以史为鉴,应对失衡

来源:百度文库 编辑:神马文学网 时间:2024/03/29 18:31:52
以史为鉴,应对失衡 History lessons for a world out of balance约翰•普伦德 

 

The prevailing rhetoric about currency wars smacks of the 1930s, when a sauve qui peut mentality marred international monetary relations. What are the lessons of that beggar-thy-neighbour period for Group of 20 policymakers meeting at a time of renewed uncertainty in sovereign debt markets?

当前,“货币战争论”甚嚣尘上,这有点像上世纪30年代的局势,当时盛行的“人人为己”的心态,破坏了国际货币关系。在主权债务市场重现不确定性之际,那段“以邻为壑”的时期能给20国集团(G20)的政策制定者提供什么教训呢?

While the world has so far avoided the extreme loss of output experienced in the Great Depression, history suggests, among other things, that competitive devaluations and capital controls are the inevitable consequence of surplus countries failing to take any responsibility for global payments imbalances.

虽说全球经济到目前为止未曾出现“大萧条”时期那种产出暴减的局面,但历史表明,若盈余国家未能为全球收支失衡承担相应责任,必然会导致竞争性货币贬值和资本管制。

The 1930s gold standard was a fixed exchange rate system in which deficit countries were required to adjust by way of deflation rather than devaluation. Surplus countries, in contrast, incurred no penalty for accumulating gold. The chief surplus countries were the US and France, while counterpart deficits were run by countries such as the UK, Germany and Italy.

上世纪30年代实行的“金本位制”是一种固定汇率制度,赤字国家必须通过通缩、而非汇率贬值的方式进行调整。相形之下,盈余国家却没有为积累黄金而受到任何惩罚。当时主要盈余国家是美国和法国,对应的赤字国家则是英国、德国和意大利。

Come the Depression, the US and French failure to adopt expansionist policies forced deficit countries to contract. The contraction was exacerbated by surplus countries’ refusal to offer emergency financial help when banks failed. Britain went off the gold standard in September 1931, while Germany saw Hitler’s rise to power.

“大萧条”来临时,美国和法国未能采取扩张性政策,迫使赤字国家经济收缩。而当银行纷纷倒闭时,盈余国家拒绝提供紧急财务援助,更是加剧了萎缩状况。英国于1931年9月脱离金本位制,而德国则迎来希特勒上台。

Barry Eichengreen, a leading expert on the gold standard, argues that far from being the stabilising influence it was perceived to be, the gold standard was itself the main threat to financial stability and prosperity between the wars. While World Bank president Robert Zoellick, in his call on this page for gold to be given a new role in the monetary system, was not advocating a return to the gold standard as such, Mr Eichengreen’s verdict suggests even a move to use gold as a reference point could be risky.

著名金本位制专家巴里•埃森格林(Barry Eichengreen)认为,金本位制非但不具有人们所认为的稳定作用,反而本身就是和平时期财政稳定与经济繁荣的最大威胁。世界银行(World Bank)行长罗伯特•佐立克(Robert Zoellick)在英国《金融时报》上撰文呼吁在国际货币体系中赋予黄金新的角色,虽然他并不是在提倡原原本本地重新推行金本位制,但埃森格林的结论表明,即使只是以黄金作为参考基准也可能很危险。

Another important lesson was that deficit countries outperformed surplus countries. This was because abandoning the gold standard liberated them to pursue expansionary policies; and the sooner this happened the better. Britain’s real growth in gross domestic product averaged 3.1 per cent from 1931 to 1938, whereas France, which stuck to the gold bloc until 1936, showed minus 1.6 per cent over the same period.

另一个重要历史教训是,赤字国家表现胜过盈余国家。原因在于,放弃金本位制使它们得以自由推行扩张性政策;而且越早推行扩张政策效果越好。1931-1938年期间,英国实际国内生产总值(GDP)年均增长3.1%,而直到1936年仍坚持金本位制的法国同期年均增长率为负1.6%。

Yet for eurozone countries such as Greece, this lesson is tantalising because the European monetary union is a much tougher discipline than the gold standard, with no provision for exit from the single currency. Greece and other southern European countries that run counterpart deficits to Germany’s surplus are now being forced to deflate, while Germany resolutely places the burden of adjustment on southern Europe. External devaluation is ruled out, while internal devaluation, in Greece’s case, cannot include a debt write-down until the European Union works out how to implement last month’s vague agreement to change the rules of the monetary union. The irony is that Greece is in a position similar to that of Germany in the early 1930s, where cutting costs makes the debt load heavier.

然而,对希腊之类的欧元区国家来说,上述经验教训不过是使人干着急,因为欧洲货币联盟的纪律比金本位制严得多,并无退出单一货币体系的途径。对应德国的盈余而背负赤字的希腊及其它南欧国家,如今正被迫陷于通缩之中,而德国则坚决地把调整的担子放在南欧肩上。外部贬值不可行,而内部贬值,就希腊的情况来说,在欧盟确定如何落实上月通过的有关修订货币联盟规则的含糊其辞的协议之前,不能包括债务减值方法。讽刺的是,希腊当前处境,竟与30年代初的德国相类似。在这种处境下,削减成本将加重债务负担。

The lessons of the 1930s are also relevant to the Chinese currency peg to the dollar. In the early 1930s China was on a silver standard. This had been in use since the country’s experiment with paper currency collapsed as a result of inflation and civil war in the late 14th century. When the US Treasury moved in 1934 to help American silver producers by buying silver to boost the price, China’s currency rose in value, leading to an outflow of silver and savage domestic deflation.

30年代的教训对人民币盯住美元的汇率制度也有借鉴意义。中国在30年代初实行的是“银本位制”。自从14世纪末纸币发行尝试由于通胀和内战的关系而失败后,中国就一直实行这种汇率机制。到1934年,由于美国财政部通过购买白银,帮助本国白银生产商抬高银价,中国货币出现升值,导致白银外流,国内陷入严重通缩。

China went off silver in 1935. Its new paper currency then became the vehicle for one of history’s greatest hyperinflations as the country struggled to finance the war with Japan. The monthly inflation rate at its peak reached 2,178 per cent. This paved the way for the communist takeover. While most western economists believe an appreciation of the renminbi would be in China’s interest, some cite this precedent to suggest external pressure for currency appreciation can be destabilising. Steve Hanke of Johns Hopkins University even argues that if Beijing caves in to demands on the renmimbi, a Chinese upheaval and a world disaster will ensue.

中国于1935年放弃银本位制。其后,由于难以筹措应对中日战争的经费,中国新发行的纸币成为历史上最严重恶性通胀之一的载体。单月通胀率最高达到2178%。这为中共上台铺平了道路。虽然大多数西方经济学家都认为人民币升值符合中国利益,但也有一些人士指出,上述例子说明外部升值压力可能具有破坏稳定的后果。约翰斯-霍普金斯大学(Johns Hopkins University)的史蒂夫•汉克(Steve Hanke)甚至认为,假如北京屈服于人民币升值压力,那么中国必将出现动荡,而世界将陷入灾难。

China was not helped, incidentally, by its lack of exchange controls when its currency was under pressure. Yet the 1930s experience of capital controls, now back in vogue, suggests they are not always effective. Such was the degree of regulatory arbitrage and smuggling in foreign exchange that Germany and Italy introduced the death penalty for violations.

顺便说一句,在本币承受压力之际,汇率管制缺位对中国并无益处。但30年代实行汇率管制(如今再度盛行)的经验,说明此类措施并不总是管用。当时由于监管套利和走私外汇现象严重,德国和意大利甚至将违法者判处死刑。

A final lesson concerns the failure of the 1933 London World Economic Conference to address the Depression. Mr Eichengreen argues that the inability to find a co-operative response stemmed from the lack of a shared diagnosis. That resonates across the decades. Expectations of Seoul should not be pitched too high.

最后一个教训与1933年的“伦敦世界经济会议”未能有力应对“大萧条”有关。埃森格林认为,那次会议之所以未能形成协作应对方案,根源就在于各方对大萧条的起因未能达成共识。几十年后,这种见解引起诸多共鸣。我们不应对这次首尔峰会抱太高期望。

The writer is an FT columnist

本文作者是英国《金融时报》专栏作家

 

译者/杨远