欧洲议会主席称未考虑承认中国市场经济地位

2010年05月28日08:22　来源：
中国日报网消息 英文《中国日报》5月28日报道:正在北京访问的欧洲议会主席布泽克（Jerzy Buzek）星期四在接受中国日报专访时表示欧盟仍未考虑承认中国的市场经济地位。
布泽克作出这番表态之时,正值美国表示将承认中国的市场经济地位后两天。本月25日,当中美第二轮战略与经济对话在北京闭幕的时候,美方表示将通过中美商贸联委会,以一种合作的方式迅速认可中国市场经济地位。
而布泽克在采访时则说中国还没有“达到欧盟的认定市场经济的标准”,即中国还没有“施行（implement）”一些法律法规。
他在说这番话后,便立刻提及到于1976年生效的联合国《公民权利与政治权利国际公约》。该公约的序言说:“本公约缔约各国,考虑到按照联合国宪章所宣布的原则,对人类家庭所有成员的固有尊严及其平等的和不移的权利的承认,乃是世界自由、正义与和平的基础。”
中国政府虽然于1998年签署了该公约,但并没有在国内执行它。因为联合国政治权利公约属于国际法,中国一旦批准这个公约后,就会面临着作为国际法的国际人权公约中国国内法的关系问题。
而布泽克则在采访中呼吁中国尽快批准并执行该公约。
对此番言论,中国学者认为将中国的市场经济地位与该公约挂钩是站不住脚的。
中国政法大学欧盟法专家张彤认为欧盟对市场经济的判断虽然有自己的评判标准,“但不一定合理”。
张彤介绍到,欧盟对判定市场经济颁布了五个标准,简单地说包括企业自主权,政府干预程度,劳资谈判自由度,汇率兑换自由度等。
事实上2001年,国内学者李晓西曾经按照美国的市场经济判定标准对中国做过市场化测评,最后得出的数字是中国的市场化程度已经达到69%,可以说已经取得了初步市场化的成果。2005年,再次做同样的测评师,这个数字达到78%。
张彤说在同样标准下欧盟曾对俄罗斯和中国做过测评,按照测评结果,俄罗斯的市场化程度低于中国。然而,2002年6月美国承认了俄罗斯的市场经济地位,紧接着,同年欧盟便也承认了俄罗斯的市场经济地位。“这里面恐怕还是受到西方所谓'行动一致’的影响。”
《欧洲联盟基础条约政策》里规定了成员国对基本价值的认同和推广责任。不光是经济方面,也在政治条件。欧盟认可有序竞争的市场经济,公正自由的司法裁决体系,以及民主自由的政治环境。
对于不承认中国市场经济地位,张彤认为欧盟其实“是在用自己的价值观来衡量其他国家,并希望其他国家也能够认同并推广他们的价值观”。
欧盟讨论设置“西藏特使”
除了不承认中国市场经济地位之外,布泽克主席在采访中也向记者坦言中国和欧盟之间还存在诸多问题和分歧,特别是在“少数民族权利与公民权利”方面。
例如,西藏便是布泽克、乃至整个欧洲议会眼中中国的“少数民族问题”。他还向记者透露,欧盟议会内部正在讨论设立“西藏问题特使”。
他认为这是欧盟内一个“期待(expectation)”。
欧洲议会干涉中国西藏问题的历史由来已久。
从欧洲议会档案显示,从2000年开始,该议会每年都至少会做出一次涉藏决议。谋求设立西藏问题特使也不是什么新鲜事。2008年4月10日,议会通过决议,要求欧盟理事会任命一名西藏问题特使,以“协助有关各方的对话和谈判”。
其实除了西藏问题,欧洲议会在过去几年也屡屡在人权方面上触犯中国的利益。在欧盟三大机构（同时包括欧盟理事会和欧洲委员会）中,曾经有媒体将欧洲议会称作“最反华”的机构。
可是布泽克对这种说话断然否认。“完全不对。我们并不反华,”布泽克说,并称其此次访华的主要目的就是在全球危机和挑战日益增强的时候加强欧盟和中国的合作。只是“少数民族问题在我们的观念中非常重要”,他如是说,并称欧盟尊重中国的主权和领土完整。
对于设立所谓的“西藏特使”的说法,中国人民大学的欧洲问题专家房乐宪认为中国政府“不能答应”,并且要“保持警惕”。
房乐宪说中国应该通过各种渠道告诉欧洲,西藏关乎中国内政,是中国的核心利益,不能“国际化”。
同时,他还说如果欧盟设立西藏问题特使,还有可能产生连锁反应,使更多的西方国家模仿。
作者：kbbk　回复日期：2010-05-29　02:58:41
China is in crisis, not in the ascendant----Will hutton
Reviews for Jacques's 《when china rules the world》
From "The Observer"
Martin Jacques partially acknowledges that economic problems exist even as he breathlessly rehearses the economically impossible extrapolations of China's recent growth far into the future. His intellectual difficulty is that he needs to make the grandiose claim that China will rule the world to drive home his interesting thesis that western-defined modernity - the belief in the marriage of democracy, Enlightenment values, capitalism and progress - is about to be contested seriously for the first time by a non-western power.
China is not a nation state, he writes, but a civilisation state. As such, it cannot make accommodations with others as it rises. It will be condemned to be true to its past; rather than submit to multilateral law and institutions, it will "feel free to be what it thinks it is and act accordingly to its history and instincts which are those of a civilisation state".
Historically, China has regarded itself as being at the centre of the world and has sought tribute from others as acknowledgement of its inherent superiority, a racism that is embedded in the Chinese psyche, Jacques argues provocatively. Its instincts remain essentially Confucian: a strong central state seeking benevolently and collectively to improve the condition of the people. Communism is a contemporary expression of Confucianism.
This is the most eyecatching part of what is in essence another of the Beware China is coming, Asian values are superior books. However, the affinity between Confucianism and communism is hardly a new insight. Liu Shaoqi, one of the party's five leaders in the 1940s, drew a parallel between the self-discipline and self-cultivation needed to be a Confucian scholar and becoming an effective communist. Where Jacques scores is in arguing that it is Chinese civilisation, rather than the Communist party, that will drive China.
Yet the more I reflect on the idea of a civilisation state standing in tension with a conventional nation state, the less am I persuaded the distinction holds. Britain, France, Germany and the US are also civilisation states, defined as much by their different cultures and histories as their jurisdictional boundaries, languages and national assemblies. All in varying ways are creatures of the European Enlightenment; all can trace core values to republican Rome and the philosophers of Greece.
Western states frequently do not meet their own standards any more than China does. But I agree with Rousseau, Kant and Paine that all human beings have a sense of self and are thus worthy of equal respect as individuals, as I agree with Aristotle and Plato about the importance of due desert underpinning justice. There is a universal hunger for these values which does not stop at China's borders because of some mystical adherence to Asian values. We all want to live lives we have reason to value - whether we are Chinese or Britain.
Indeed, the processes thrown up by the western tradition - the rule of law, the drive to experiment and innovate, the prevalence of free argument and exchange of ideas - also drive successful, long-term economic performance. China can approach the frontier of technological knowledge developed by others, but it has a limited capacity to get beyond it. It is deeply corrupt, deeply uninnovative, deeply environmentally wasteful and these deformations can be traced back to its lack of institutions rooted in Enlightenment values. China has no checks and balances; it needs them.
The great reforming revolutionary Sun Yat-Sen wanted them for China; the Tiananmen protesters in Beijing and other cities across China risked their lives for them; Charter 08, instigated by more than 300 Chinese intellectuals last December, campaigns for them; and the Chinese in Taiwan have succeeded partially in implanting them. Jacques's argument implies that Chinese workers don't want representation at work, nor Chinese shareholders any influence on company managements, nor Chinese citizens to hold their government to account. It is profoundly mistaken. The majority do want these things and the fact they don't have them holds China back.
China cannot build its economy for ever on a savings rate of 40 per cent of GDP, or exports growing at such a rate that by 2020 they will constitute half of the world's merchandise exports. The model is cracking because it must. China must save less and consume more, as Jacques acknowledges.
But it will not make the transition without political change. The Chinese save because they do not trust the future. They know the Communist party's grip is unsustainable. The real story of the next generation will be of the west drawing ahead of a China facing political turmoil and increasing economic difficulties. The problem we will have to manage is not China ruling the world. It will be of bridging the already high and growing gap between the west and the rest. Martin Jacques's extensive research is marred by the book's central thesis. He is too suspicious of the west to offer real insight into the future.