中国终结美元地位为时尚早-神马文学网

中国正采取攻势。北京长期以来一直是国际经济事务的旁观者，最近几周却宣布了一系列改造全球金融体系的举措。所有这些举措都只有一个目标：终结美元的霸主地位。

上月中国表示，希望最终看到美元的主要全球储备货币地位，被一篮子重要的货币和大宗商品取代。中国央行行长周小川称，当前以美元为基础的体系，过于容易受到金融危机的攻击。

中国已经与阿根廷、韩国、印尼、马来西亚和白俄罗斯等国央行签订了一系列货币互换协议，允许这些国家用完外汇后，可以使用人民币进行结算。

上周的举措牵涉到贸易。中国和巴西开始就使用人民币和雷亚尔（而不是美元）结算的双边贸易方案展开谈判。北京发现巴西政府是一个乐于合作的合作伙伴。巴西一方面在国内实施保守的经济政策，另一方面在国外摆出世界主义者的姿态。

情况不会迅速发生巨大变化。美元地位是强大的经济现实的结果，而不是一屋子官僚所决定的。但中国正埋下一些重要的长期伏笔。突然之间，国际金融安排的干巴巴场面，变得充斥着经济力量从西方向东方转移的象征。

中国或许无懈可击地谈论着多边主义，但目标是提高其在国际经济事务中的地位，并限制美国行动的空间。

然而，对于中国对美元主导地位的攻击，奇怪之处在于，这在多大程度上是受到短期国内政治的推动。在这一过程中，有关中国增长模式及其未来角色的真正重要的问题正被搁置一边。

中国国内一直对政府持有的两万亿美元外汇储备——其中约70%投资于美国政府债券——颇有微词。

越来越多的人开始追问，为什么一个仍旧贫穷的国家借给一个富国那么多钱？——尤其是在官员们不断警告美元可能暴跌的情况下。中国政府还对关于其庞大外汇储备加剧全球金融市场流动性泛滥的言论表示愤怒。

其中的一些愤怒是可以理解的——谁不认为危机的核心是美国的挥霍无度？不过，中国持有的巨大美元头寸，在部分程度上是自己酿成的苦果。

如果近几年人民币更快速地升值，中国经济或许不会经历如此涡轮增压式的增长，但另一方面中国外汇储备也不会如此迅速地爆炸式增长，十分需要的向内需拉动型增长转变，也将更为深入。

中国政府批评美国不负责任的行为很容易，但只要中国拥有占国内生产总值(GDP)8%-9%的经常账户盈余，总账另一边的某国就必须运行巨大的经常账户赤字。

如果中国希望其货币在国际上发挥更大的作用，它还将不得不进行其它的艰难转变。首先，人民币还未能完全自由兑换，资金进出中国仍有一系列限制。在美元更容易交易和对冲的时候，巴西出口至中国的商人，为什么会选择接受人民币付款？

如果中国能够用自己的货币向海外放贷——比如借给美国——中国的国际影响力也会加强。但在中国出现一个深厚、开放的债券市场，由市场而不是政府确定利率之前，人们对这种人民币资产的需求有限。

中国有许多理由对这种调整保持谨慎——毕竟，金融危机不太可能让北京对取消资本管制更感到舒适。

但如果中国确实希望提升人民币地位，减少美国经济单边主义的空间，就需要应对这些问题——而不是签署在双边贸易中使用人民币结算的没有真正作用的协议。

BEIJING HAS A LONG WAY TO GO BEFORE IT CAN DISLODGE DOLLAR

China is on the offensive. Long a bystander in international economic affairs, Beijing has in recent weeks announced a string of initiatives for remoulding the global financial system. And they all have one target – knocking the US dollar off its perch.

Last month, China said it hoped eventually to see the US dollar replaced as the main global reserve currency by a basket of significant currencies and commodities. Zhou Xiaochuan, head of the central bank, argued that the current dollar-based system was too vulnerable to financial crises.

China has set up a series of swap arrangements with other central banks, including Argentina, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Belarus, through which it will make its currency available to the other countries if they run out of foreign exchange.

This week's initiative involves trade. China and Brazil are to begin talks on a scheme for bilateral trade to be settled in the renminbi and the real, rather than the dollar. Beijing has found a willing partner in the Brazilian government, which mixes conservatism in economic policy at home with developing worldist flourishes abroad.

Big changes will not happen quickly. The dollar's position is the result of powerful economic realities, not the decision of a room full of bureaucrats. But China is putting down some important long-term markers and all of a sudden, the dry arena of international financial arrangements has become loaded with the symbolism of economic power shifting from west to east.

China's language may be impeccably multilateral but the goal is to boost its position in international economic affairs and limit space for the US to do its own thing.

Yet the curious thing about China's attacks on the dominance of the dollar is just how much they are motivated by short-term, domestic politics. And in the process, the really important questions about China's growth model and its future role are being pushed to one side.

The government has been stung by domestic criticism of its $2,000bn (€1,440bn, £1,250bn) in foreign exchange reserves, about 70 per cent of which are invested in US government securities.

Why is a country that is still poor, people are increasingly asking, lending so much money to a rich country – especially when officials warn constantly about a possible slump in the dollar. Beijing has also reacted angrily to anyone who suggests its huge build-up in foreign currency reserves contributed to the orgy of liquidity in global financial markets.

Some of the outrage is understandable – who does not believe that profligacy in the US was at the heart of the crisis? Yet China's huge exposure to the dollar is partly a trap of its own making.

If the Chinese currency had appreciated more rapidly in recent years, the economy might not have experienced such turbo-charged growth rates, but its reserves would not have exploded so quickly and the much-needed shift to domestic demand would be more advanced.

It is all very well for Beijing to criticise irresponsible behaviour in the US, but for China to run a current account surplus of 8-9 per cent of gross domestic product, someone on the other side of the ledger must be running big deficits.

If China wants a bigger international role for its currency, it will have to make other difficult shifts. For a start, the renminbi is not yet fully convertible and there are still a battery of restrictions on bringing funds in and out of the country. Why would a Brazilian exporter to China choose to be paid in renminbi, when the dollar is so much easier to trade and hedge against?

China's international leverage would also be enhanced if it could lend money overseas in its own currency– to the US, for instance. But until China has a deep and open bond market where interest rates are set by the market and not the government, there will be only limited takers for such renminbi assets.

There are plenty of reasons for China to be cautious about such changes – after all, the financial crisis is unlikely to have made Beijing more comfortable about lifting its capital controls.

But if China really does want to promote the renminbi and reduce the space for US economic unilateralism, it is these questions – and not toothless agreements about using the renminbi for bilateral trade – that it needs to address.