美国防部发布2010中国军事与安全年度报告

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当地时间16日下午，美国五角大楼发布推迟5个月之久的《中国2010年军事与安全发展报告》。这项报告称，在军事透明度方面，中国有了一些进步，但还远远不够。报告说，中国海军拥有强有力的水面舰只和潜水艇，并正在努力在1998年从乌克兰购买的航空母舰上打造海军航空兵力量。中国可能于今年开始建造本国生产的航空母舰。
美五角大楼报告称中国可能于今年建造航空母舰
2010年08月17日 07:56:30 　来源：新华军事

8月9日，中国海军护航编队中的“广州”舰抵达希腊的比雷埃夫斯港。新华社记者刘春晖摄
8月16日下午，美国五角大楼公布了向国会提交的题为《与中华人民共和国有关的军事与安全发展》报告。根据美国2000财政年度国防授权法的规定，五角大楼需自那以后的20年每年向国会提交与中国军力有关的报告。与往年相比，今年五角大楼的这一报告标题便有了微妙的变化。
这项报告称，在军事透明度方面，中国有了一些进步，但还远远不够。中国决定中止与美国的军事交流有损美中两国利益。
这一报告认为，中国正在发展成为一个经济超级大国，这一增长使得中国政府更多地投资于军力。中国极力实现军事现代化，并转变军力结构、军事学说和军事战略。
报告说，在过去十年间，中国加快了转变的步伐，其军力已发展到足以影响其境外所发生的事件。中国军队现在可以为国际维和努力、人道主义援助和反海盗行动做出贡献。美国对此表示欢迎，并愿意与中方在这些领域发展进一步的合作。
报告说，然而，中国军队其他方面的能力增长更加令人感到不安。中国正在投资发展迫使美国海、空军更加远离中国海岸的反接近技术，并已部署大量短、中程导弹和巡航导弹。
报告说，中国海军拥有强有力的水面舰只和潜水艇，并正在努力在1998年从乌克兰购买的航空母舰上打造海军航空兵力量。中国可能于今年开始建造本国生产的航空母舰。
报告说，中国军队有着125万人的地面部队，现正在以新的坦克、火炮和装甲运兵车等进行装备升级。此外，中国陆军还在着力增强指挥、控制、地空联合协调和突击能力。
报告说，中国还在建设空间和网络力量，中国仍在建造和发射间谍卫星。但报告承认，中国的网络攻击能力至今仍是一个谜。报告称，2009年，全球多个计算机系统，包括美国政府的计算机系统，继续成为看起来是来自中国的网络侵入的目标，以获取军事和商业信息。这些侵入计算机系统所需的方法和技能与发动对计算机网络进行攻击所需的方法与技能类似。
报告称，因为在中国以外，没有人能真正了解中国军力增长止于何处，中国对其军力转变目标的透明将使其所在地区国家和全球伙伴感到放心。此外，中国军力和安全事务的有限透明将增加不确定性，增加潜在误解和误判的可能。
美国总统奥巴马说，他理解美中之间有时会有着困难的关系，但美中两国“必定是敌手的概念并非命定”。报告说，美中间可持续、可靠的军事关系有助于减少不信任，增强相互理解，进而扩大合作领域。（人民网华盛顿8月16日电 记者 温宪）
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DoD Releases Annual Report On China’s Military Modernization

DoD finally released its annual report to Congress on the little that’s known about the Chinese military today and like previous reports its largely an exercise in bean counting. It points to the “limited transparency” and “many uncertainties” regarding China’s military modernization and acknowledges that due to a paucity of sources, studying China’s military strategy is an “inexact science.” Since the report is mandated by Congress, its authors go ahead and “make some generalizations.”
With those significant caveats in mind, I’m going to make some quick generalizations of my own about the report, titled “Military and Security Developments in the People’s Republic of China,” and provide additional analysis as I get a chance to read it more thoroughly as there’s a lot to digest.
First off, what is China’s military/security strategy? “China’s current strategy remains one of managing the external environment to ensure conditions are conducive to its own economic development,” the report says. There are internal debates, particularly in Chinese academic circles, on the best way to go about that, the report says. Some argue for a play it cool approach while others urge Chinese policymakers to be more aggressive on the world stage.
What is certain: China’s voracious raw material consumption is forcing the country to focus on securing its sea-lines of communication–up to 40% of crude oil destined for China transits the Straits of Hormuz and 80% transited the Straits of Malacca. While one eye focuses on the SLOCs, the other remains fixed on Taiwan, the PLA’s primary mission, the report says; although there is the occasional glance at U.S. carrier battle groups steaming around WestPac.
The report’s authors put Chinese military spending at $150 billion in 2009; in percentage terms, increases in Chinese military spending have closely tracked China’s GDP growth. Unlike the Cold War era Soviet Union, China is not bankrupting itself through huge defense expenditures.
The report points up China’s lack of operational experience, “the PLA remains untested in modern combat.” That absence of combat experience may explain some of the lack of sophistication in China’s doctrine and strategy vice what was seen in Soviet military doctrine during Cold War days (the Soviets had a very rich and innovative doctrinal heritage upon which to draw).
“China’s civilian leaders must rely upon the advice of commanders lacking direct experience in modern combat or upon “scientific” combat models divorced from the realities of the modern battlefield… Despite significant improvements, the PLA continues to face deficiencies in inter-service cooperation and actual experience in joint exercises and combat operations. Recognizing these shortcomings, China’s leaders continue to stress asymmetric strategies to leverage China’s advantages while exploiting the perceived vulnerabilities of potential opponents.”
Chinese military doctrine and strategy is still heavy influenced by 1991’s Desert Storm, the report says, which implies that the revolution in military affairs (RMA) line of thinking is a major driver. That certainly jibes with the PLA’s heavy investment in long-range precision strike. China is amassing a formidable guided missile arsenal with much of it aimed at Taiwan, although Beijing is looking beyond that scenario as it builds out its military.
– Greg Grant