A dragon of many colours

Oct 22nd 2009
From The Economist print edition

America will have to get along with China. But which China will it be?

“OUR policy has succeeded remarkably well: the dragon emerged and joined the world.” So said Robert Zoellick, then deputy secretary of state, in 2005, in a speech suffused with confidence in America’s ability to shape China’s progress. But, said Mr Zoellick, who is now president of the World Bank, China’s behaviour on the world stage left room for improvement: the country needed to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the global community.

This anodyne catchphrase helped to redefine the two countries’ relationship. It was, in effect, an admission that America could cohabit with a powerful China. Many in his audience of American businessmen in New York, however, felt uneasy. As Mr Zoellick recalls, they saw his remarks as “too harsh and demanding”. Had he delivered the same speech to the political elite in Washington, DC, he reckons, he might have been criticised for being too soft. But China, despite being a bit unsure at first how to translate the word “stakeholder” (a term for which a standard rendering in Chinese had yet to be found), quickly warmed to the new formulation.

It was not then obvious to Chinese officials that America really could accept the rise of China as it was, a one-party system controlled by communists. China saw the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the “colour revolutions” against authoritarian governments in former Soviet-block countries as evidence that America wanted to go it alone as a superpower and was bent on re-creating the world in its own image. The Chinese media accused America of instigating the pro-democracy movements in Georgia, Ukraine and on China’s doorstep in Kyrgyzstan. A young Chinese diplomat proudly told Mr Zoellick that he spent until 4 o’clock the next morning explaining the significance of the New York speech in a cable to Beijing. “The Chinese saw it as just about right,” says Mr Zoellick.

Mr Obama’s administration has made less use of the “responsible stakeholder” tag, but its strategy is clearly the same. Mr Obama and Mr Hu have agreed to forge what they call a “positive, co-operative and comprehensive relationship” (a step up, presumably, from what was previously dubbed a “candid, constructive and co-operative relationship”). Notwithstanding the tyre tariffs, Mr Obama can expect a warm reception in Beijing next month. China’s leaders see acceptance by America as a boost to their legitimacy at home.

Prepare for all eventualities

“We no longer have the luxury of not getting along with China,” John Podesta told a congressional committee in September. Mr Podesta was the head of Mr Obama’s transition team and now heads the Centre for American Progress, a think-tank close to the Obama White House. He said it was time to move beyond the past strategy of “engage and hedge” and adopt one that “maximises opportunity but also manages risk”. But American respect and goodwill, as this special report has argued, cannot be relied upon to ensure that relations remain on solid ground. And whether called hedging or managing risk, America has no choice but to prepare for the possibility that China might one day threaten American security.

The risk is not that China’s current leaders might one day discard their pragmatism and march into all-out conflict with America, whether in the economic or military sphere. It is rather the instability of China itself. So far the most disruptive influence on Sino-American relations has been public and political opinion in America. China’s bloody crackdown in Tiananmen Square in 1989 was hugely destabilising, but consistent with a time-honoured approach to political threats.

What do the Chinese think?

Increasingly, however, public opinion in China will play a role as well. Chinese censors ensure that criticisms of the Communist Party quickly disappear from the internet, but xenophobic opinions are usually left untouched. The internet magnifies nationalist sentiment in China, sometimes even putting the government on the back foot. Such sentiment is invariably hostile to America.

Elite-level politics is another worrying factor. Over the past 30 years leadership changes in China have had remarkably little effect on the relationship between the two countries, but there have been occasional deviations. The Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96 erupted at a time of heightened political uncertainty in China, with Deng Xiaoping’s health fading and his relatively inexperienced successor, Jiang Zemin, trying to burnish his credentials. The spy-plane crisis of 2001, which resulted in a tense stand-off as China detained 24 American crewmen for 11 days, broke close to a period of leadership transition.

China’s preparations for another change at the top in 2012 and 2013 appear to be in hand, but America would be wise to be cautious. The workings of China’s leadership remain as much of a mystery to outsiders as they were when China and America established diplomatic relations in 1979, if not more so. Mr Hu is more cautious in his meetings with foreigners than his predecessors were (which may be a blessing for Mr Obama, probably safe from Mr Jiang’s predilection for bursting into song). Leaks from politburo-level deliberations, few and far between at the best of times, are now almost unheard of.

Vice-President Xi Jinping looks the most likely man to take over, with Li Keqiang as his prime minister. Mr Xi is a “princeling”, as the descendants of communist China’s revolutionary founders are often called. As the party chief of Zhejiang Province from 2003 to 2007 he promoted greater openness in grassroots government. But in February a widely circulated video clip of Mr Xi accusing “well-fed foreigners with nothing better to do” of interfering in China’s affairs suggested that he might incline towards nationalist crowd-pleasing. And the succession is still not certain. Party leaders meeting in Beijing in September failed to announce Mr Xi’s widely expected promotion as deputy commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He currently has no military post.

It is reasonable to think that China may well get richer yet stay authoritarian, at least for the next 10-20 years. But there are two other scenarios that are worth thinking about. One is that China might in fact become more democratic. A politically more liberal China would put enormous strains on the multi-ethnic empire that China’s communists inherited from imperial times. Minorities across the Tibetan plateau and in Xinjiang would step up demands for greater autonomy. That, in turn, would jeopardise either China’s democratic development or the unity of the state. And a more democratic China would be unlikely to countenance the permanent separation of Taiwan. It might even pursue irredentist claims more aggressively.

The other possibility is that China might be convulsed by the same kind of tumult that occurred in much of the rest of the communist world two decades ago. This would be a nightmare for America. In such a scenario, the conservative and inward-looking armed forces would play a critical role. As President Clinton put it in 1999, “as we focus on the potential challenge that a strong China could present to the United States in the future, let us not forget the risk of a weak China, beset by internal conflict, social dislocation and criminal activity; becoming a vast zone of instability in Asia.” Ten years and much economic growth later, his words are still worth heeding.

The threat posed by China is not (yet, anyway) one of military expansion but one of great new uncertainty looming over the global order. Mr Obama will need to keep reminding China that America would be irresponsible not to prepare for the worst even as it hopes for the best. Chinese leaders would be wise to be just as cautious about their own future.

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