诺奖得主斯宾塞新浪专栏：中国下一座要爬的山

　　导读：2001年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者、美国增长与发展委员会主席迈克尔-斯宾塞今日为新浪财经独家撰文表示，中国正在进入一个复杂的过渡时期，这将有希望在未来25年奠定了其成为发达国家的地位。中国必须面对国内转型的挑战，以维持经济的增长，但中国也必须承担更大的国际责任。

　　以下为斯宾塞文章原文。

　　中国正在经历一系列复杂的转型，这将为它跻身发达国家奠定基础，而中国有望在未来25年内做到这一点。经过三十年的经济持续增长，加之应对不久前全球危机的政策取得巨大成功，中国的自信心正在不断攀升。但是，政府从这场危机得到的经验教训，可能不是国家长期发展的最佳指南。

　　中国面临的几个并列且互有关联的挑战对自身发展及全球经济关系具有至关重要的作用。这些挑战包括：

　　经济需进行微观层面的调整，巩固国家新兴的中等收入国的地位；

　　经济宏观层面的转变，使家庭收入和消费达到更高的水平，使中产阶层更快速增长；

　　扭转现在日益严重的收入不平等； 降低相对投资显得非常高的储蓄水平，从而减少经常帐盈余；

　　降低未来经济增长的能源消耗量和碳排放量；

　　承担更大的国际责任。

　　事实上，中国对全球经济的影响力已达到关乎整个系统的很重要水平。但是，中国做到这一点，与以往任何一个具有系统重要性的前任国家相比，其人均收入水平相对来讲是低得多。原因是中国迄今依然是人口最多的国家，而经济持续快速地增长了30年。一个已颇为复杂的政策议程又加入了估算这个国家全球影响力的内容，大多数国家在这一阶段只需基本以国内为焦点。

　　中国需要平衡这些国内和国际优先事务，但它仅有很少的历史经验来指导应该怎样做。(印度将在大约10年后来面对这一问题，目前它还在持续快速增长中。)

　　国民平均收入达到约4000美元(对购买力进行调整这一数字将更高)，中国经济的重要组成部分已经是或正在进入一个中等收入国家的状态。这是一个困难的转折，在这个过程中，许多国家因结构转型停滞而丧失了动力。

　　例如，中国的劳动密集型出口行业正在失去其竞争优势，必须允许它们衰退或迁移到内陆(最终它们还是会衰退)，它们将被更多依赖于技术和人力资本的行业所取代。

　　在过渡期间，服务业毫无疑问地将继续增长；加工业上下游的高附加值行业和职能部门也有必蓬勃发展；全球性品牌应该开始出现，政府在企业的所有权将继续减少，公共部门的投资将转向教育和研发。

　　全球和国内的市场，而不是中国政府，将越来越多地推动这种转变。计划性行业将衰退，国内市场和不断壮大的中产阶级将表现更加突出，城市化的加速将推动公共领域投资。

　　在中国，家庭可支配收入约占中国国民收入的60%，家庭储蓄率接近可支配收入的30%。相比其他国家，前一数字较高后一数字较低。对于中国来讲，这样的状况使得消费量维持在国内生产总值的40-45%之间。要加强国内市场来推动收入的增长，加速中产阶级的增长，这些数字需要转变。

　　中国的家庭收入必须有所提高，且用于社会保障、保险和服务的储备金应更为充足，而预防性储蓄应当减少。通过扩大作为增长动力的国内市场，这两方面都将支持国家向中等收入国转变，并且在可预期的全球需求疲软时候维持经济的增长。

　　但最重要的是，快速增长的国内市场，尤其是服务行业，有必要基本上取代曾将农村人口拉入现代经济充当就业发动机的出口行业。随着出口行业转向高附加值行业，它将不再象过去那样提供如此有效的就业功能。

　　中国企业的多数投资一直来自留存收益而不是向家庭融资。政府继续拥有剩余国有企业的50%以上，但政府并不需要或不使用企业收入。这两个收入来源(公司和政府)的很大一部分必须重新定向到家庭。

　　高速增长和城市化导致城市地区的收入迅速上升，而农村地区的增幅较小。一大批移民劳工和家庭(150至200百万人)的正式居住地仍在农村，但事实上他们是权利和获得服务都受到限制的城市移民。由此而造成的社会紧张局势正在通过扩大农村服务、向城市基础设施和服务投资，以及农村移民的身份合法化等方式来解决。

　　中国在过去遇到了艰巨的挑战，基本上其表现一直胜过外界怀疑的预测。但是，现在中国也必须面对全球性压力和责任，部分原因是中国庞大的规模和影响。但是，中国也要面临这样一个外部环境：它偶尔会出现对这个国家政体的敌对，有时会高估或低估数百万脱离贫困迅速崛起的中国人；出现视全球经济为一场无赢家游戏的倾向性，错误地把中国的经济成就归因于汇率管制等某些不合作政策。

　　中国必须面对国内转型的挑战以维持经济增长，并主张自己有发展而不因其规模而受到处罚的权利。但是，中国也必须在全球性不平衡、经济、财政稳定和管理方面承担更大责任，同时要代表较弱小的发展中国家的利益。世界的其他国家会在这一复杂转型的结果中获得巨大利益。

　　新浪财经美国洛杉矶记者  段皎宇 供稿 李派 编译

　　以下是迈克尔-斯宾塞文章的英文原文。

　　China’s Next Mountain to Climb

　　China is entering a complex set of transitions that will lay the foundations for the advanced-country status that it hopes to reach in the next 25 years. After three decades of sustained growth and a remarkably successful policy response to the recent global crisis, Chinese self-confidence is soaring. But the lessons that the government may draw from the crisis may not be the best guides for the long term

　　China faces several parallel and related challenges that are crucial for its internal development as well as its global economic relations. Among these are:

　　● a major microeconomic restructuring of the economy to anchor the country’s emerging middle income country status;

　　● a macroeconomic shift to a higher level of household income and consumption and a more rapid expansion of the middle class;

　　● a reversal of the country’s now rising income inequality; lowering the very high savings level relative to investment and thus reducing the current-account surplus;

　　● reducing the energy and carbon intensity of future growth;

　　● assuming greater global responsibilities。

　　Indeed, China has arrived at a point where its impact on the global economy is systemically important. But it has reached this point at a much lower level of per capita income than any systemically important predecessor. The reason is that China is, by far, the most populous country to have sustained very rapid growth for 30 years. So reckoning with the country’s global impact has been added to an already complex policy agenda, at a point when most countries have the luxury of maintaining a largely domestic focus。

　　China needs to balance these domestic and international priorities, but it has very little historical experience to guide it. (India will take on this problem in about a decade, as it continues on its rapid-growth path。)

　　With a per capita income of around $4000 (more with purchasing power adjustments)， important parts of China’s economy are already, or are now entering, middle-income status. This is a difficult transition, during which many countries have lost momentum as structural transformations stall。

　　For example, China’s labor-intensive export sectors are losing their competitive edge. They must be allowed to decline or move inland (and eventually decline). They will be replaced by sectors that rely more on technology and human capital。

　　In this transition, services will undoubtedly grow. Higher value-added sectors and functions that are upstream and downstream from processing industries will also need to flourish. Global brands should start to appear, and government ownership of enterprises will continue to diminish. Public-sector investment will shift toward education and R&D。

　　Global and domestic markets, rather than China’s government, will increasingly drive this transition. Targeting of sectors will decline. The domestic market and a growing middle class will assume greater prominence. Urbanization will accelerate with supporting public-sector investment。

　　Household disposable income is about 60% of national income in China, and the household savings rate is close to 30% of disposable income. These numbers are low and high, respectively, compared to other countries. For China, this puts consumption in the range of 40-45% of GDP. To empower the domestic market to drive income growth, and to accelerate the growth of the middle class, these numbers need to shift。

　　Household income must rise, and, with more ample provision of social security, insurance, and services, precautionary savings should fall. Both will support the middle-income transition by expanding the domestic market as a driver of growth, and will help sustain growth in the face of prospectively weaker global demand。

　　But, most important, rapid growth of the domestic market, especially the service sector, needs to largely replace the export sector as the employment engine pulling the rural population into the modern economy. As the export sector moves into higher value-added sectors, it will no longer serve this function as effectively as it did in the past。

　　China ’s corporate sector has financed much of its investment out of retained earnings without having to raise capital from the household sector. The government continues to own more than 50% of remaining state-owned enterprises, but does not need or use the income. A big portion of these two income streams (corporate and government) needs to be redirected to the household sector。

　　High growth and urbanization have caused rapid rises in incomes in urban areas, with smaller increases in the rural areas. A large group of migrant workers and families (on the order of 150 to 200 million people) are formally still rural, but in fact are marginal urban residents with constrained rights and access to services. The resulting rise in social tensions is being addressed through expanded provision of rural services, investment in urban infrastructure and service provision, and regularization of migrants’ status。

　　China has faced daunting challenges in the past – and has generally outperformed the forecasts of skeptics. But now China must face global pressures and responsibilities as well. These partly reflect China’s sheer size and impact. But China also faces an external environment that is occasionally hostile to the country’s form of government; that sometimes overlooks or undervalues the rapid rise of millions of Chinese from poverty; that tends to view the global economy as a zero-sum game; and that mistakenly attributes China’s economic success to non-cooperative policies in areas like exchange-rate management。

　　China must confront the challenge of domestic restructuring to sustain growth, while asserting the right to develop without being penalized because of its size. But it must also assume greater responsibility for global imbalances, economic and financial stability, and governance, as well as represent the interests of less powerful developing countries. The rest of the world has a huge stake in the outcome of this complex balancing act。