忽略台灣最堅定友人的安全利益，也是為了短期政治目標而甘讓台灣人民冒著安全風險。美國的底線是，這個公投對美、台利益可能傷害很大，而任何加入聯合國的公投都對台灣的國際地位現狀都毫無實質幫助，因此美國必須強烈反對公投這樣的倡議。
我想直接討論美國對公投問題的立場干涉台灣民主的指控。我代表美國政府，斷然否決這項指控。有鑑於美國數十年來對台灣安全的承諾與對台灣民主的支持，這種說法根本禁不起檢驗。民主政體之間可以也的確會在政策上有意見不合的情況。這種情況舉世皆然，經常發生。此外，朋友也有義務警告那些往不明智方向前進的朋友。而考慮到美國在台灣的安全利益，美國對台灣的責任是更大了。畢竟，台北的行動不只會威脅到台灣的和平穩定。
美國沒有能力，也沒有權利告訴台灣人民他們能或不能做什麼。美國作為台灣的朋友，有義務警告台灣，這項入聯公投的內容不僅規劃不週，也潛藏很大的傷害性。壞的公共政策計畫，即使包裹著「民主」大旗，也無法美化。如果這項公投最後依然舉行，相信台灣理性、明智的公民也會看穿這套說詞，明白這項公投項不符合他們利益，會根本傷害台灣對外關係。
除了公投對台灣海峽穩定的明顯威脅，美國反對公投，也因為入聯公投宣稱可擴展台灣的國際空間，其實適得其反，不會擴大，反會限制台灣的國際空間。主張公投會擴大台灣國際空間的說詞聽起來很有英雄氣魄，卻與我們周遭可見的證據恰恰相反。我可以根據真實經驗告訴你，因為美國國務院帶領美國政府各單位保護與擴張台灣人民的國際空間。令人沮喪的實情是，如果台灣當局採取沒有必要的挑釁行動，反會授予北京限制台灣空間的力量，原本可能幫助台灣的國家也會對台灣敬而遠之。
我們必須承認一項根深柢固的事實，無論我們是否樂見，舉世絕大多數國家都接受北京對台灣的表述，而中華人民共和國一旦卯起勁來，有可能獲得壓倒性支持，將台灣邊緣化。台灣人民當然向來習慣中華人民共和國的打壓，我們當然也不會告訴台灣人民不要抵抗這種壓力，我們的立場絕非被動。有鑑於此，台北必須憑智慧回手，以老練手段發揮長處。正面攻擊北京敏感之處注定要失敗，最終會導致台北落後更多。公投以台灣名義申請加入聯合國就是一項正面攻擊，無望改變台灣在國際舞台上的實際現狀，卻會使台海兩岸關係更緊張，使台灣拓展國際空間的潛在支持者疏遠。
我想強調的是，我們不願意公開表達我們與陳水扁政府在公投或其他任何政策上的歧見。台灣是美國的長久朋友，我們不樂見彼此在重要議題上有重大分歧。我可以向你保證，若非我方在這一段時間內已疲於藉所有非正式機會傳達一貫、無誤且權威的訊息，我們不會這麼做。問題不在誤解或缺乏溝通，而是我方相信這個計畫對台灣或美國無益，且我方已別無他法，只好向台灣人民直接表達我方觀點。
有信心的台灣
我要用這個講台傳達嚴酷的事實，我也要提出一些平常少被提及但值得一提的正面要點：我要打破台灣人民遭孤立或者台灣是國際孤兒的迷思。沒錯，台灣只與少數國家有正式邦交，也非聯合國一員。然而，事實上台灣若沒有與全球社會廣泛整合，則不可能成為目前這樣一流的世界民主、商業尖兵，台灣人民就無法走遍世界洽商觀光，台灣的航空、貨運業就無法行遍天下，台灣也就不會是全球資訊科技的最主要來源。台北或許沒有很多大使館，但有遍布全球的幾十處非正式辦事處，有專業代表推動台灣人民的各項事務。單就貿易而言，台北若不是與支持國際商務的全球機構稠密網絡全面連結，經濟早就停滯不前。台北許多最重要的關係都是非正式的，名副其實的溝通與合作每一天都在進行。
要確認此事，只消看新聞報導，就知道台灣高層官員川流不息地到訪華府與美國其他地方。人們常把最高層官員未能訪問當成焦點，但在任何關係中，高層出訪都不是司空見慣的。任何有心一探現況的人會立刻發現，美國與台灣之間的對話，在實質與範圍上，可與美國任何其他中型夥伴相提並論。
我並非試圖淡化台灣民眾在國際空間所面臨的實質限制，我了解這些限制必定造成台灣民眾的失望。台灣終究在國際社會占有不尋常的地位。對台灣的民選領導人而言，眼前的挑戰是如何在這樣的情況下替人民營造最大的利益。幸運的是，台灣做得非常好，當台灣做得非常好的同時，未來也會有許多正面機會。
策略性的美國利益
美國擁有一貫的台海兩岸政策。年復一年，美國歷經兩大黨政權輪替，台海政策不僅大大造福美國民眾，還有台灣人民。倘若有人對此存疑，只要想想近30年前台灣喪失（國際）承認時的情況。台灣現在是民主蓬勃發展、社會繁榮的世界一流社會，人民生活大為改善。身為台灣的盟友，身為台灣民主與自由的不可或缺支持者，美國當仁不讓。美國人非常有理由自豪一再做出正確的事情。
我們對台灣的支持毋庸置疑，若我說美國界定自身利益，且以此為根據解讀東亞區域發展，在座不會有人感到意外。因此，有關我們與北京協調台灣政策的說法，絕對毫無根據。根本沒有這回事。協調和合作之類的說法根本不適用於華府和北京之間在台灣政策上的關係。中國的看法是否影響美國的思惟？當然，我們若不將中國的看法納入考量，就是鹵莽行事，台北也一樣。但我可以向各位保證，任何層級的美國官員都不會花任何時間和北京協調我們的對台政策。這類的協調謠言滿天飛，但和許多謠言一樣，都沒有事實根據。
同樣地，我們和台北的關係密切友好，但不會讓台北來界定美方的立場。根據多項已為大家接受的理由，美國早已宣示反對台海兩岸任何一方片面改變現狀的立場。近年來，台灣某些領導人主張，台灣獨立是現狀，應加以捍衛。針對此點，請容我徹底說明白：美國反對中國威逼台灣是無庸置疑的，但美國不承認台灣是獨立國家，也不接受台獨挑釁主張有助於維持現狀或台海兩岸和平穩定的論點。基於我前面提出的種種理由，事實上美國把這些主張，以及以台灣名義加入聯合國的公投，都視為是不必要的挑釁，明顯不符合台灣人民或美國的最佳利益。
結論
讓我轉向促使我們大家聚集在此的基本議題，作為這場演講的結束。在座各位不論是陳水扁總統政府的官員、在野黨領袖、美國企業高層、新聞從業人員、學者，或美國政府官員，在台灣安全問題上都擁有共同的不變利益，台灣在敏感的區域中占有微妙的地位，是美國的重要盟友。美國政府相信，堅強而節制的台灣是維持台灣海峽和平與穩定的要素，美國仍將是台灣人民未來追求更大利益時的堅定夥伴。
A Strong and Moderate Taiwan
Thomas J. Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Speech to U.S.-Taiwan Business Council
Defense Industry Conference, Annapolis, Maryland
September 11, 2007
Vice Minister Ko Cheng-heng, Dr. Su Chi, Rupert, other distinguished guests, I am delighted to be able to speak today at this important event. Many thanks to all of you for being here – especially our friends from Taiwan, who have taken time from busy schedules and traveled so far. I would also like to thank the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, which has established this conference as the premier annual venue for discussing Taiwan’s security. As the State Department’s representative, I will touch on broad issues in Taiwan security in my remarks this morning, leaving detailed questions of defense strategy and arms procurement to the military experts. My remarks represent the agreed views of the United States Government. I invite you to consider my comments in that light.
This conference is timely. In the year ahead, we will again celebrate Taiwan’s democracy, and we will also closely follow how Taiwan’s leaders navigate the often difficult circumstances in relations across the Taiwan Strait. Their actions will be a major factor in determining whether the interests of their people are protected; whether Taiwan will continue to flourish in an environment of peace and security; or whether all that Taiwan has achieved might be put at risk by cross-Strait tensions or, worse still, conflict.
For reasons that I will elaborate in a moment, the United States has an abiding interest in a stable and peaceful relationship across the Taiwan Strait in which Taiwan thrives. Anything that makes Taiwan stronger and safer is good for the United States, and, for obvious reasons, is also good for the people of Taiwan. Anything that places such peace and stability at risk runs directly against the interests of the United States. For these reasons, we look to Taiwan to adopt strategies toward cross-Strait relations that combine strength – both military and economic – with moderation. When we see policies that diverge from these goals, we owe it to ourselves and to the Taiwan people to speak out.
Origins of U.S. Interest
I would first like to address two fundamental questions: why does the United States care about Taiwan’s security, and what is the basis for our expression of views on this important subject? The answers to the first are straight-forward. As a Pacific power with global interests and obligations, the United States has a natural interest in peace throughout Asia. Because the Taiwan Strait is a potential flashpoint for conflict, the area demands our constant attention. Meanwhile, through our decades of close friendship with the people of Taiwan, we have acquired deep admiration for their achievements under difficult circumstances and a special concern for their democracy, freedom from coercion, and prosperity. A successful Taiwan is a beacon for East Asia and beyond. Finally, U.S. support for Taiwan is enshrined in U.S. domestic law in the Taiwan Relations Act. In short, strategic, moral, and legal requirements compel a continuous U.S. interest in Taiwan and its security.
The same arguments, in turn, give us a legitimate voice on issues touching on Taiwan security. Naturally, judgments about how to defend Taiwan rest ultimately with the people of Taiwan, as articulated through their democratic institutions. We respect that prerogative. At the same time, to defend our own interests, satisfy our legal obligations, and, indeed, support people whom we regard as old friends, we believe we are right to express our views, including our real concerns, regarding Taiwan’s security policies. Because Taiwan is a democracy, the Taiwan people will decide for themselves how to respond to the views expressed by their friends in the United States.
With that, I would like to speak today about Taiwan’s security in the broadest sense and about the factors that are critical to sustaining it. Everything I say here is based on a recognition of the growing PRC military threat to Taiwan posed by the fast-paced military build-up opposite Taiwan and by Beijing’s refusal to rule out the use of force against Taiwan. The United States has demonstrated its rejection of any coercion of Taiwan through both its defensive arms sales to Taipei and maintenance of our unilateral capability to respond to such coercion, if our President were so to choose. Actions speak louder than words, and no one on either side of the Strait has an excuse for being ignorant of U.S. expectations and determination to protect our own interests. At the same time, our resolute defense of these interests has benefited the region for decades, providing the indispensable conditions for stability in the Strait, a dramatic increase in prosperity on both sides, rich and growing cross-Strait connections, and a democratic transformation on Taiwan that is an inspiration to the world.
The Need for Taiwan’s Strength and Moderation
As I stated at the outset, the United States believes that a strong and moderate Taiwan is essential to the immediate and long-term security needs of the people of Taiwan. Anything less than strength and moderation leaves Taiwan vulnerable, endangers regional peace, and potentially threatens U.S. interests. Let me address these two fundamental elements in turn.
A Strong Taiwan
A strong Taiwan is, very simply, one that maintains the military capacity to withstand coercion for an extended period of time. To the extent Beijing knows it cannot subdue Taiwan swiftly -- before the international community would be able to react -- deterrence is reinforced. Taiwan’s prosperity and social stability are, of course, additional sources of strength, but the military dimension is indispensable. A Taiwan that can defend itself is a major factor for peace. A strong Taiwan can also negotiate with Beijing with greater confidence and thereby pursue more effectively durable, equitable arrangements for cross-Strait peace.
After a frankly disappointing performance for several years, there recently has been good news in this area. In budgetary terms alone, Taipei has done much to provide for its defense. For some time the Taiwan defense budget declined as a percentage of GDP. Even during that period, however, it remained substantial – higher than in all but a few other Asian peers. As a portion of a large economy, those budgets provided a basis for some progress. This year, the defense budget has at last begun to increase as a portion of GDP. We congratulate Taiwan’s leaders from all major parties for finding a way to break this logjam.
Funding is only part of the defense equation, of course. Taiwan also is pursuing smarter priorities and defensive strategies. It is allocating more money to hardening and sustainment, and it is embracing modern warfighting doctrine, taking advantage of Taiwan’s greatest practical asset, its geography. Taiwan and its surroundings constitute an intrinsically challenging military environment, and wise defense expenditures and planning can keep it that way.
U.S. arms sales have played an important role in keeping Taiwan strong, and, of course, today’s audience has a special interest in the subject. The Bush Administration demonstrated its recognition of the U.S. role when it approved its 2001 arms package. The Administration’s commitment to fulfillment of TRA requirements remains beyond question. The principal issue in Taiwan’s defense, however, is not whether Taipei buys a particular weapon system or whether that system comes from domestic factories or from abroad. The principal issue is the substance of Taiwan’s overall defensive strategy and the maintenance of core capacities to sustain it. And the decision on that strategy, once again, rests with the Taiwan people themselves. Frankly, an abiding U.S. concern is that Taiwan as yet has still not had the sort of sustained, general debate on security that we think it deserves. We hope that, in the coming election season, the people of Taiwan will demand of their political candidates an intelligent and productive discussion of this profoundly important subject.
At the same time, I want to give credit to both Taiwan’s ruling party and the opposition for the very real progress that they have made in recent years. Under President Chen’s leadership, the MND has begun compiling more sophisticated budgets and sought increases in overall funding. For its part, the opposition-controlled legislature has performed its role by vetting and passing these budgets, giving the executive branch most of what it requested. The United States welcomes these developments as hopeful signs that we are witnessing a maturation of the public debate on Taiwan, one in which political leaders lay aside damaging accusations against one another’s basic patriotism and agree to place defense above partisan politics. Whether or not these recent events become a long-term trend will depend on leaders from all political parties, including many in the audience today.
A Moderate Taiwan
I would now like to turn to the other indispensable dimension of Taiwan’s security, a moderate, sophisticated, effective political approach toward cross-Strait relations. Without moderation, Taiwan’s security will be compromised, no matter how much money Taipei spends on defense and no matter how wisely those defense dollars have been allocated. On the other hand, all things being equal, a moderate approach by Taipei to relations across the Strait will reduce the challenges faced by Taiwan’s armed forces.
Taiwan occupies a delicate and, indeed, unique political position. The absence of a resolution of cross-Strait disputes causes understandable frustration among many people, but it’s a fact of life that the majority of Taiwan citizens understand. That recognition is reflected in opinion polling that shows powerful, consistent support for the status quo.
In terms of security, the proposition is reasonably simple: as long as Taiwan maintains a credible defensive capability, the chief threats to its welfare are political actions by Taipei itself that could trigger Beijing’s use of force. The United States has repeatedly made clear that the use of force would be unacceptable, and we have repeatedly called on Beijing to demonstrate more military transparency, to cease its arms buildup opposite Taiwan, and to reduce its armed threat to Taiwan. But as much as we oppose Beijing’s threat to use force, we also take it seriously, and Taipei cannot afford to do otherwise. It is for this reason that Taiwan’s security is inextricably linked to the avoidance of needlessly provocative behavior. This does not mean that Taipei should or can be passive in the face of PRC pressure. But it means that responsible leadership in Taipei has to anticipate potential Chinese red lines and reactions and avoid unnecessary and unproductive provocations.
The USG’s recent expression of concern about certain policies advocated by the Chen Administration has flowed directly from this perspective. I want to emphasize that the overall U.S.-Taiwan relationship is as close and mutually beneficial as ever. The friendship between the American people and the people of Taiwan has deep roots and continues to flourish. The disagreements that have arisen occur in a comparatively narrow part of the U.S.-Taiwan agenda. Since it is the part that directly relates to peace and stability, however, the disagreement is very important.
In particular, we have expressed special concern about Chen Administration support for a proposed referendum on UN membership in the name of Taiwan. Much has been said on Taiwan about U.S. positions, a lot of it wrong. Let me try to provide some clarity.
The United States is not opposed to referenda; Taiwan is as entitled to hold referenda as is any other democracy. But the topic and content of any particular referendum must be considered. A referendum on applying to the UN without the suggestion of name change as part of that referendum – while striking us as odd and unproductive - would not elicit a very strong reaction from the United States. Given that everyone knows the bulk of Taiwan’s citizens would like to see Taipei apply to the United Nations and given that such a referendum would have no prospect of improving the likelihood of success in such an application, everybody would know that support for such a referendum would only be useful in domestic political posturing in Taiwan. For the United States’ part, the matter of how to respond would be straightforward: we would reiterate that we do not support Taiwan’s membership in international organizations that require statehood and therefore would not support such a referendum.
The particular referendum supported by President Chen concerns us considerably more than would a generic referendum on applying to the UN. What worries us, very specifically, is the issue of name change. This draft referendum raises the question of what Taiwan should be called in the international community. Moreover, it does so in what could be interpreted by many to be a legally-binding popular vote. In an ideal world, we would not have to worry about this. In the vernacular, we all speak of “Taiwan.” The State Department does, people in Taiwan do, even Beijing does. So why worry about using the same word in this more formal political and legal context? The simple reality is that, in the world of cross-Strait relations, political symbolism matters, and disagreements over it could be the source of major tensions or even conflict. President Chen recognized the importance of such “symbolic” issues in 2000 and 2004 when he promised our President and the international community not to pursue a change in Taiwan’s official name, and he has reaffirmed that promise repeatedly.
It is the apparent pursuit of name change in the referendum, therefore, that makes the initiative appear to us to be a step intended to change the status quo. Arguments that the referendum, even if passed, would not amount to a pursuit of name change, frankly, strike us as purely legalistic. After all, if the specific nomenclature does not matter, why include it in the referendum in the first place? At a fundamental level, such legalistic arguments from supporters of the referendum make it seem that they do not take seriously Taiwan’s commitments to the United States and the international community, are willing to ignore the security interests of Taiwan’s most steadfast friend, and are ready to put at some risk the security interests of the Taiwan people for short-term political gain. Our bottom line is that the potential downsides of such an initiative for Taiwan and U.S. interests are potentially large, and, as with any UN referendum, the benefits for Taiwan’s international status are non-existent, so we must oppose such an initiative strongly.
I would like to face head-on the accusation that the U.S. position on the referendum constitutes interference in Taiwan’s democracy. On behalf of the U.S. Government, I reject this accusation categorically. Given the decades of America’s commitment to Taiwan’s security and support for its democratization, the idea just does not stand up to scrutiny. The reality is that democracies can and do disagree over policies. It happens all the time around the world. Moreover, friends have an obligation to warn friends who are moving in an unwise direction. The U.S. obligation is even stronger, given our interest in Taiwan’s security. After all, it is not just Taiwan’s peace and stability that Taipei’s actions may threaten.
The United States has neither the power nor the right to tell the Taiwan people what they can and cannot do. As friends, however, we feel it is our obligation to warn that the content of this particular referendum is ill-conceived and potentially quite harmful. Bad public policy initiatives are made no better for being wrapped in the flag of “democracy.” Fortunately, if the referendum goes forward unchanged, we anticipate that Taiwan’s perceptive, intelligent citizens will see through the rhetoric and make a sound judgment that the referendum does not serve their interests because it will be fundamentally harmful to Taiwan’s external relations.
Beyond the obvious threat to stability in the Taiwan Strait, the United States also opposes the proposed referendum because it will do the exact opposite of what it promises: it will limit, not expand, Taiwan’s international space. Arguments to the contrary sound heroic, but they stand in opposition to the evidence all around us. I can say this to you with real experience, because it is the State Department that takes the lead in the U.S. Government in trying to help preserve and expand the Taiwan people’s international space. The frustrating truth is that needlessly provocative actions by Taipei strengthen Beijing’s hand in limiting Taiwan’s space and scare away potential friends who might help Taiwan.
This is again an area where we have to acknowledge a tough truth. Whether we like it or not, most countries in the world accept Beijing’s characterization of Taiwan, and, when energized, the PRC can call in overwhelming support to marginalize Taipei. The Taiwan people are, of course, long accustomed to PRC pressure, and we are certainly not telling them not to resist these efforts; our own position is far from passive. That said, Taipei needs to push back intelligently and in a sophisticated manner that plays to its strengths. Frontal assaults on Beijing’s sensitivities are bound to fail and, at the end of the day, leave Taipei further behind. The referendum on applying to the UN under the name Taiwan is just such a frontal assault with no hope of changing Taiwan’s actual status on the international stage while increasing cross-Strait tensions and alienating potential supporters of Taiwan’s increased international space.
I would like to emphasize that we do not like having to express publicly our disagreement with the Chen Administration on this or any other policy. Taiwan is a longstanding U.S. friend, and we do not like there to be gaps between us on important issues. I can assure you that we would not have done so had we not exhausted every private opportunity through consistent, unmistakable, and authoritative messages over an extended period of time. The problem here is not misunderstanding or lack of communications: it is that we believe this initiative is not good for Taiwan or us and that we have found ourselves with no alternative but to express our views directly to the Taiwan people.
A Confident Taiwan
While I am using this podium to convey tough truths, let me raise a more positive point that is not often mentioned but deserves to be: let me debunk the myth that the people of Taiwan are isolated or that Taiwan is an international orphan. Yes, Taipei has formal diplomatic relationships with only a small number of states, and it is not a member of the United Nations. The reality, however, is that Taiwan could not be the first world, democratic, commercial powerhouse it is if it were not extensively integrated into global society. Its citizens could not travel the world on business and pleasure, its airliners and freighters could not span the globe, and it could not be one of the world’s premier sources of information technology. Taipei may not have many embassies, but it has dozens of unofficial offices around the planet staffed with professional representatives who carry on the business of the people of Taiwan. In the trade arena alone, Taipei would be an economic backwater if it were not thoroughly linked into the dense web of global institutions that support international commerce. Many of Taipei’s most important relationships are unofficial, and yet genuine communication and cooperation goes on every day of the year.
To confirm this, just follow the news to see the steady stream of senior Taiwan officials who visit Washington and other parts of the United States. People often focus on the absence of visits at the highest levels, but those are infrequent in any relationship. For anybody who bothers to pay attention, it quickly becomes clear that the U.S.-Taiwan dialogue is comparable in substance and scope to that with any other medium-size partner.
I am not trying to downplay the genuine limitations on the international space of the Taiwan people, and I appreciate the frustrations that these must generate. At the end of the day, Taiwan occupies an unusual place in the global community. For Taiwan’s elected leadership, the challenge ahead is how to maximize the people’s interest within this context. Fortunately, Taiwan has done remarkably well, and, when Taipei plays its hand well, it has a range of positive opportunities in the years ahead.
Strategic U.S. Interests
The United States has a consistent policy toward the Taiwan Strait. Year in and year out, and over administrations from both major parties, that policy has provided great benefits not only for the American people but also for the people of Taiwan. If there is any doubt about this, just consider Taiwan’s circumstances at the time of de-recognition nearly 30 years ago now. Its vibrant democracy and prosperous, first world society today offer a vastly better life to the people of Taiwan. And as a friend of Taiwan, as an indispensable supporter of its democracy and freedoms, the United States ranks second to none. Americans can feel justifiably proud for having done the right thing, again and again.
While our support for Taiwan is beyond question, nobody here will be surprised if I say that the United States defines its own interests and interprets East Asian regional developments for it. There is, therefore, absolutely no foundation to the assertion that the United States coordinates its Taiwan policy with Beijing. It just does not happen. Words like coordination and cooperation simply do not apply to the relationship between Washington and Beijing on Taiwan policy. Do Chinese views influence U.S. thinking? Of course: we would be reckless, as would Taipei, if we did not take them into consideration. But I can assure you that no USG official at any level spends any amount of time coordinating our policies toward Taiwan with Beijing. Rumors of such coordination abound, but as with many rumors, they have no basis in fact.
By the same token, while we have a close, friendly relationship with Taipei, we also do not let Taipei define our positions. For well-established reasons, the United States has declared its opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo by either side of the Taiwan Strait. Some Taiwan leaders in recent years have asserted that Taiwan independence is the status quo that should be defended. On that point, let me be perfectly clear: while U.S. opposition to Chinese coercion of Taiwan is beyond question, we do not recognize Taiwan as an independent state, and we do not accept the argument that provocative assertions of Taiwan independence are in any way conducive to maintenance of the status quo or peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. For the reasons I have given above, in fact, we rank such assertions along with the referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan as needless provocations that are patently not in the best interests of the Taiwan people or of the United States.
Conclusion
Let me bring this presentation to a close by returning to the fundamental issue that has brought all of us together here. Regardless of whether members of this audience are officials in President Chen’s Administration, opposition party leaders, U.S. corporate executives, journalists, scholars, or U.S. Government officials, we all share an abiding interest in the security of Taiwan, an important friend of the United States occupying a delicate position in a sensitive neighborhood. The United States Government believes that a strong and moderate Taiwan is essential to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and we will remain the steadfast partner of the people of Taiwan as they seek to advance their interests in the years ahead.
Released on September 11, 2007